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Abstract
With the emergence of smart devices and data-driven applications, personal data are being
dramatically generated, gathered and used by modern systems for data analytics in a wide
range of customised service applications. Despite the advantages of data analytics, potential
risks arise that allow adversaries to infer individuals’ private information by using some
auxiliary information. Therefore, it is crucial to develop new methods and techniques for
privacy-preserving data analytics that ensure acceptable trade-offs between privacy and
utility.
Over the last decade, differential privacy (DP) has been viewed as a promising notion of
privacy because it mathematically bounds the trade-off between privacy and utility against
adversaries’ strong inference attacks (n 1 out of n items in the input). By exploring the
latest results of differentially private data analytics, this thesis concentrates on four sub-topics:
differentially private data aggregation with security guarantees, privacy budget guarantees
in distributed systems, differentially private single-path publishing and differentially private
k-means clustering.
For differentially private data aggregation with security guarantees, we propose a two-
layer data aggregation approach against semi-honest but colluding data aggregators, where
DP noise is randomly injected. We address the problems of the collusion of data curators and
data aggregators. The key idea of our approach is injecting DP noise randomly to prevent
privacy disclosure from collusion, while maintaining a high degree of utility and splitting
and sharing data pieces to guarantee security. The experimental evaluations over synthetic
x
datasets confirm our mathematical analysis results and show that our approach achieves
enhanced aggregation utility.
For privacy budget guarantees in distributed systems, we study the parallel composition
of privacy budget in differentially private data aggregation scenarios. We propose a new
lower bound of the parallel composition of privacy budgets. We address two problems of
the state-of-the-art: poor utility when using global sensitivity for both data curators and
data aggregators and unknown privacy guarantees with conditions on the local sensitivities
between data curators and data aggregators. The key is taking a property of the summation
function: the local sensitivity of summation for a dataset is equal to the maximum summation
of any sub-dataset. The experimental results over a real-life dataset support our theoretical
results of the proposed lower bound of the unconditional parallel composition of privacy
budget.
For differentially private single-path publishing, we propose a graph-based single-path
publishing approach with DP guarantees. We address two problems in existing work:
information loss regarding the exact path for genuine users and no privacy guarantees for
edges when adversaries have information about all vertices, yet one edge is missing. The main
idea is adding fake vertices and edges into the real path by DP, and then hiding connections
in the perturbed path in the topology of the published graph so that only the trusted path users
with full knowledge about the map can recover the real path. The experimental evaluations
of synthetic datasets corroborate the theoretical properties of our approach.
For differentially private k-means clustering, we propose a convergent differentially
private k-means algorithm that addresses the non-convergence problem of existing work. The
key idea is that, at each iteration, we sample a centroid for the next iteration from a specially
defined area in each cluster with a selected orientation to guarantee both convergence and
convergence rates. Such an orientation is determined by either past centroid movements or
past plus future centroid movements. Both mathematical and experimental evaluations show
xi
that, because of the convergence, our approach achieves enhanced clustering quality over the
state-of-the-art of DP k-means clustering, while having the same DP guarantees.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Privacy is a fundamental human right [109]. Achieving acceptable trade-offs between data
utility and data privacy is a continuous research challenge for data analytics. This thesis
studies highly utilised privacy-preserving solutions to some computing tasks of data analytics,
including data aggregation/collection, data publishing/sharing and data mining/machine
learning.
In this chapter, we first briefly introduce the research background of this thesis, including
the overview of non-private data analytics, privacy issues of the non-private data analytics and
the privacy-preserving techniques (the notion of privacy) used in this thesis. Afterwards, we
state the research scope of this thesis, discuss the research challenges of the state-of-the-art
and summarise our contributions.
1.1 Research Background
1.1.1 Brief Overview of Data Analytics
Over the last decade, data, especially personal data, have been explosively produced, collected
and consumed because of the proliferation of smart devices and the Internet of Things (IoT). It
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has been reported that, by 2020, there will be about 40 zettabytes of data in the world [67, 30].
Based on the latest maximum download speed of Australia’s National Broadband Network
(NBN), say 60 Mbps [111], it would take around 170 million years to download these data.
Note that 170 million years ago was the Jurassic Period.
It is commonly accepted that such a data explosion has been caused by the emergence
of data-driven applications. By taking advantage of insights learnt from customers’ data,
data-driven applications can offer significant financial benefits to businesses and convenient
personalised services to customers. For example, modern recommender systems of online
shopping (e.g., Amazon), social networks (e.g., Facebook) and streaming music/video
providers (e.g., Spotify and YouTube) collect and analyse customers’ profile information
and visit records every single minute to provide reliable and personalised suggestions for
customers and their potential interests [29].
To gain insights from customers’ raw data, there are many computing tasks in the pro-
cess of data analytics. In this thesis, we focus on three key computing components: data
aggregation/collection, data publishing/sharing and data mining/machine learning [169].
Specifically, data aggregation/collection component gathers raw data from distributed data
curators/contributors, such as customers of recommender systems or smart electricity me-
ters [146, 15]. Data publishers broadcast the data (without explicit identifiers of an individual)
to authorised organisations and/or persons wishing to further study the data. Data publish-
ing/sharing may occur without provision of secure channels or data encryption [46]. Finally,
suitable data mining/machine learning algorithms, according to the computing tasks, gain
knowledge from the collected data.
1.1.2 Privacy Disclosure against Data Analytics
Despite the potential benefits and insights attained by such a data analytics process,
privacy disclosure (data breaches) can arise and generate huge financial loss [8], as well
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as discouraging people’s willingness to share personal data [123]. Since 2004, there have
been a large number of severe data breaches (privacy disclosure of at least 30,000 records)
reported worldwide involving all types of organisations, including government, finance,
academia and high-tech firms, to name a few [164]. Most of the privacy breaches listed in
[164] were caused by hacking, inappropriate permission for use of data and theft by system
insider(s). For example, in 2018, it was revealed that around 50 million Facebook users’
profile information and social connections were used for political opinion predictions without
the users’ permission [165].
To prevent private information disclosure as a result of hacking, inappropriate permission
and system insider theft, a normal and useful approach involves keeping the system firewall
up to date, and reviewing and refreshing the database permission/authority list regularly [117,
139, 135]. However, there is a group of attacks, often referred to as inference attacks [77,
110, 141, 98] that are more challenging for privacy preservation. Some famous inference
attacks include linkage attacks [151], sybil attacks [31], continuous observation attacks [16]
and shilling attacks (including nuke attacks and push attacks) [55]. Inference attacks aim
to infer partial or all input data by considering auxiliary knowledge held by adversaries
against a given computing outcome. Figure 1.1 depicts an overview of such inference
attacks (leveraging the computing outputs and adversaries’ auxiliary knowledge) against data
analytics.








Fig. 1.1 Overview of Inference Attacks.
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We formally define the inference attacks for this thesis in Definition 1.1.
Definition 1.1 (Inference Attack). Given a function f , a private dataset X = {x1, . . . ,xn},
an adversary’s inference function g and the adversary’s auxiliary information set A, where
A\X = {ai, . . . ,a j}, 9xi 2 X and ai\ xi 6= /0, an inference attack successfully infers privacy
if and only if (Y \A)\X 6= /0, where Y is the inferred data, defined by Y = g( f (X), f (A)).
We have the following remarks for the inference attack in Definition 1.1:
• f could be any computing component involved in the data analytics. In this thesis,
we specify them as data aggregation/collection, data publishing/sharing and data
mining/machine learning.
• In the best case, where the adversary has no background knowledge, A is empty.
• In the worst case, where the adversary has all except one arbitrary item of the private
dataset, A = X \{xi}. That is, when the adversary has one more data point xi, such that
A = X , the adversary does not need to infer anything about X .
• Y \A is the privacy inferred by a potential adversary, that is the difference between any
subset of the private dataset and the adversary’s auxiliary information. In the worst
case, Y = X .
Such inference attacks could successfully access additional private data, with sufficient
auxiliary information, from any computing component of the data analytics process. For
instance, let f be a counting function and X be a list of patients’ human immunodeficiency
virus (HIV) test results, where the number of positive/negative cases is 1/0, f (X) = n. If
f (A) = f (X) = n, then the adversaries infer that the unknown patients in X \ A are all
HIV negative. Detailed running examples of the way inference attacks work against each
component of data analytics are presented in Chapter 4 (for data aggregation/collection),
Chapter 6 (for data publishing/sharing) and Chapter 7 (for data mining/machine learning).
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1.1.3 Privacy-preserving Techniques for Data Analytics against the In-
ference Attacks
Generally, the goal of privacy-preserving techniques for data analytics is to produce
privacy-preserved computing outcomes, which minimise the opportunity of inferring the
privacy. Achieving indistinguishability during computation is a common direction in current
research. Indistinguishability guarantees that the computing outcomes over the original
private dataset and adversaries’ auxiliary information set are similar (or the same) with a
given similarity measurement.
Currently, there are three main techniques that implement the concepts of indistin-
guishability for security or privacy-preservation purposes: secure multi-party computation
(SMC) [174], anonymity [150] and differential privacy (DP) [33]. Briefly, SMC ensures
that a real protocol, p , for multi-party computation achieves the indistinguishable behaviour
of a securely trusted third party, T , which takes the inputs from each party and produces a
computing output without compromising any input. This way, SMC defines the security of p
by the security of T , that is, the value of a private input X to a joint computation cannot be
inferred by the computing outcome, f (X). However, when adversaries have some auxiliary
information, SMC is vulnerable to inference attacks. The anonymity requires that each
item, xi 2 X , is indistinguishable from a group of items, such that adversaries cannot infer
a specific item even with preassumed auxiliary information. However, when adversaries
have different auxiliary information, anonymity may be vulnerable. DP guarantees that the
outcomes over the original private dataset X and a dataset X 0, which differs in one item
to X , are indistinguishable. In DP, X 0 is assumed to be within the adversaries’ auxiliary
information, which is the maximum information the adversaries could have, thus DP is the
most promising notion of privacy for privacy-preserving computation at this stage. Table 1.1
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Table 1.1 Brief Comparisons of SMC, Anonymity and DP.
Aux Info Indistinguishability Vulnerability
SMC /0 Security of f (X) run by p= security of f (X) run by T
When A 6= /0,
no privacy guarantee
Anonymity A predefined A f (X) = f (A) When 9A




X \X 0 = {xi}
f (X)⇡ f (X 0) At this stage,no significant vulnerability
presents a brief comparison of SMC, anonymity and DP for indistinguishability against
inference attacks.
1.2 Research Scope, Challenges and Contributions
Given the strong privacy guarantees of DP, we use DP as the basis for implementing privacy-
preserving data analytics. That is, this thesis presents research on differentially private data
analytics preserving individual privacy while retrieving insights from raw data against the
strongest adversary’s auxiliary information across the computing components specified in
Section 1.1 - differentially private data aggregation, differentially private data publishing
and differentially private data mining/machine learning.
1.2.1 Research Scope
In this thesis, we particularly study the above three research topics through the following
specific research problems:
• For differentially private data aggregation, we focus on two problems. First, we
consider how a data aggregation system guarantees both the (output) privacy and (com-
puting) security when delivering aggregation results, that is, differentially private data
aggregation with security guarantees. Second, we consider the privacy performance of
the whole data aggregation system (aggregating data from distributed data curators)
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through a summation/counting function when injecting DP noise at each data curator
locally, that is, the privacy budget guarantees of distributed systems.
• For differentially private data publishing, we study this via differentially private path
publishing. This is triggered by the fact that, because of the prevalence of global
positioning system (GPS)–enabled devices, location-based service mobile applications,
such as WhatsApp, Facebook, Google Maps and Uber, have perhaps been the most
downloaded and used apps in the world and offer the greatest privacy issues. Protecting
personal privacy (relationships between individuals in a path) when publishing a path
of connected individuals (e.g., trajectory) has become an urgent need.
• For differentially private data mining/machine learning, we focus on differentially
private k-means clustering, which preserves membership privacy of the input dataset.
1.2.2 Research Challenges and Contributions
Given this research scope, the research challenges and thesis contributions are listed below:
• For differentially private data aggregation with security guarantees, the research
challenges of existing work [130, 140, 1, 38, 52, 39, 122] include the collusion of
data curators/contributors, the collusion of data aggregators, the vulnerability of a
single data aggregator and the high communication cost when the network topology
is a complete graph without a data aggregator. To address these challenges, we
propose that DP noise is randomly injected into two-layer data aggregation against
semi-honest yet colluding data curators and colluding data aggregators [88]. Our main
contributions here are guaranteeing both DP and security with low community cost,
while maintaining high data utility against both collusion of data curators and collusion
of data aggregators. Our approach involves the following steps. First, each data curator
randomly injects DP noise into their data, and then splits and shares each piece of
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the differentially private data with semi-honest data aggregators. Second, each data
aggregator aggregates the received pieces and then randomly injects DP noise into the
aggregated data. Finally, the data aggregators securely compute the aggregation output.
Both mathematical and experimental analyses1 (on synthetic datasets) show that our
approach achieves enhanced data utility, while maintaining the same DP and security
guarantees as existing work.
• For privacy budget guarantees of distributed systems, we study the parallel composi-
tion of the privacy budgets of differentially private data aggregation for the summa-
tion/counting function. To address the research challenges with existing work [99, 140]:
low overall data utility through global sensitivity for both aggregators and curators and
no privacy guarantees with unconditional local sensitivities for curators and aggrega-
tors, we provide a new lower bound of the parallel composition of privacy budget for
differentially private data aggregation for the summation/counting function [89]. Our
main contributions are ensuring acceptable overall data utility with unconditional local
sensitivities between curators and aggregators. The key idea here is taking advantage of
a property of the summation/counting function when computing local sensitivity, where
the local sensitivity of summation/counting for the aggregation system is equal to the
maximum summation of any individual data curator. We also confirm the theoretical
results by running experiments2 over real-life datasets.
• For differentially private single-path publishing, to address the research challenges
of existing work [71, 171, 61, 62, 113, 158, 157, 173, 54, 20], we consider the case,
where trusted path users should recover the exact path from the published path while
preserving the privacy of the edges (i.e., the relationships between individuals), if
adversaries’ auxiliary information includes all vertices, instead of partial vertices as
1Source code (Chapter 4): https://github.com/suluz/sec_dp_aggregation
2Source code (Chapter 5): https://github.com/suluz/dist_DP
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assumed in existing work. We develop a graph-based path publishing scheme in [92].
Our main contributions are preserving the privacy of the existence of any edge in a
map against adversaries that have all information about vertices and m 1 out of m
edges, while, with high probability, guaranteeing full utility for trusted path users.
Specifically, we publish a graph where each node represents a vertex (that could be
either fake or real). The connections in the path for publishing are concealed in the
topology of the graph. By reading such a topology, only trusted path users that have
correct/full information about the existence of an edge can recover the exact path
from the published graph, while adversaries with partial information cannot. The
experimental results3 on synthetic datasets match the theoretical properties of the
published graphs.
• For differentially private k-means clustering, to address the research challenge of the
non-convergence in existing work [12, 34, 104, 176, 112, 147, 148, 118], we present an
approach guaranteeing the convergence in [90, 91]. Our main contribution is providing
enhanced clustering quality (because of the convergence guarantee), while achieving
the same DP requirement as existing work. In particular, to ensure convergence,
we differentially privately update the centroid of a cluster at each iteration from a
specially designed area in the cluster. Further, to enable a good convergence rate, we
control the orientation of the centroids update through knowledge of past centroid
movements or knowledge of past plus future centroid movements. We prove that, in
the expected/average case, our algorithm converges (to the same clusters as Lloyd’s
k-means algorithm [87]) in at most twice as many iterations as Lloyd’s algorithm. The
experimental (on real-world datasets) results4 show that our algorithm outperforms the
state-of-the-art methods with guaranteed convergence and enhanced clustering quality,
while meeting the same DP requirement.
3Source code (Chapter 6): https://github.com/suluz/dp_path
4Source code (Chapter 7): https://github.com/suluz/diffpriv_clustering
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1.3 Thesis Publications
During my PhD study at the University of Adelaide, I, as the first author, produced five
papers related to this thesis. Three conference papers were published and two manuscripts
that are currently under review as journal articles (one of them recieved a major revision from
the first-round review). This thesis is largely based on the content presented in the following
papers.
Conference Papers
• Zhigang Lu, Hong Shen. 2019. "A Convergent Differentially Private k-Means Clus-
tering Algorithm", In Proceedings of the 23rd Pacific-Asia Conference on Knowledge
Discovery and Data Mining (PAKDD-2019). Springer, pp. 612-624. [90]
CORE rank A
• Zhigang Lu, Hong Shen. 2017. "A new lower bound of privacy budget for distributed
differential privacy", In Proceedings of the 18th International Conference on Parallel
and Distributed Computing, Applications and Technologies (PDCAT-2017). IEEE, pp.
25-32. [89]
CORE rank B
• Zhigang Lu, Hong Shen. 2017. "Secured Privacy Preserving Data Aggregation
with Semi-honest Servers", In Proceedings of the 21st Pacific-Asia Conference on
Knowledge Discovery and Data Mining (PAKDD-2017). Springer, pp. 300-312. [88]
CORE rank A
Journal Articles
• Zhigang Lu, Hong Shen. 2020. "Differentially Private k-Means Clustering with
Convergence Guarantee". IEEE Transactions on Dependable and Secure Computing
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(TDSC). Early Access. [91]
CORE rank A
• Zhigang Lu, Hong Shen. 2020. "Protect Edge Privacy in Path Publishing with Differ-





The remainder of this thesis is organised as follows:
• Chapter 2 presents a brief introduction of the most commonly used notions of privacy,
including secure multi-party computation (SMC), anonymity and differential privacy
(DP). In particular, when reviewing each notion of privacy, we describe its motivation
scenarios first, and then present the basic concepts and formal definitions through
running examples. Finally, we discuss their possible vulnerabilities against given
adversaries with background knowledge. By comparing the notions of privacy, we
choose DP as the basis for privacy in this thesis because of its mathematical bound of
privacy preservation against adversaries with maximum auxiliary information.
• Chapter 3 reviews the literature of differentially private data analytics, including
differentially private data aggregation with security guarantees, parallel composition
of privacy budgets of differentially private data aggregation for summation/counting,
differentially private single-path publishing and differentially private k-means cluster-
ing. We analyse both the advantages and disadvantages of existing work on the above
topics. Such analyses help us discover the research gaps, which lead us to propose our
approaches and contributions.
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• Chapter 4 focuses on differentially private data aggregations with security guarantee.
In this chapter, we propose a differentially private data aggregation framework where
malicious data curators and semi-honest data aggregators inject DP noise randomly.
We mathematically prove the DP and security of the framework. We also use synthetic
datasets to experimentally compare the utility of our approach with existing work,
while achieving the same DP guarantees.
• Chapter 5 studies the privacy budget guarantees of distributed systems. Specifically,
we consider the parallel composition of the privacy budgets of differentially private
data aggregation during summation/counting. In particular, we provide a new lower
bound of privacy budget for distributed differentially private summation/counting. Our
bound of privacy budget is tighter than existing summation/counting functions, without
any conditions on the function sensitivity. We evaluate this bound experimentally on
real-life datasets, which confirm the theoretical performance of our lower bound on
the privacy budget.
• Chapter 6 considers the existence of a single edge in a graph as the privacy when
publishing a path, rather than preserving the privacy of vertices, as considered in
existing work. We propose a graph-based path publishing algorithm that conceals the
real path in the topology of the published graph. DP is implemented by adding fake
edges and fake vertices to the published graph. Both mathematical and experimental
evaluations are provided to study the performance of our proposed algorithm.
• Chapter 7 considers the convergence of a differentially private k-means clustering
algorithm. In Chapter 7, we first discover a convergent zone for each cluster to ensure
convergence, and then take care of the convergence orientation to achieve an acceptable
convergence rate. We apply an exponential mechanism of DP to perturb and update
centroids within the given convergent zone and the given convergence orientation. We
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analyse the properties related to convergence mathematically and experimentally over
real-world datasets.
• Chapter 8 summarises this thesis and identifies several possible extensions and areas
for future work.
1.5 Summary
To conclude, this PhD thesis aims to develop new methods and techniques for differentially
private data analytics, where the entire process of data analytics (data aggregation/collection,
data publishing/sharing and data mining/machine learning) is guaranteed based on DP to
achieve the most acceptable trade-offs between data utility and privacy against adversaries
with maximum background knowledge. In particular, we develop methods from the following
four parts: differentially private data aggregation with security guarantees, the privacy
budget guarantees of distributed systems, differentially private single-path publishing and
differentially private k-means clustering. The research challenge in this thesis is improving
the data utility of the above computing tasks while maintaining the same DP guarantees
as existing work. To do so, for each part, we consider the research gap of the state-of-
the-art works, propose our framework/algorithms to address the problems with existing
work, mathematically evaluate the key features or properties of our proposed approaches and
compare the performance of our work and existing work with real-life (or synthetic) datasets.

Chapter 2
Background on the Notion of Privacy
The notion of privacy is important to privacy-preserving algorithms, as it is the basis to
evaluate whether a framework, a scheme or an algorithm is privacy preserved (or secure) under
a given set of assumptions of adversaries. In this chapter, we briefly summarise three famous
notions of privacy that are widely used in most of the state-of-the-art privacy-preserving
research fields: secure multi-party computation (SMC) [174, 175], anonymity [150, 95, 80]
and differential privacy (DP) [37, 33].
Indistinguishability is a core concept used to define security and privacy. SMC defines
security by ensuring that the outputs of a joint computation from a secure protocol and a
fully trusted middle party are indistinguishable. Anonymity publishes privacy-preserved
data, where each individual belongs to a group of indistinguishable individuals. DP guar-
antees that slightly different datasets (in the worst case, different by one record) produce
indistinguishable outputs with a given probability bound.
SMC, as a paradigm, aims to formally define the security of a jointly computed proto-
col/function without a trusted third party. In SMC, a protocol/function is secure, if and only
if, multiple parties jointly compute a function over their own private data, while ensuring
that no party learns the others’ private data from the outputs of the joint computation. As
a result, SMC guarantees full utility and security of the outputs of a computing protocol
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against adversaries without auxiliary information. Unfortunately, adversaries with some
background knowledge could infer private information from the secure outputs of an SMC
function. In this case, given utility requirements and adversaries’ background knowledge
(to form an inference attack), an anonymity scheme processes the raw data by removing or
generalising the precise information that is vulnerable to adversaries’ background knowledge,
whilist retaining specific statistical features of the data according to the utility requirements.
However, as anonymity schemes do not have a clear measurement of an adversary’s auxiliary
information, such schemes only produce sound results against adversaries with pre-assumed
background knowledge. To address this, DP provides a formal metric to measure the trade-off
between utility and privacy in the case where the adversaries have maximum background
knowledge: n  1 out of n items of a dataset. In particular, DP bounds the probability to
distinguish whether a differentially private output is produced by the dataset with n items or
n 1 items, so that any arbitrary item in the dataset is concealed against adversaries with
maximum auxiliary information. Figure 2.1 depicts how SMC, anonymity and DP achieve
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Fig. 2.1 Development of Notion of Privacy.
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2.1 Secure Multi-party Computation
Secure multi-party computation (SMC or MPC) is also known as secure function evaluation,
and was first introduced by Andrew Chi-Chih Yao [174, 175]. SMC is a paradigm to define
the security of a multi-party protocol/function without a trusted third party. As a result of the
limited space in this thesis, we only provide a brief introduction to some of the important
concepts and implementations of SMC here. For more details on SMC protocols and recent
developments in both academia and industry, please refer to surveys, such as [24, 11, 40].
2.1.1 Toy Example and Informal Concepts
Prior to introducing the SMC paradigm, in this section, we provide a toy example that is a
special case of SMC, where two parties are involved in the computation: Yao’s Millionaires
Problem [174], also known as secure two-party computation.
Problem description: Two millionaires, Alice and Bob, want to know who is wealthier,
without revealing their actual wealth.
A simple solution: There are a huge number of solutions to this problem [174, 175, 68,
121, 83, 178, 86, 85] from different aspects. In this section, for simplicity, we apply Yao’s
original solution [174], where we have the following assumptions. The wealth (in millions)
of Alice and Bob is represented by its integer part in a range of [1,9], say Alice has I millions
and Bob has J millions. A solid encryption scheme, such as, RSA [132], is applied in the
communications between Alice and Bob, where Bob’s public/encryption key is (e,n) and
private/decryption key is (d,n). In particular, this solution contains three steps:
1. Alice chooses a random N-bit integer x, calculates C = RSA(e,n)(x), m =C  I+1, and
sends m to Bob.
2. Bob calculates a list Y , where Yi = RSA 1(d,n)(m+ i  1), i 2 [1,9], generates a list Z,
where Zi = Yi, for i J, Zi = Yi +1; otherwise, chooses a random N/2-bit prime p for a
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new list W , where Wi = Zi mod p, and sends W and p to Alice.
Notes:
• YI =C.
• Given that Bob does not know the value of I (Alice’s wealth), C and x; hence,
Bob cannot identify the value of I by C = YI .
• Bob does not send Z to Alice; otherwise, Alice will immediately know the value
of J by the following operations. Alice calculates a list V , where Vi =RSA(e,n)(Zi),
and finds an index i that Vi Vi 1 = 2, then J = i 1.
• Alice cannot have the value of Z by W and p, according to how Bob generates W .
3. Alice calculates G = C mod p; if G = WI , I  J; otherwise I > J. She shares the
results with Bob.
Toy example summary. Clearly, the above operations and communications provide a
positive answer to Yao’s Millionaires Problem, that is, without a trusted third party, all that
Alice and Bob receive in the communications only reveals the output about who is wealthier,
yet cannot be used to deduce or infer the real value of their wealth, unless one of them does
not faithfully follow the protocol.
From the above, we provide a more general description of SMC. SMC considers the fol-
lowing problem. Suppose m parties want to compute the value of function f (x1,x2, . . . ,xm),
where xi is a private integer number, owned by party Pi, within a given bound. Commu-
nications between each party are allowed. Is it possible for each Pi to have the value of
f (x1,x2, . . . ,xm), yet does not know anything about x j, 8 j 6= i? Roughly, SMC requires that
a secure computation leaks nothing that can be learnt from the output of the computation.
Once a protocol or function meets this requirement, the protocol or function is secure.
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2.1.2 Security Definition via Ideal-World vs. Real-World Approach
In this section, we first introduce an ideal-world versus real-world approach [51, 17, 84],
which provides clear security requirements for SMC. Then, based on the ideal-world versus
real-world approach, we provide a formal definition regarding the security of a function in
SMC.
Generally, a straightforward method to define security involving making a checklist
containing items that violate our security requirements. However, it is difficult to confirm
whether we enumerate all possible security violations, so such a method would not be
reliable to define the security. To overcome this difficulty, people apply an ideal-world versus
real-world approach, where we define security by making the outputs from a secure ideal
world and the real world indistinguishable. Namely, in the ideal world, everything perfectly
guarantees the security, so that we can define security in the real world with regard to this
ideal world.
In short, the philosophy of defining security through an ideal-world versus real-world
approach is two-fold. First, we create an ideal world for a multi-party computation. In
this ideal world, there is a trusted mechanism (or third party) that receives input from each
party, yet does not release those private inputs to anyone else. Then, this trusted third party
produces and broadcasts the output of the joint computation. At the end of the above process,
all parties only have their own input and final output; therefore, such joint computation
in the ideal world is secure. Second, when having the same joint computation in the real
world without the trusted third party, if a protocol produces an output that is equivalent (or
indistinguishable) to the one from the ideal world, then such a protocol is secure. Figure 2.2
depicts the ideal-world versus real-world approach. On the left side of Figure 2.2, security
is guaranteed by the existence of a trusted third party, T , in an ideal world. We require this
trusted party T to only report the output of computation, yet not collude with any other parties.
As a result, each Pi only learns the output of the joint computation FT (x1, . . . ,xn), without
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knowing anything about x j, 8 j 6= i. In SMC, such a computation is secure. On the right
side of Figure 2.2, there is no such trusted third party, T , in the real world. However, if we
could have a joint computation protocol p , such that Fp(x1, . . . ,xn) achieves indistinguishable
results as FT (x1, . . . ,xn), then we say that such a protocol p is as secure as the trusted party
T for the joint computation F .
Trusted T
Joint computation F
" x1 " xn
P1
. . . Pn
Ideal World ! Real World
) FT (x1, . . . ,xn)⇡ Fp(x1, . . . ,xn)( Protocol p
Joint computation F
" x1 " xn
P1
. . . Pn
Fig. 2.2 Ideal World versus Real World.
Wensley et al. [161] further prove that a joint computation in the real world is as secure
as the ideal world, if and only if less than one-third of all parties are colluding semi-honest
adversaries (a.k.a Byzantine faults in distributed computing [161, 78]). Here, a semi-honest
adversary is also known as an honest-but-curious (HBC) or passive adversary, which always
follows the protocol honestly, yet also tries to infer the privacy from both the process and the
output of the protocol. Colluding adversaries may collude to exchange information to learn
more.
We now go to the formal definition of security based on the "indistinguishable" concept
from the ideal-world versus real-world approach. We call such security semi-honest security
since it is only secure against semi-honest adversaries.
Definition 2.1 (Security by Indistinguishability [51, 17, 9, 24, 40]). A protocol p securely
realises T against semi-honest adversaries in every possible subset Z, if there exists a
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polynomial time simulator S, such that, for any inputs (x1, . . . ,xn), we have that:
|Pr[Realp(k,Z,x1, . . . ,xn) = 0] Pr[IdealT,S(k,Z,x1, . . . ,xn) = 0]|
is negligible in k.
In Definition 2.1, we use the indistinguishable probability distribution to indicate the
indistinguishability between the outputs from the real world and ideal world. Specifically,
in the ideal world, T is the trusted third party who never colludes with any other parties,
and S is a polynomial time simulator that simulates all possible attacks in the presence of
a group of semi-honest adversaries Z. In the real world, we use the same inputs vector
(k,Z,x1, . . . ,xn) as the ideal world without the trusted third party, but only a protocol for the
secure multi-party computing.
In addition, besides SMC, there are several classic security techniques: secret shar-
ing [137, 119, 23], homomorphic encryption [116, 48, 156], oblivious transfer [128, 107, 69]
and zero-knowledge proof [127, 50, 129]. Shamir et al. [137] first invented a secret-sharing
scheme, which refers to methods for distributing a secret among a group of participants, each
of whom is allocated a share of the secret. The secret can be reconstructed only when a
sufficient number, of possibly different types, of partial shares is combined; individual shares
are of no use on their own. Homomorphic encryption [116, 48, 156] is a form of encryption
that allows computations to be undertaken on cipher text, thereby generating an encrypted
result that, when decrypted, matches the result of the operations performed on the plain text.
In particular, additive homomorphic encryption and multiplicative homomorphic encryption
are two famous techniques [48]. An oblivious transfer (OT) [128, 107, 69] protocol is a
type of protocol in which a sender transfers one of potentially many pieces of information
to a receiver, yet remains oblivious as to what piece (if any) has been transferred. A zero-
knowledge proof [127, 50, 129] is a method by which one party (the prover) can prove to
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another party (the verifier) that a given statement is true, without conveying any information
apart from the fact that the statement is indeed true.
2.1.3 Vulnerability of SMC to Adversaries with Auxiliary Information
Clearly, SMC is quite a strong security guarantee for data publishing/sharing in a dis-
tributed environment against semi-honest adversaries; however, it may fail to protect individ-
uals’ private information as a result of adversaries’ background knowledge combining the
published output of the computation. Here is a simple counterexample for the solution to
Yao’s Millionaires Problem. Suppose in the Millionaires Problem that Bob knows a smaller
range of Alice’s wealth, say, Alice’s wealth I 2 [a,b]. Bob takes values from [a,b] linearly,
as his value, J, to the protocol. Bob determines that Alice’s wealth I = J once Bob has
I   J and I < J+1. In this example, Bob, with some background knowledge, successfully
infers Alice’s wealth by providing serial inputs to the protocol. In summary, based on this
counterexample, to preserve privacy against adversaries with auxiliary information, SMC is
not a robust privacy-preserving solution.
2.2 Anonymity
From the previous section, we see that SMC is vulnerable to adversaries with some back-
ground knowledge. In this section, we briefly introduce another branch of privacy notion,
anonymity, which addresses the weaknesses of SMC. Overall, anonymity retains the statistics
of a set of data records, while guaranteeing that each record is indistinguishable from a
number of other records by generalising and/or suppressing individual data to remove the ex-
plicit linkage to a specified individual, with minimal data modification. This way, anonymity
approaches achieve a trade-off between individual privacy and data utility.
To date, researchers have proposed several approaches [150, 167, 95, 80, 170, 120,
153, 10] to implement anonymity according to the various background knowledges of
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adversaries. For example, in k-anonymity [150], (r,a)-anonymisation [10], incremental
anonymisation [120] and m-invariance [170], the authors suppose that the adversaries have
knowledge about an individual’s quasi-identifier (i.e., non-sensitive information, such as
postcode, gender and age). In the model of l-diversity [95] and (a,k)-anonymity [167],
the researchers assume that the adversaries know the distribution of sensitive values (e.g.,
the morbidity of one disease in a given area). In the model of l-diversity [95] and (r,a)-
anonymisation [10], the scholars presume that the opponents have knowledge about one
person’s appearance in the published data. In the model of t-closeness [80], Li et al. believe
that the attackers hold the knowledge discovered from the published data. In the model of
km-anonymity [153], Terrovitis et al. consider that the opponents are aware of m attributes of
an individual.
In this section, we mainly focus on three key approaches for anonymity: k-anonymity [150],
which is the first in the line of works; l-diversity [95], which is the first that considers the
diversity of sensitive values in each anonymised block; and t-closeness [80], which is the
first that considers the balance of distributions of sensitive values between an anonymised
block and the whole dataset.
2.2.1 Fundamental Concepts in Anonymity
In this section, we introduce fundamental concepts and techniques that are widely used
in the family of anonymity approaches, including relational table and generalisation and
suppression techniques.
Relational Table. Originally, an anonymity approach was proposed for publishing a
relational table, T = T (A1, . . . ,An), where Ai is the ith attribute of T . The table T is made
up of finite tuples, for example, ti(A1, . . . ,An) is the ith tuple in the table T . Each tuple
represents an individual record. t[Ai] indicates the value of attribute Ai in a tuple t.
24 Background on the Notion of Privacy
For anonymous data publishing, the attributes of a table are important and can be split
into three categories: explicit identifiers, sensitive attributes and non-sensitive attributes.
Among these, explicit identifiers, such as name and ID number, are always removed prior
to publishing because such attributes can identify a tuple from the table directly. Sensitive
attributes should be kept in a published table for further data analysis, such as patients’ disease
or staff salary; however, the sensitive attributes must not be linked directly with a specific
tuple without permission. To link sensitive attributes to an individual tuple, adversaries
must have a quasi-identifier (first defined in [150]). A set of quasi-identifiers is a subset
of non-sensitive attributes by which adversaries can identify one tuple uniquely without
knowing the explicit identifier. Table 2.1 presents an example of a relational table.





Name ID No. Postcode Age Gender Commitment Date Charging Salary
Alice 03071052 7500 19 F 5/May/2008 $2 $128 k
Bob 03071074 7100 27 M 1/Mar/2016 $32 $95 k
Generalisation and Suppression Techniques. Generalisation and suppression [136]
are essential concepts used by many anonymous data publishing methods to achieve indistin-
guishability. Overall, generalisation changes a value t[Ai] to be less specific yet still useful
statistical information, while suppression removes a value/tuple from a dataset, which is
equivalent to replacing a value with a symbol, such as a star. Figure 2.3 illustrates an example
of generalisation and suppression used in anonymous data publishing, where Z0 contains the
raw value of attribute Z; Z1 and Z2 contain less specific values for attribute Z (i.e., generalised
values); and Z3 shows the result of suppression, that is, all values of attribute Z are removed











Fig. 2.3 Generalisation and Suppression.
2.2.2 Famous Anonymity Approaches
We now consider the three most famous anonymity approaches: k-anonymity, l-diversity
and t-closeness. In this section, we introduce each of these approaches in two parts: the
target problem (i.e., the attack model) and the main idea (i.e., the definition).
k-Anonymity
• The target problem is linkage attacks.
A linkage attack [151] aims to discover more knowledge about a record by linking
the quasi-identifier of that record over different relational tables where all explicit
identifiers of that record have been removed. The success of a linkage attack is based
on a simple statistical property: given a set of quasi-identifiers of a person as the
background knowledge of an adversary, an adversary could link different relational
tables by those quasi-identifiers, such that the adversary learns more information about
that person. Figure 2.4 shows an example of a linkage attack, where the circle on the
left contains personal medical information, and the circle on the right contains electoral
enrolment data. By linking these two tables with the quasi-identifiers, the adversary
can easily erode a person’s privacy, such as accessing disease and party affiliation
information.
• The main idea:
k-anonymity decreases the probability of identifying a particular person from 1 to at














Fig. 2.4 Example of Linkage Attack.
most 1/k in linkage attacks. That is, for a give set of quasi-identifiers, there are at least
k indistinguishable tuples for each tuple in a k-anonymised relational table.
Definition 2.2 (k-Anonymity [150]). Given a relational table T = {tuples}, if T
provides k-anonymity, then for each tuple ti 2 T , there exists at least k 1 tuples that
have the same quasi-identifiers as ti.
Table 2.2 displays an example when processing a normal relational table to a 4-
anonymity table. From Table 2.2, we see that the 4-anonymity table does not release any
specific person’s privacy against linkage attack, yet retains useful statistical information
that can be used for further knowledge discovery, such as the relationship between
people’s age group and a given disease.
l-Diversity
• The target problem is that two attacks can increase the privacy inference probability by
excluding some anonymised records in an anonymous block in a k-anonymity table
with an adversary’s background knowledge. This can include background knowledge
attacks and homogeneity attacks.
A background knowledge attack [94] identifies a record from a k-anonymity table
using an adversary’s background knowledge, such as one disease morbidity in a specific
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Table 2.2 Example of 4-Anonymity.
(a) Original Table
No. Quasi-identifier Sensitive Attr.Postcode Age Ethnicity Disease
1 1253 51 Chinese Heart
2 1268 59 Japanese Flu
3 1253 68 Indian Flu
4 1268 80 British Heart
5 1340 18 Spanish HIV
6 1349 29 Chinese HIV
7 1345 25 Korean HIV
8 1343 2 Indian HIV
(b) 4-Anonymity Table
No. Quasi-identifier Sensitive Attr.Postcode Age Ethnicity Disease
1 12** > 50 * Heart
2 12** > 50 * Flu
3 12** > 50 * Flu
4 12** > 50 * Heart
5 13** < 30 * HIV
6 13** < 30 * HIV
7 13** < 30 * HIV
8 13** < 30 * HIV
ethnicity. For example, assume that Table 2.2b is published by hospital X. Alice knows
that her Japanese friend is receiving medical treatment in that hospital. That is, Alice
knows that her friend is in Table 2.2b. Note that Alice does not know which record of
the table is her Japanese friend. By comparing information about her friend, such as
postcode and age, with the anonymised information in Table 2.2b, she knows that her
friend is in the block of {Postcode: 12⇤⇤, Age > 50}. Based on Alice’s background
knowledge that Japanese people have an extremely low morbidity of heart disease,
Alice can further infer that her friend is possibly the second or the third record of that
block. Since both records reflect someone with flu, Alice confirms that her Japanese
friend has flu with higher probability from such background knowledge, which is a
privacy breach.
A homogeneity attack [94] is a special case of background knowledge attack. With a
homogeneity attack, the adversary only takes the quasi-identifier(s) as the background
knowledge to infer the privacy of a record. For example, if the adversary knows
that someone’s quasi-identifier falls in the block of {Postcode: 13⇤⇤, Age < 30} in
Table 2.2b, then they can infer that this person must have HIV.
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• The main idea:
l-diversity introduces diversity in sensitive attribute(s) for each anonymous block of a
k-anonymity table, so that we can further decrease the probability of privacy inference
by background knowledge attack and homogeneity attack.
Definition 2.3 (l-Diversity [95]). Given a k-anonymity table T = {Blocks}, if T pro-
vides l-diversity, then, in each block, which is k-anonymity, there exist at least l kinds
of sensitive identifiers in this block.
Table 2.3 presents an example of processing a normal relational table to a 3-diversity
table (also a 4-anonymity table).
Table 2.3 Example of 3-Diversity.
(a) Original Table
No. Quasi-identifier Sensitive Attr.Postcode Age Ethnicity Disease
1 1253 51 Chinese Heart
2 1268 59 Japanese Flu
3 1253 68 Indian Flu
4 1268 80 British Heart
5 1340 18 Spanish HIV
6 1349 29 Chinese HIV
7 1345 25 Korean HIV
8 1343 2 Indian HIV
(b) 3-Diversity Table
No. Quasi-identifier Sensitive Attr.Postcode Age Ethnicity Disease
1 1*** (20,60) Asian Heart
2 1*** (20,60) Asian Flu
6 1*** (20,60) Asian HIV
7 1*** (20,60) Asian HIV
5 1*** (0,20)[ (60,90) Non-Asian HIV
3 1*** (0,20)[ (60,90) Non-Asian Flu
4 1*** (0,20)[ (60,90) Non-Asian Heart
8 1*** (0,20)[ (60,90) Non-Asian HIV
t-Closeness
• The target problem includes skewness attacks and similarity attacks.
A skewness attack [81] infers privacy by the difference/skewness between the value
distribution of sensitive attributes in an anonymous block and the whole anonymity
table. For example, according to data from the World Health Organization (WHO),
about 0.6% people worldwide are HIV positive [168]; however, in Table 2.3b, 50%
of individuals are HIV positive. Such a big difference/skewness would provide more
information to an adversary.
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A similarity attack [81] infers privacy by the semantic closeness of sensitive values
in an anonymous block. For example, an adversary could deduce that a person has eye
problems if all the diseases in an anonymous block are eye-related diseases.
• The main idea:
t-closeness maintains the balance between the distribution of sensitive values in each
block and the distribution of sensitive values in the whole table. Namely, in t-closeness,
the distribution of sensitive values in each block is as close as possible to the distribution
of sensitive values in the whole table.
Definition 2.4 (t-Closeness [80]). Given a k-anonymity table T = {Blocks}, if T
provides t-closeness, then, for each k-anonymity block, the distance between the
distribution of sensitive values in the block and the distribution of sensitive value in
the whole table T is no more than a given t.
In t-closeness, the threshold t is the key parameter. Li et al. [80] used the earth mover’s
distance (EMD) [134] for the distance calculation. The result of calculating EMD is
the minimal amount needed to move from one distribution to another. Table 2.4 shows
an example of building 0.278-closeness from 3-diversity.
Table 2.4 Example of 0.278-Closeness.
(a) 3-Diversity Table
No. Postcode Age Disease
1 476** 2* Gastric ulcer
2 476** 2* Gastritis
3 476** 2* Stomach cancer
4 4790* > 40 Gastritis
5 4790* > 40 Flu
6 4790* > 40 Bronchitis
7 476** 3* Bronchitis
8 476** 3* Pneumonia
9 476** 3* Stomach cancer
(b) 0.278-Closeness Table
No. Postcode Age Disease
1 4767* < 40 Gastric ulcer
8 4767* < 40 Pneumonia
3 4767* < 40 Stomach cancer
4 4790* > 40 Gastritis
5 4790* > 40 Flu
6 4790* > 40 Bronchitis
7 4760* < 40 Bronchitis
2 4760* < 40 Gastritis
9 4760* < 40 Stomach cancer
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2.2.3 Vulnerability of Anonymity to Adversaries with Arbitrary Auxil-
iary Information
In summary, anonymity achieves a satisfying trade-off between individual privacy and
published data utility against adversaries with specified background knowledge. However,
there are two weaknesses in anonymity. First, each approach has pre-assumed background
knowledge of adversaries in a very specific range, for example, k-anonymity only preserves
privacy against linkage attacks, but not homogeneity attacks [95]. Second, although all
anonymity approaches can measure privacy based on privacy disclosure probability, the utility
of the published anonymous table cannot be quantified. For example, k-anonymity ensures
that the probability of an adversary discovering private information about an individual is at
least 1/k; however, we do not have any utility guarantee when using a k-anonymity table for
data analysis. To preserve privacy against adversaries with arbitrary auxiliary information,
while measuring the trade-off between privacy and utility, anonymity is not a suitable notion
of privacy.
2.3 Differential Privacy
To address the problems of anonymity approaches, Dwork et al. [37] proposed differential
privacy (DP) to measure the trade-off between privacy and utility against adversaries with
maximum auxiliary information. DP is one of the most widely adopted notions of privacy in
the current research field [114, 96, 32, 57, 16, 5, 53, 60, 6, 115, 152, 28, 90]. The concept
of DP was first introduced and defined by Dwork et at. [37] as e-indistinguishability, then
formalised in [33] as e-differential privacy. Informally, DP is a scheme that minimises the
sensitivity of output for a given function on two neighbouring datasets that differ by one
record. In this manner, DP achieves indistinguishability between the outputs produced by
two neighbouring datasets, so that the presence or absence of any record in a dataset, that is,
the difference between the two neighbouring datasets, will be concealed to an adversary.
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In this section, we introduce DP from three aspects. First, we consider a standard
definition of DP and the fundamental concepts, including the privacy budget, composition
properties of the privacy budget and function sensitivity. Second, we consider three important
mechanisms or frameworks that implement DP for different computational tasks. Third, we
discuss the most commonly used relaxation of DP.
2.3.1 Fundamentals of Differential Privacy
Given a trusted data curator who has a dataset X , and an adversary who has a dataset X 0,
DP assumes that X 0 contains all records except an arbitrary one in X , that is, | kXk kX 0k |= 1,
let X \X 0 = x0. We call such a pair of datasets, X and X 0, neighbouring datasets. With such a
dataset X 0, the adversary has maximum background knowledge about the dataset X because
the adversary only needs one more atomic record to have the full dataset X .
Standard Definition and the Privacy Budget
Basically, DP turns a function f to a randomised mechanism T by injecting random
noise into either input(s) or output(s) or the computing process of f , so that the outcomes
of T from X and X 0 are indistinguishable within a given bound based on a DP parameter:
the privacy budget e . The privacy budget measures the ratio of probabilities of returning the
same outputs from both X and X 0. We now provide the earliest formal and standard definition
of DP by Dwork et al. [33].
Definition 2.5 (e-Differential Privacy [33]). A randomised mechanism T is e-differentially
private if and only if, for all neighbouring datasets X and X 0 and for all output sets S ✓
Range(T ), T satisfies:
exp( e)⇥Pr[T (X 0) 2 S] Pr[T (X) 2 S] exp(e)⇥Pr[T (X 0) 2 S], (2.1)
where e is the privacy budget.
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According to Definition 2.5, it is clear that a small e indicates a high level of indistin-
guishability, and hence good privacy-preserving performance; however, this is equivalent
to bad output utility performance. In the extreme case, when e = 0, T (X) and T (X 0) are
completely indistinguishable. Therefore, in practice, the trusted data curator should set a
predefined privacy budget according to the requirements for privacy and utility. Usually, the
privacy budget is publicly available, so that the privacy performance is agreed upon by all
parties involved in function f .
Composition of the Privacy Budget
When working with complicated cases, such as several differentially private mechanisms
collaborating, there are two composition properties of the privacy budget used to analyse the
overall privacy performance: sequential composition (Theorem 2.1) and parallel composition
(Theorem 2.2) by McSherry et al. [99].
Theorem 2.1 (Sequential Composition of Privacy Budgets [99]). Given a dataset X, a set of
mechanisms where each Ti satisfies ei-DP, the sequential composition of Ti(X), T (X), is
Âi ei-differentially private.
Based on Theorem 2.1, when we sequentially compute multiple differentially private
mechanisms over one dataset, the privacy-preserving performance of the sequential compo-
sition would be worse than an individual mechanism. To attain a satisfying overall privacy
performance, we must set a higher privacy requirement for each component of the sequential
composition.
Theorem 2.2 (Parallel Composition of Privacy Budgets [99]). Given a dataset X = [iXi
where Xi \Xj = /0,8i, j, a set of mechanisms where each Ti satisfies ei-DP, the parallel
composition of Ti(Xi), T (X), is maxi{ei}-differentially private.
Based on Theorem 2.2, when we compute multiple functions in parallel over mutually
disjoint datasets, the overall privacy-preserving performance is the same as the worst privacy-
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preserving mechanism. Thus, to attain a satisfying overall privacy performance, we only
need to take care of the worst case among all parallel functions.
Sensitivity
Although the privacy budget bounds the DP guarantee, it is impossible to achieve the
same privacy-preserving performance with the same privacy budget for all functions, even
with the same input dataset X . Intuitively, a function on a given dataset X , which is more
sensitive to an adversary with maximum background knowledge about X , needs more noise
to conceal the privacy of the input data. To achieve this, Dwork et al. [37] defined the
sensitivity of a function f , D f , as the difference between f (X) and f (X 0). The sensitivity
actually measures the effect of the adversary’s auxiliary information used to infer privacy.
The aim of injecting noise in DP is to make the sensitive result f (X) insensitive and hide
the difference between X and X 0 to preserve privacy. Two function sensitivities are widely
used for DP, global sensitivity [37] and local sensitivity [114], according to how extensive
the adversary’s background knowledge could be.
Global sensitivity considers the globally greatest difference between f (X) and f (X 0), that
is, the global worst-case of the adversary’s auxiliary information, or the maximum difference
between f (X) and f (X 0) over all possible X ⇢ Range(X). Equation (2.2) [37] displays how
to calculate the global sensitivity.
D fG(X) = max
8X ,|kXk kX 0k|=1
| f (X)  f (X 0)|. (2.2)
In contrast, local sensitivity considers the locally greatest difference between f (X) and
f (X 0), that is, the local worst-case of the adversary’s auxiliary information, or the maximum
difference between f (X) and f (X 0) over all possible X 0 as the neighbouring dataset of X .
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Equation (2.3) [114] displays how to calculate the local sensitivity.
D fL(X) = max
8X 0,|kXk kX 0k|=1
| f (X)  f (X 0)|. (2.3)
Note that global sensitivity is also the maximum value among all the local sensitivities of
a given pair of f and X . When the privacy-preserving requirement is not strict, to decrease
the noise that needs to be injected, we can use D fL as the value for D f .
D fG(X) = max
8X
{D fL(X)}. (2.4)
We illustrate the difference between global sensitivity and local sensitivity by an example
shown in Table 2.5. As we can see, with a given dataset, different functions would have
different sensitivities. For function Max, D fG = 9, when X = {10,1,1,1,1}, X 0= {1,1,1,1};
D fL = 1, when X 0 = {1,2,3,4}. For function Sum, D fG = 10, when X = {10,x1,x2,x3,x4},
X 0 = {x1,x2,x3,x4}; D fL = 5, when X 0 = {1,2,3,4}.
Table 2.5 Example of Sensitivity in DP.





In addition, from parallel composition from Theorem 2.2, we should be aware that the
function sensitivity for each Ti is calculated with each disjoint dataset xi, that is, D f (xi);
while the function sensitivity for the overall mechanism T is calculated with the whole
dataset X , that is, D f (X).
Figure 2.5 depicts how DP changes the distribution of the function output (to guarantee
DP as Definition 2.5) by injecting random noise, where a/b = exp(e), that is the bound of DP.
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(a) Output Distribution without DP

















(b) Output Distribution with DP
Fig. 2.5 General Idea of Differential Privacy.
2.3.2 Mechanisms of Differential Privacy
In this section, we present three mechanisms or frameworks of DP used in the state-of-
the-art: the Laplace mechanism [33], the exponential mechanism [100] and the sample and
aggregation framework [114].
Laplace Mechanism
The Laplace mechanism of DP (LapDP) [37] was the first mechanism to implement
DP in a form suitable for numeric computing, such as Max/Min, Sum/Counting. The key
idea of LapDP is adding random noise, following a Laplace distribution, to numeric values.
Following the definition of probability density function (PDF), we cannot determine the
probability of an arbitrary random variable x. Thus, to apply a Laplace distribution to LapDP,
we use its probability density function (PDF, mean is zero) to calculate the sampling weight






where b is the scale parameter in Laplace distribution [163]. In DP, b = D f/e. We define
LapDP in Definition 2.6.
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Definition 2.6 (LapDP [37]). Given a function f : X!R, T (X) is e-differentially private if




where D f is the sensitivity of function f and e is the privacy budget.
Exponential Mechanism
The exponential mechanism of DP (ExpDP) [100] is an implementation of DP used for
non-numeric computing, e.g., recommending an item from a set of items. The key idea
of ExpDP is assigning a weight for each candidate according to its likelihood, and then
weighted sampling the preferred items from the candidates. To assign weights, ExpDP uses a
quality function, q(X ,x), which reflects how appealing the pair (X ,x) is, where X denotes
a dataset and x is the random response to a query function on the dataset X . Definition 2.7
formally defines ExpDP.
Definition 2.7 (ExpDP[100]). Given a quality function of a dataset X, q(X ,x), which reflects
the quality of a query response x, the exponential mechanism T provides e-DP, if T (X) =
{w(x) = exp( e·q(X ,x)2Dq )}, where Dq is the sensitivity of q(X ,x) and e is the privacy budget.
Sample and Aggregation Framework
The sample and aggregation framework of DP [114] is proposed to further decrease the
value of local sensitivity to improve the utility of the computing output. The key idea of
sample and aggregation is computing the function f over repeatedly sampled subsets of the
original dataset X , and then aggregating the multiple sub-results using DP. In the sample and
aggregation framework, the local sensitivity of the final aggregation step is usually less than
the location sensitivity over the whole dataset X , as it is unlikely to sample all the items of X
in the sampling step.
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The most famous application of sample and aggregation framework is GUPT k-means
clustering. Mohan et al. [104] proposed GUPT, a clustering algorithm that applies the sample
and aggregation framework based on Lloyd’s k-means clustering algorithm [87]. Briefly,
GUPT uniformly samples items from an input dataset to different buckets, where the local
clustering result of each bucket is generated by Lloyd’s algorithm. The final clustering result
is the mean of the local ones with Laplace noise applied.
2.3.3 Relaxation of Differential Privacy
Given that the standard DP is too strong, in terms of the adversary’s background knowl-
edge, for some applications (as in the real-life scenario), the worst-case assumption regarding
the adversary’s background knowledge is rarely achieved or it is rare to have some of the
possible dataset from the required range; hence, it is natural to consider relaxing the standard
DP. In this section, we briefly discuss two famous relaxations of standard DP: (e,d )-DP [36],
which includes an additional probability of error and (a,e)-Rényi DP (RDP) [102], which
considers the differentially private bound for two arbitrary datasets.
In (e,d )-DP, this additional d allows the output privacy loss to be larger than the bound
exp(e) in the standard DP. A Gaussian distribution is often used to achieve (e,d )-DP, as
described in Definition 2.8.
Definition 2.8 ((e,d )-Differential Privacy [36]). A randomised mechanism T is (e,d )-DP
if and only if for all neighbouring datasets X and X 0 and for all output sets S✓ Range(T ),
T satisfies:
Pr[T (X) 2 S] exp(e)⇥Pr[T (X 0) 2 S]+d , (2.6)
where e is the privacy budget and d is a small non-zero item.
(a,e)-RDP aims to provide a differentially private bound for two arbitrary datasets,
rather than two neighbouring datasets, to relax the standard DP. To measure the difference
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(to bound it by the privacy budget e) between the two datasets, drawing from two different
distributions, (a,e)-RDP extends Rényi divergence [131] as defined in Definition 2.9.
Definition 2.9 (Rényi Divergence of Order a [131]). Given two distributions P, Q, and a












where P(x) (Q(x)) is the density of P (Q) at x.
Based on Definition 2.9, we have the definition of (a,e)-RDP as follows.
Definition 2.10 ((a,e)-Rényi DP [102]). A randomised algorithm f is (a,e)-Rényi DP for
any two neighbouring datasets X and X 0, if
Da( f (X)|| f (X 0)) e.
Note that, when a = •, (•,e)-RDP is the standard e-DP for the X and X 0, such that
distributions in Definition 2.9 satisfy P = f (X) and Q = f (X 0).
Additionally, there are several other proposed relaxations of standard DP, such as, con-
centrated DP [35] and pufferfish privacy [74] (or, a similar concept, blowfish privacy [60]).
2.4 Summary
This chapter has introduced the related work and ideas on privacy. It has identified that
indistinguishability is the core idea behind the three notions of privacy. In particular, it has
identified that SMC defines secure computing by achieving indistinguishability between
outputs from the ideal world and real world, anonymity measures privacy by preventing any
individual from being distinguished against a group of individuals for an adversary with
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given background knowledge, while DP measures the trade-off between privacy and utility
by implementing indistinguishable outputs from two neighbouring datasets to conceal an
arbitrary item against an adversary who potentially has maximum auxiliary information.
As a result of the adjustable bound in the worst-case assumption of the adversary, we use
e-DP as the notion of privacy for the remainder of this thesis, including discussing the
state-of-the-art applying DP in data analytics in Chapter 3 and introducing the proposed DP




There are several major computing tasks in the process of data analytics, such as data
aggregation (for collecting raw data), data publishing (for sharing data with the public for
further research) and data mining/machine learning (for gaining insights from the data).
However, because of privacy disclosure threats [66, 149, 159, 2, 154, 155], researchers have
studied privacy preservation for such computing tasks. In this chapter, we briefly summarise
the state-of-the-art approaches in differentially private data analytics. In particular, we review
differentially private data aggregation, differentially private path publishing as a special
application of data publishing and differentially private k-means clustering, as representatives
of typical computing tasks.
We first review differentially private data aggregation with security guarantees [130, 140,
1, 38, 52, 39, 122] with a focus on the privacy of the final aggregation results against the
strongest inference attacks and the security in the data collection process, where distributed
data curators share their private data with other data curators or data aggregator(s). To
guarantee both (output) privacy and (computing) security, according to our discussion in
Chapter 2, DP and SMC are the two most commonly used tools in existing work. In addition,
when implementing DP to preserve privacy for data aggregation in distributed environments,
each data curator shares differentially private data (i.e., their data plus DP noise added)
42 Literature Review
to address privacy concerns. Given that the DP noise is not added at a central server/data
aggregator, it is necessary to consider the overall privacy budget guarantees of the whole
distributed data aggregation, and hence consider the parallel composition of DP privacy
budget.
We review differentially private data publishing by studying a special application, dif-
ferentially private trajectory publishing, which aims to preserve privacy in trajectory data
(e.g., the existence of a given location/road in the published trajectory) by considering
some of the special features of trajectories, such as the movement direction or the spa-
tiotemporal relationship. There are two main scenarios in this field: publishing a single
trajectory [71, 171, 61, 62, 113, 158, 157, 173, 54, 20] and publishing a set of trajecto-
ries [21, 138, 65, 19, 58, 3, 25]. In this thesis, we focus on the former.
Differentially private k-means clustering aims to gain insights from unlabelled data, while
preserving privacy in the worst case of adversaries with potentially extensive background
knowledge (see Chapter 7 for details of the worst-case adversary background knowledge).
Most existing work [12, 34, 104, 176, 112, 147, 148, 118] achieves DP in an interactive
setting by injecting DP noise into each iteration of the k-means clustering to guarantee the
privacy of every single step of the clustering.
3.1 Background on Differentially Private Data Aggrega-
tion with Security Guarantees
In this section, we review the current work on differentially private data aggregation with
security guarantees [130, 140, 1, 38, 52, 39, 122]. Figure 3.1 depicts the general idea of this
topic, where xi is the raw data of a data curator i, di is the DP noise, f is the aggregation
function, and y is the differentially private aggregation output.
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xi only learns y,
but not x j, 8 j 6= i
di = Lap 1(ei), 8i
· · ·
Fig. 3.1 General Idea of Differentially Private Data Aggregation with Security Guarantees.
The computational task of data aggregation typically focuses on linear calculations of data
that are allocated at distributed data curators. In this thesis, we study summation/counting
function as a special application of linear calculations following existing studies in [99, 130,
140], since summation/counting function acts an important role in learning the statistics
of aggregated data. There are two main branches of existing work. First, where there are
multiple data curators/contributors that share data to one data aggregator [130, 140, 1, 38, 52].
Second, where there are multiple data curators/contributors that jointly compute the output
of aggregation without a data aggregator [39, 122]. Given that we collect and aggregate
data from distributed data contributors, to guarantee the security of computation and the
privacy of each individual’s data, a combination of SMC and DP is applied. In particular, the
SMC paradigm is applied in the joint computation when sharing private data with other data
curators to guarantee the security of computation, while DP is used for preventing privacy
disclosure from the resultant output.
Rastogi et al. [130] proposed the first schemes to ensure private and secure data aggre-
gation based on the combination of SMC and DP, called PASTE. PASTE is an approach
that allows a semi-honest central server to compute the sum of values from distributed
data curators (also semi-honest data curators) securely without privacy disclosure. PASTE
entails the following steps. First, each data curator encrypts the sum of its own data and
LapDP noise. It then sends the encrypted sum to the data aggregator. Note that the sum of
the noise guarantees DP for the sum of the distributed data; however, the distributed noise
cannot guarantee DP for the distributed data. Second, based on homomorphic encryption,
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the aggregator sums up the received data and sends them back to each data curator. Third,
the data curators decrypt the message and send it back to the data aggregator. So far, the
final output is secure and differentially private. However, once the central server has any data
curator’s decryption key, the privacy of that data curator is disclosed. Further, if some of the
data curators collude with each other, because the LapDP noise with each data curator does
not preserve individual privacy, the individual data are also not guaranteed to be differentially
private.
Similar to [130], Shi et al. [140] proposed an addition-based encryption scheme that
guarantees security (for the data aggregation) and DP (for each data curator) while achieving
high data utility. The key point in [140] is applying the Diffie-Hellman key exchange
protocol [27], by which two entities jointly generate the encryption keys together. Every data
curator keeps r encryption keys, which are paired with the keys in other r entities. As a result,
the data aggregator’s decryption key is zero minus the sum of the data curators’ keys, which
guarantees that the aggregator learns nothing (not even the data curator’s key) different than
the final output. However, this scheme is vulnerable to collusion attack in the worst case,
that is, if n 1 data curators work together (minus their sum from the overall output), they
can determine the victim’s private information with high probability.
Ács et al. [1] proposed a scheme based on requesting a set of computation entities to send
encrypted and noise-added private data to a semi-honest data aggregator periodically. This
method is similar to [130], yet assumes the data curators are dishonest-but-non-intrusive,
that is, such adversaries may not follow the protocol and may collude with someone, yet do
not modify the networks. The data aggregator in this scheme can only learn the answer to
a query, but nothing else, because of the security guarantees of homomorphic encryption
in each period. With such an assumption about adversaries, each data curator adds LapDP
noise to preserve its own privacy in [1] (based on their own local sensitivity), rather than
preserving the privacy of aggregated data, as in [130] (based on the local sensitivity of the
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given aggregated data or the global sensitivity of the aggregation function). However, if the
central server is compromised, then the decryption key of any data curator is vulnerable;
hence, the individual privacy would not be safe any longer.
Following [140] and [1], Goryczka et al. [52] provided an enhanced fault-tolerant (EFT)
scheme, which is a fault-tolerant version of [1]. Given the similarity between [52] and [1],
we only consider the extended part of [52], i.e., the fault-tolerant function of the EFT scheme.
In particular, to achieve fault tolerance, in [52], the data aggregator is able to detect any faulty
data curator, e.g., where they might be disconnected. Once there is a faulty data curator, all
the neighbouring data curators remove the value received from the faulty one. In the worst
case, if all neighbours of a party i are faulty, then sending the recovery key to the aggregator
would reveal the contributed value xi. In such a case, the party i subtracts xi from the recovery
key, which will remove it from the aggregated result as well. This fault-tolerant scheme
recovers the status of data aggregation by removing the faulty data, rather than providing an
estimated value of the overall aggregation utility. Therefore, this method will not guarantee
the utility of the final aggregation output.
Eigner et al. [38] proposed a three-layer data aggregation protocol, PrivaDA, where data
curators are placed in the first/bottom layer, computing servers are in the second layer and
a data aggregator is in the third/top layer. They assumed that the data curators and data
aggregator may collude and be corrupted, and the computing servers are semi-honest. Based
on such assumptions of the adversary model, data are aggregated in the following three
steps. First, the data curators split their data into multiple pieces according to the number
of computing servers. Second, the computing servers receive and aggregate each encrypted
piece of data individually with LapDP noise, and then send the local outputs to the data
aggregator. Finally, the data aggregator reports the aggregated result. In addition, the security
of PrivaDA is guaranteed by the Shamir secret-sharing scheme [137], which is applied when
the data curators share their pieces of data, while the privacy is ensured by LapDP. However,
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as the data curators send encrypted original data to the computation servers, once these
semi-honest computing servers are compromised or collude, the privacy guarantees at the
second layer of PrivaDA are lost.
The above works aggregate data with the help of a data aggregator. Given that the
data aggregator may be vulnerable to different types of attacks, such as collusion attack,
other works aggregate the data in a fully distributed manner, that is, without a central data
aggregator. Elahi et al. [39] proposed PrivEx to securely learn statistical information from
the data of distributed data curators. PrivEx achieves DP by injecting Gaussian noise into the
original data collected from the data curators. Secure information sharing is implemented with
two schemes. The first scheme is based on secret sharing, which is similar to PrivaDA [38],
whereby information is aggregated through a three-layer network comprising data curators,
tally key servers and a data aggregator. The second scheme does not contain a data aggregator
at the third layer. Instead, it uses a public bulletin board to save the results and keys from
data curators. Note that, in the second scheme, the public bulletin board does not serve as a
computational party in the data aggregation; therefore, this scheme only contains two layers,
data curators and tally key servers, which check the correctness of data from data curators by
zero-knowledge proof. PrivEx assumes that at least one data curator should be honest, which
is weaker than PrivaDA.
In contrast to the above, Pettai et al. [122] studied the cost of combining DP and SMC
using the sample and aggregation framework of DP because of its statistical functions,
such as counting and arithmetic means. This method first applies a secret-sharing scheme,
Sharemind [13], to split and share pieces of input with all involved parties. Then each party
returns its local output with a fixed threshold to avoid data leakage. Finally, all parties
aggregate the output for the final result. The major result of [122] shows that, for almost
all arithmetic operations—including summation, division, square root, logarithm and bit
shift—adding DP on top of SMC only introduces additional linear time complexity, which is
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an acceptably extra cost for SMC. However, without a constant number of data aggregators,
this full connection network would result in O(n2) time complexity for communication,
where n is the number of data curators, which is significantly higher than other methods
using constant number (c) of data aggregators, where the time complexity for communication
is O(cn) = O(n).
In summary, numerous researchers have applied the combination of SMC and DP schemes
into privacy-preserving data aggregation, so that the aggregated result is both secure and
differentially private. However, the existing work suffers from at least one of the following
problems. First, potential privacy disclosure risk against malicious data curators (or aggre-
gators) exists because of collusion attacks or a potential malicious central server. Second,
a high communication cost may occur because of the fully connected network for infor-
mation sharing without a central server. Therefore, in this thesis, we propose an approach
that ensures both security and DP for distributed data aggregation, while retaining a linear
communication cost against collusion attacks by malicious data curators and/or malicious
server(s).
3.2 Background on Privacy Budget Guarantees of Distributed
Systems
Following the privacy-oriented data aggregation approaches from the previous section, we
further study the overall DP guarantee of a data aggregation system, where each individual
data curator shares differentially private data based on their local privacy requirements. In
DP, this problem is represented by the parallel composition of privacy budget.
We review the results [99, 140] in analysing the parallel composition of the privacy
budget of a distributed differentially private summation system for the overall privacy budget
guarantee. Figure 3.2 displays the general idea, where xi is the raw data of data curator i,
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di is DP noise, ei is the privacy budget of data curator i, y is the aggregation result, e is
the overall privacy budget of the whole aggregation system, and g is the function mapping
privacy budgets of individual data curators and the overall privacy budget of the aggregation
result. Given that function g does not depend on any specific network topology, for simplicity,
we use such an n to 1 star network in this thesis.






Parallel Composition of Privacy Budget:
Let y = (xi +di)+(x j +d j) = (xi + x j)+d
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Fig. 3.2 General Idea of Privacy Budget Guarantees of Distributed Systems.
There are two ways to preserve DP for such a system: implement DP bottom-up or
top-down. For the former, we require each data curator to share differentially private data
according to their own requirement for privacy preservation. We call such an implementation
local DP in this thesis. For the latter, instead of injecting DP noise at each data curator, we
ask the data aggregator to collect the raw data from the data curators, and then compute
a differentially private aggregation output. We call such an implementation global DP in
this thesis. Note that the local DP and global DP preserve DP against different adversaries’
background knowledge. In particular, the local DP guarantees DP in the case of one missing
item in the data curator’s local data, while the global DP guarantees DP in the case of one
missing data curator among all data curators. The global DP works against the strongest
collusion attacks, where n 1 out of n data curators potentially collude with each other.
Based on the amount of injected noise, the final aggregated result could be both locally
and globally differentially private. That is, there is a privacy budget for the global DP that
has equivalent privacy performance to the composition of the local DP of each data curator.
Therefore, our goal is to find the corresponding global DP privacy budget that matches the
3.2 Background on Privacy Budget Guarantees of Distributed Systems 49
performance of the local DP composition. In particular, in this section, we review existing
results on such summation functions [99, 140].
From the previous discussion, we know that the combination of SMC and DP can
guarantee both the security of the computing process and the privacy of computing outcomes
for distributed data aggregation systems. However, such a combination has two main
problems: unknown guarantee of DP for the whole system (i.e., global DP) and the potentially
high computational cost due to SMC. Specifically, the reason for the unknown guarantees
of global DP is that these methods do not differentiate local DP and global DP in terms of
the different assumptions related to adversaries’ background knowledge, that is, one missing
record in the dataset of each data curator (considered by local DP) or one missing data
curator among all the data curators (considered by global DP). Thus, in existing work, when
the authors prove that their scheme is differentially private globally, a D f from each data
curator’s local DP is often used instead of the D f of the whole distributed system.
Some researchers focus on analysing the privacy performance of global DP by ensuring
the local DP of each data curator. McSherry [99] provided the first result on this topic
by studying the property of DP in parallel composition (Theorem 2.2 in Chapter 2). The
property of parallel composition ensures that, if each data curator i provides ei-DP locally,
then the parallel composition of these data curators (like the data aggregation system in the
last section) will have a maxi{ei}-DP globally. This property is helpful for analysing the
privacy performance of a distributed system, such as [172, 103, 88]. However, this parallel
composition property introduces a condition in the proof. That is, D fL(X)   Âi D fL(xi),
where D fL(X) is the local function sensitivity for the data aggregator to have a max{ei}-DP
(global guarantee) and D fL(xi) is the local function sensitivity for each data curator to have
ei-DP (local guarantee), where X = (x1,x2, . . . ,xn). When D fL(X)< Âi D fL(xi), the global
DP guarantee is unknown in the parallel composition in [99]. Table 5.1 in Chapter 5 presents
a counterexample of the conditions in [99].
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Shi et al. [140] achieved Âi ei-DP globally when each data curator provides ei-DP
locally without any such conditions. To do so, both the local and global DP use the same
query function sensitivity D f = D fG where "G" is the global function sensitivity, defined in
Equation (2.2). However, we observe two shortcomings of the result in [140]. First, using
global sensitivity in this case can introduce more noise to conceal the potential difference
between the outputs computed from two neighbouring datasets (one is ours having n records,
the other is the attacker’s having n 1 records). Second, the privacy budget for the global
DP could be too large to have an acceptable level of data utility if the data curators set a large
privacy budget for their local DP.
Based on the above analyses of existing work to guarantee distributed DP, we aim to
provide a lower bound of privacy budget without conditions on any component of the system’s
local function sensitivity (in Equation (2.3) in Chapter 2) to guarantee enhanced privacy
performance.
3.3 Background on Differentially Private Single-path Pub-
lishing
In this section, we briefly summarise the state-of-the-art work on differentially private
single-trajectory publishing [71, 171, 61, 62, 158, 157, 173, 54, 20]. We consider both the
advantages and disadvantages of these works. Figure 3.3 illustrates the general idea of
existing works.
The existing differentially private single-trajectory publishing algorithms are robust to
protect the privacy of vertices/locations of a given path/trajectory under potentially the same
assumptions on an adversary’s background knowledge, and often apply exponential mecha-
nism of DP (ExpDP) [100] to support DP. In particular, they focus on location information as
the privacy of the target trajectory, and assume the adversary does not know some locations
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Fig. 3.3 General Idea of Differentially Private Single Path Publishing.
in a target trajectory. In the worst case, those existing differentially private single-trajectory
publishing algorithms are resilient to the attacker that has n  1 out of n locations (and
their connections) of the private trajectory (such background knowledge is considered the
maximum background knowledge in DP). When achieving DP to preserve location privacy,
the published trajectory may contain fake locations only, which are sampled via ExpDP
from a pre-selected area to replace the real locations in the target trajectory. Researchers
have developed different ways to decide on fake locations with ExpDP according to their
objectives. These include the spatiotemporal relationships between locations [171, 173, 20],
movement directions in a trajectory [71], and the similarity between real and fake loca-
tions [61, 62, 158, 79, 54, 93], e.g., [158, 79, 54] apply clustering-based strategies for
determining fake locations.
The study in [71] presents one of the first differentially private algorithms for single-
trajectory publishing. In [71], Jiang et al. proposed a sampling distance and direction (SDD)
mechanism, which publishes a partially perturbed trajectory of a ship’s movements on the
sea. To retain the utility of the published trajectory, they assume that the starting/first location
and the terminal/last location should be publically available. In the published trajectory,
these two special locations are kept the same as that of the original trajectory. The remaining
locations in the trajectory are determined by a noisy distance and a noisy direction based
on the original adjacent locations. In particular, SDD samples the fake location i+1 with
52 Literature Review
ExpDP, according to the direction and distance from the fake location i to the real location
i+ 1. Additionally, to ensure utility and privacy, the distance between any two adjacent
positions is bounded by the speed of the ship; otherwise, it would be easy for an adversary to
infer the fake locations.
Similar to [71], He et al. [61, 62] proposed a differentially private trajectories (DPT)
system to select the most similar/possible locations in a given area to replace the real locations
in a trajectory. The DPT system was achieved using three key components: hierarchical
referencing, model selection and direction weighted sampling. Hierarchical referencing first
splits the map into equal-sized grids. According to the resolution (the size of the grid cells),
the DPT system creates multiple maps for the given trajectory. If there are real locations of
the trajectory that appear in a grid, then the centre of the grid will be used as a fake location
in the map. Doing so generates a group of possibly fake trajectory candidates. Afterwards,
model selection selects a subset of the fake trajectories using the grid-based injected DP
noise. Following this step, some of the most unlikely trajectories, which are easy to be
filtered, are removed. Finally, direction weighted sampling adjusts the directions of each
location in the fake trajectory to meet the directions in the original trajectory, and then a fake
trajectory is selected randomly to publish the final DP trajectory.
Wang et al. [158, 157] proposed a private trajectory calibration system, which applies a
clustering-based method to find representatively fake locations to replace the real ones for the
published trajectory. In this system, as an initialisation step, frequently visited locations of a
given user, whose trajectory will be published then, are clustered. Then an anchor location in
each cluster is chosen as the representative of the cluster. In [158], the anchor location in a
cluster could be the most visited location, such as the city council or the physical centroid
of the cluster. After generating the anchor point based on the visiting frequency, LapDP
noise is injected into the visit counts of the locations. For a given trajectory of a user, each
location in this trajectory is replaced with its nearest anchor location, while considering
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the spatiotemporal relationship between adjacent locations to finally form the published
trajectory.
Li et al. [79] proposed a differentially private trajectory analysis for points-of-interest
(POI) recommendation based on a clustering approach. In general, this approach builds up
differentially private connections between an individual user and POI for further recommen-
dations. It first selects some of the POI on the trajectories of each user, and then clusters
those POI based on their physical closeness to several super locations, called hubs in [79].
Finally, a matrix of user–POI with LapDP noise is published as the final recommendation
data. In the user–POI matrix, each row indicates the perturbed visit records of a user; hence,
each cell indicates whether a user visits a POI or not. Further, [79] assumes that one atomic
cell in the user–POI matrix is unknown for an adversary, which is the maximum background
knowledge under the DP framework because, in this case, the authors assumed that one
arbitrary user’s full trajectory is not known by the adversary. Note that the atomic cell in
the matrix is actually a location in a trajectory, which is similar to assumptions in other
differentially private trajectory publishing algorithms.
Gu et al. [54] proposed a clustering-based approach for single-trajectory publishing that
is similar to [158]. It differs from [158] by providing a protected locations-oriented approach,
rather than clustering any location to a map. Specifically, for each location in the trajectory,
they first generate a cluster, whose centre is the protected location, with a given radius. The
cluster only contains the locations that have enough visit counts, for example, over a given
threshold. Then, it treats the cluster as a polygon, whose apexes are the most distanced
locations to the cluster centre. Finally, the centroid of the polygon with LapDP noise is used
as the replacement for the original location for subsequent publishing. Note that, in most
cases, the centroid of the polygon is not the same as the centre of the cluster, that is, the
original location because the given visit counts filter out some locations that are close to the
real location.
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Ma et al. [93] proposed an R-tree-based continuous location-publishing scheme, AGENT,
based on dynamic programming. AGENT produces and saves fake locations that are geo-
metrically close to the real locations, in an R-tree. It then searches the corresponding fake
locations in the R-tree to publish the trajectory. In particular, several locations in a given area
are mapped to a sanitised location, which is used as a replacement for those locations. Such
a sanitised location is created by drawing a random location in polar coordinates, where the
real location is the origin, and sampling a radius and angle with uniform distribution. When
publishing the real location, AGENT searches its corresponding sanitised location in the
R-tree within a bound given by LapDP, that is, the distance between the real location and the
selected sanitised location is bounded by random LapDP noise.
Xiao et al. [171, 173] observed that the spatiotemporal relationship may leak privacy,
even if a perturbed trajectory is published. For instance, if a location A is sampled as the
perturbation of the real location X , note that A should be close to X for utility; however, in
the area of A, if X is the only possible place for a person to visit, then the adversary would
immediately know that X is the real location. To address such privacy disclosure problems
caused by spatiotemporal relationships, Xiao et al. [171, 173] prepared a d -locationt set for
each location at timestamp t in the trajectory. All locations appearing in the d -locationt set
can possibly be visited at timestamp t, which satisfies the requirement for the spatiotemporal
relationship. In case the real location is not in the d -locationt , a nearest location will
be used instead. Then, the most possible location to replace the real one in the original
trajectory will be sampled via ExpDP from the d -locationt set. Additionally, a planar isotropic
mechanism (PIM) was proposed to achieve an optimal lower bound of DP for the d -locationt
set. Following [171, 173], Cao et al. [20] proposed a private spatiotemporal event (PriSTE)
framework to further study the spatiotemporal privacy of [171]. The researchers formally
defined a spatiotemporal event as Boolean expressions of a set of (location, time) predicates,
which is a generalisation of geometric-based trajectory.
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In summary, by considering the features of a trajectory, such as the movement direc-
tions, spatiotemporal relationships and closeness of locations, the state-of-the-art DP single-
trajectory publishing algorithms achieve satisfying trade-offs between the privacy guarantee
and data utility of the published trajectories. However, we observe two weaknesses with
existing work. First, through applying DP, even trusted users, who should have full access to
the trajectory information, cannot recover the real trajectory. Second, because of assumptions
about the adversary’s background knowledge, these works are vulnerable when a given
adversary’s background knowledge does not fit their assumptions. Specifically, we assume
that the adversary has full knowledge about the vertices in a path, but misses some edges
(in the worst case, only one missing edge). With such assumptions about the adversary, the
published trajectory from existing work would be vulnerable to releasing the missing edge
to the adversary. Therefore, in this thesis, we aim to propose an approach that publishes a
trajectory with full utility to trusted users, while preserving privacy against adversaries under
our assumption.
3.4 Background to Differentially Private k-Means Cluster-
ing
In this section, we briefly summarise the work on differentially private k-means clustering in
interactive settings [12, 34, 104, 176, 148, 118] and non-interactive settings [112]. Figure 3.4
displays the general idea of centroids updating at any iteration of the interactive differentially
private k-means clustering for two clusters, where triangles and circles denote the centroid of
a cluster and the items for clustering, correspondingly.
Lloyd’s k-means algorithm [87] is the base algorithm for iteratively updating centroids.
Differentially private k-means algorithms typically inject/embed DP into Lloyd’s algorithm
in some way according to their needs/demands and assumptions. Specifically, DP k-means
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At iteration i: ( is the cluster centroid, is the item for clustering)
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Fig. 3.4 General Idea of Interactive Differentially Private k-Means Clustering.
clustering algorithms in both interactive and non-interactive settings assume that the adversary
has maximum background knowledge about the dataset for clustering, that is, n 1 out of n
items in the dataset. Existing work in interactive settings further assumes that the clustering
result of any iteration may be disclosed to an adversary. Therefore, to preserve DP, the works
in interactive settings inject DP noise to each iteration using three major DP mechanisms:
the Laplace mechanism (LapDP) [37], the sample and aggregation framework [114] and the
exponential mechanism (ExpDP) [100]. Meanwhile, the works in non-interactive settings
mainly inject DP noise into the input and/or output using LapDP.
In interactive settings, there is a group of works [12, 34, 148] focusing on injecting
Laplace noise to the centroids of each iteration of Lloyd’s algorithm directly to ensure DP.
The difference between these works is the way they allocate the privacy budget to each
iteration. Blum et al. [12] proposed one of the first differentially private k-means algorithms
by applying LapDP in a sublinear query (SuLQ) database. The key idea of [12] is adding
LapDP noise with the same privacy budget to the k centroids at each iteration of Lloyd’s
algorithm. This algorithm preserves the privacy of each record in the input database using DP,
even against adversaries with the maximum background knowledge. However, it is not easy
to apply SuLQ in real-world databases because it would not terminate without a predefined
number of iterations. To guarantee an acceptable utility of the clustered results, it is necessary
to find a suitable value for the number of iterations by running experiments repeatedly, rather
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than analysing the algorithm theoretically to determine the number of iterations. When the
size of the input database increases, the computational cost to find such a predefined iteration
number also increases significantly.
To avoid running experiments for a predefined number of iterations, Dwork [34] proposed
a privacy budget self-consuming approach to assign the privacy budget of each iteration. In
particular, they set a total privacy budget for k-means clustering according to the privacy re-
quirements, and then allocated a privacy budget to each iteration with decreasing exponential
distributions, such as e/2 for the first iteration, e/4 for the second, and e/8 for the third, etc.
This way, the algorithm can terminate when the privacy budget is exhausted. However, the
total noise injection cannot be ignored. A larger privacy budget implies less noise injection
and hence better utility. The privacy budget allocation of [34] demonstrates that every later
iteration will add more noise to the k centroids before we finally lose control of clustering
utility because the final step will almost add (e = 0)-DP noise, which means no further data
utility. Additionally, if we want to control the amount of injected noise in [34], we must have
a predefined number of iterations, which would be the same problem as faced by [12].
To improve the results of [12] and [34], Su et al. [148] proposed an "optimal" privacy
budget allocation method, which was proven to assign the best privacy budget value to
each iteration. The key idea of the optimised privacy budget allocation is two-fold. First,
it calculates the mean square error (MSE) to measure the amount of injected noise to each
iteration. Second, it chooses the number of iterations to ensure that the MSE of each iteration
is bounded by a given threshold. Su et al. [148] guaranteed that the algorithm terminated
within a finite number of iterations and had a bounded (or optimal) overall noise injection.
However, in the proof of Equation (4) in [148], a key assumption was that the number of
items in each cluster in Lloyd’s algorithm was the same. This is not a realistic assumption in
real-world databases. That is, the proposed "optimal" privacy budget allocation only works
with perfectly clustered datasets.
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To date, there is only one work that applies a sample and aggregation framework to ensure
DP for an interactive k-means clustering algorithm. Mohan et al. [104] proposed GUPT (that
means ‘secret’ in Sanskrit), which embeds the sample and aggregation framework of DP into
Lloyd’s algorithm. GUPT uniformly samples items from an input dataset to different buckets,
where the local clustering results of each bucket are produced by Lloyd’s algorithm. The final
clustering result is the mean of local results with Laplace noise injected. GUPT guarantees
both DP for the final result and algorithm convergence for k-means clustering. The clustering
result of any iteration does not release the privacy of any arbitrary item, as uniform sampling
ensures that the adversary does not know which bucket contains the missing item. However,
the clustering quality is unsatisfactory because of the large amount of noise involved in the
sample and aggregation steps, since the uniform sampling may result in skewness over the
sampled buckets, that is, it can place items belonging to one cluster (the final cluster when
the algorithm terminates) into the same bucket. Then, when we aggregate (calculate the
average value of) the clustering result in each bucket, the aggregated centroids would have a
significant distance from the exact Lloyd’s result.
ExpDP was also used to ensure DP for k-means clustering in interactive settings. Zhang et
al. [176] proposed a genetic algorithm (GA)–based differentially private k-means clustering
algorithm, PrivGene. Unlike with traditional GAs, which select the most qualified candidates,
PrivGene randomly samples the candidates with ExpDP for each iteration, and then applies
the crossover and mutate operations of traditional GAs to iteratively update the centroids.
PrivGene achieves fair clustering quality if the input dataset is relatively small because only
then can it produce globally optimal clustering results with high probability. The reason for
achieving the global optimum is that the mutate operation is computed on multiple selected
centroids; hence, it is possible to find a global optimum with a small dataset. However, similar
to [12], PrivGene also requires a predefined iteration number to terminate the algorithm,
so has efficiency issues. Differing from the above algorithms, Park et al. [118] focused on
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(e,d )-DP, rather than e-DP, with given assumptions on the distribution of the input dataset,
which narrows its applicability to real-world scenarios.
The above are some of the major methods that interactively modify Lloyd’s algorithm to
be differentially private. We also consider other methods to achieve differentially private k-
means clustering based on non-interactive approaches by adding DP noise to the input/output
data, rather than perturbing the algorithm itself. Nguyen et al. [112] proposed a framework
(similar to ExpDP) to add noise to the final clustering results directly, based on the adversary’s
background knowledge (e.g., whether a single record belongs to a given cluster). In the final
iteration, instead of calculating the mean of a cluster, Nguyen et al. calculated an estimated
mean for each cluster. Their approach first creates a bag for each cluster, and then bootstrap
samples (i.e., sampling with replacement) the items from one cluster to its corresponding bag,
where the final number of items of a bag comprises the cluster. It then calculates the means
for each bag as an estimation for the original cluster. In fact, any approach that can process
raw data to be differentially private could be used for non-interactive k-means clustering.
For example, Qardaji et al. [125] proposed differentially private grids for geospatial data to
answer queries about two-dimensional data with high accuracy. Su et al. [147] improved the
result in [125] by making the input data k-means differentially private. The improvement
of [147] was to find a way to decide a key parameter in [125] for high-dimensional data.
Adding noise to the data (either input or output) would be a straightforward way to achieve
DP; however, once we assume that the clustering result of any iteration may be disclosed to
an adversary, just injecting noise to the output would not be a safe choice. Further, when the
size of the input database is very large, injecting noise to the input can result in an additional
high computational cost on the data pre-processing prior to the clustering process.
Based on the above analysis of existing differentially private k-means clustering algo-
rithms in both the interactive and non-interactive settings, we draw three observations for
differentially private k-means algorithms. First, we should preserve privacy for all iterations
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in case of the accidental disclosure of clustering results of any iteration to preserve DP in
interactive settings. Second, convergence is an important property of differentially private
k-means algorithms for both efficiency (convergence avoids running algorithms repeatedly
to determine a predefined number of iterations) and the resultant clustering quality (conver-
gent algorithms terminate at one of the local optimums for k-means problems). Third, it is
essential to have a good trade-off between the privacy of each single item in a dataset and the
clustering quality. In this thesis, we explore how to guarantee convergence and improved
clustering quality to meet the same DP requirement as existing work in interactive settings.
3.5 Summary
In this chapter, we have briefly reviewed the literature in state-of-the-art differentially private
data analytics from the following aspects: differentially private data aggregation with security
guarantees, privacy budget guarantees suitable for distributed systems, differentially private
single-trajectory publishing and differentially private k-means clustering. We observe some
problems in existing work, as follows:
• For differentially private data aggregation, the weakness of existing work is when data
aggregator(s) maliciously collude to present a risk to data curator(s).
• For the privacy budget of distributed systems and the parallel composition of DP budget,
existing lower bounds of privacy budget are insufficient for the summation/counting
function.
• For differentially private single-path publishing, the state-of-the-art approaches fail to
protect the existence of edge(s) when the adversary knows all information (vertices
and edges) except one edge in a path.
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• For differentially private k-means, poor clustering quality arises because of potential
non-convergence.




Differentially Private Data Aggregation
with Security Guarantees
With the large deployment of smart devices, the collection and analysis of personal data can
significantly benefit both industry and people’s daily life. However, it gives rise to a serious
risk to people’s privacy. Recently, combining SMC and DP has offered a popular strategy
to guarantee both (computing) security and (output) privacy when dealing with distributed
data aggregation. To decrease the communication costs of the traditional SMC paradigm, the
existing work introduces trusted/semi-honest data aggregator(s) that aggregate data collected
from distributed semi-honest data curators. However, there is neither security nor privacy
guarantees when trusted/semi-honest data aggregators collude. That is, collusion of data
aggregators could result in exchange of received data that could be used to infer the privacy
of contributing data curator(s). In the worst case, n 1 out of n data aggregators may collude.
To address the privacy disclosure problem caused by the colluding and semi-honest data
aggregators, while maintaining acceptable data utility, we propose an approach that randomly
injects DP noise into both data curators and data aggregators. Theoretical and experimental
analyses show that, to achieve the same security and privacy guarantees, our framework
provides better data utility than existing approaches.
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4.1 Introduction
The application and development of the IoT, radio frequency identification [72] and wireless
sensor networks [97] have significantly affected the way we live [52, 14, 180]. For example,
modern recommender systems provide us with accurate recommendations by collecting and
analysing our online behaviour, such as shopping histories, visited locations and identifying
users that have similar preferences to us [101].
In many real-life applications of the IoT, the source data are distributed across different
parties or servers. To learn important insights from the distributed data, it is necessary to
support computations over the distributed sources of data. However, such joint computation
raises key challenges in (computing) security and resultant (output) privacy [122]. Thus, the
security requirement aims to guarantee that every computational party only learns the knowl-
edge that can be learnt from the computation outputs [57], while the privacy requirement
aims to decrease the probability of inferring other parties’ privacy based on the computation
outputs.
To ensure security, techniques to achieve SMC (or MPC) (see details of SMC in Chapter 2)
are the most established. As discussed, the SMC paradigm allows multiple parties to jointly
compute a function over each party’s private data, without a trusted third party taking the
raw data from each party and computing the result. Consequently, each party is oblivious
to the other parties’ private inputs. After many years of development, there are a number
of established techniques to implement SMC, including secret sharing, oblivious transfer,
zero-knowledge proof and homomorphic encryption [24]. However, SMC remains vulnerable
to inference attacks, as discussed in Chapter 2. Given that the final output of SMC makes no
difference to the corresponding non-privacy-preserving computation, adversaries can still
infer people’s privacy based on the explicit output and auxiliary information.
To achieve privacy, researchers apply some famous data perturbation techniques, such
as data randomisation [33, 160] and data anonymisation [150, 179] (that includes data
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suppression and data generalisation). These perturb the original data and/or algorithm to
satisfy privacy requirements (a detailed introduction of these techniques can be found in
Chapter 2). Among all the techniques for data randomisation and anonymisation, DP [33] is
one of the most promising because of its strong assumptions about adversaries’ background
knowledge and the privacy budget, e , that can trade-off data utility and privacy. However,
DP does not provide any security guarantees in distributed environments.
Given that neither SMC nor DP can address the above privacy challenges independently,
a common approach is combining SMC and DP to leverage the advantages of the two
techniques. Researchers have applied a combined SMC and DP scheme in privacy-preserving
data aggregation [130, 1, 140, 38, 39, 52, 122]. In [39, 122], the schemes worked on a full
connected network; however, this resulted in a high communication cost. Meanwhile, in
[130, 1, 140, 52, 39, 122], the schemes assumed that at least some of the computation parties
(either data curators or data aggregators) were semi-honest, and could potentially disclose
a specific user’s (party’s) privacy when there is collusion with n  1 parties (malicious
adversaries). The research in [38] addressed the problems of colluding data curators and
data aggregators and high communication cost by introducing a semi-honest server. Such
a semi-honest server aggregated the final output. However, if the semi-honest server is
compromised, user privacy will be at risk. To conclude, existing work suffers from at least
one of the following problems: (1) potential privacy disclosure risk against malicious data
curators (or aggregators) through collusion attacks or a malicious central server or (2) high
communication costs due to the fully connected network for information sharing without a
central server. To address these weaknesses, the contributions of this chapter are as follows:
• In contrast to existing work, which guarantees security and privacy against semi-
honest computation parties or with a mix of semi-honest and colluding semi-honest
(malicious) parties, we assume that all parties are potentially colluding semi-honest
(malicious), while still achieving the same security and privacy guarantees.
66 Differentially Private Data Aggregation with Security Guarantees
• We propose a two-layer (data curator and data aggregator layers) data aggregation
approach, where each party injects DP noise randomly, instead of injecting noise by all
parties, as is common in existing work. Additionally, we demonstrate that our random
noise-injection approach achieves the same DP requirements as existing work.
• We experimentally evaluate our approach against the state-of-the-art approaches using
a synthetic dataset and summation function. To achieve the same security and privacy
guarantees, our approach offers enhanced data aggregation utility because of the
random noise injection.
Organisation. The remainder of this chapter is organised as follows. In Section 4.2, we
provide a brief introduction to the preliminaries of this chapter, and then propose the novel
privacy-preserving data aggregation scheme, which addresses the privacy disclosure problem
of existing work. In Section 4.3, we provide an experimental evaluation of existing work and
discuss our framework. Finally, in Section 4.4, we conclude this chapter.
4.2 Privacy-Preserving Data Aggregation with Colluding
Semi-honest Aggregators
In this section, we introduce our privacy-preserving data aggregation framework and present
a theoretical evaluation of its performance with regard to security, privacy and utility.
4.2.1 Adversary Model
Generally, we categorise adversaries into two models, semi-honest adversaries and malicious
adversaries, according to their willingness to follow a privacy-preserving protocol. A semi-
honest adversary is also known as a honest-but-curious (HBC) or passive adversary. That is,
a semi-honest adversary always follows the protocol faithfully, yet tries to infer additional
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information (especially private information) from both the process and output of a protocol.
A malicious adversary is also known as an active adversary who aims to cheat the protocol
arbitrarily to violate the targeted victim’s privacy. In this chapter, we define a malicious
adversary as a colluding, semi-honest adversary.
4.2.2 Our Framework
This work is inspired by [38]. Given that the network model in [38] is not a fully connected
graph, the communication cost will be sufficiently low: O(n), where n is the number of
data curators. Moreover, the security is guaranteed through secret sharing between the data
curators and aggregators from the architecture in [38]. Building on the two advantages of
[38], our framework also comprises two layers, as shown in Figure 4.1. Note that, without a
data aggregator, a ring network can potentially achieve low communication cost with both
security and DP guarantee. That is, each data curator sends the aggregation of data received
from a predecessor and his or her differentially private data to the successor. The final data
curator would have the final aggregation result in O(n) time complexity. However, such a
scheme would fail to deliver the final output if there is a faulty connection.
. . .
. . . . . . . . .
: c data aggregators (c is a constant)
: n data curators (at most n 1 are colluding)
: secure communication channels
Fig. 4.1 Framework Overview of Differentially Private Data Aggregation with Colluding
Semi-honest Aggregators.
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Specifically, in Figure 4.1, there are n data curators with private data as inputs to a linear
data aggregation function, such as counting or summation. We assume that there are at most
n 1 malicious (colluding semi-honest) data curators who work together to attempt to violate
a victim’s privacy. There are c malicious (colluding semi-honest) data aggregators who
assist in this process. It is quite straightforward to make this assumption because curators’
privacy/secret will be easily disclosed by cooperation of k out of c aggregators, where k is
the security bound of the secret-sharing scheme. Note that, in the real world, compared with
the number of customers (data curators, such as mobile telephone users), the number of
servers (data aggregators) is much smaller; hence, we assume that the number of servers is
constant in this chapter. In this model, we cannot send the original data to any aggregators
directly. Instead, we must upload the differentially private data to the aggregators to ensure
the privacy of the source curator data. However, a new problem will emerge if we only inject
noise at the curator layer. Given that we care about the data utility, we must limit the extent
that we perturb the original data; however, cooperation of adversaries can also potentially
violate the victim’s privacy from the final output. Thus, we must also inject differentially
private noise at the aggregator layer. However, since we inject noise at both the curator layer
and aggregator layer, the overall data utility will be significantly affected because of the
extra noise. Therefore, in this chapter, we introduce two probabilities at the two layers for
injecting the noise. The data utility will be controlled by tuning these two probabilities. Such
noise injection probabilities can be treated as an additional privacy parameter/measurement
to normal differential privacy, which are similar to the idea of privacy budget, therefore it is
assumed known beforehand. Specifically, a higher noise injection probability indicates higher
privacy guarantee. Since determining a suitable value of this noise injection probability is
similar to that of privacy budget, it is out of the scope of this thesis. Algorithm 4.1 shows
how the framework works.
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Algorithm 4.1: Privacy Preserving Data Aggregation.
Input : Original curator data set: U = {u1,u2, . . . ,un};
Data aggregation request function (linear function): f (U );
Number of curators: n; Number of aggregators: c;
Data splitting weights: w ji for data curator i’s jth piece of data;
DP budget: e iu, for each curator i; e
j
s , for each aggregator j;
Noise adding probability: Priu, for each curator i; Pr
j
s , for each aggregator j.
Output :Privacy preserved data aggregation result: R.
1 Curator i splits ui into c parts: ui = Âcj=1 w
j





2 Curator i generates a DP noise Nui with e iu and local sensitivity Dsum(w
j
i ui), splits






= u ji +w
j






= u ji with
probability 1 Priu;
3 Curator i sends u ji
0
to Aggregator j;




, . . . ,u jn
0
} from each curator i;
5 Aggregator j generates a DP noise Ns j with e js and local sensitivity D f (s j), then
calculates f (s j)0 = f (s j)+Ns j with probability Pr
j
s , f (s j)0 = f (s j) with
probability 1 Pr js ;
6 All aggregator j construct a Secured Multi-party Computation for R = f ( f (s j)0);
From Line 1 to Line 3, the data curators apply DP and a secret sharing scheme to
guarantee both the security and privacy of their private data. A noise injection probability,
Priu, is used for a curator i to decide whether a noise will be added. From Line 4 to Line 6,
the data aggregators apply DP and the basic SMC paradigm, so that none of the data at each
aggregator will be released to other aggregators. Similar to what happened at the curator
layer, each aggregator j will also use a noise injection probability, Pr js , to inject DP noise
randomly.
4.2.3 Theoretical Evaluation
Privacy and Security Guarantee
Proposition 4.1. The proposed privacy preserving data aggregation framework is e-differentially
private.
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Proof. Given that our framework works with two layers, we start from the data curator layer:
Each data curator i injects differential privacy noise with probability Priu (injects 0 with
probability 1 Priu); thus we have the following expectation of the differentially private data
after noise injection.





i ui} is the local sensitivity of the aggregation function (summation/counting
in this chapter) for ui. Let it be D fL(ui), and then Lap 1(D fL(ui),e iu) is the LapDP noise
generated by Laplace distribution. Thus for ui, we have
Pr[ûi = xi] = Pr[noise = xi ui] = Priu⇥Lap(maxni=1{w
j
i ui},e iu,noise),





Pr[noise = xi  ûi]




i ui}),e iu,(xi  ûi))
Priu⇥Lap((maxni=1{w
j
i ui}),e iu,(xi  û0i))
.
According to the definition of DP (Definition 2.5, Chapter 2), assuming the aggregation
function is summation, the above is upper bounded by exp(e iu). That is,
Pr[ûi = xi]< Pr[û0i = xi]⇥ exp(e iu).
Given that, at the curator layer, we have a parallel composition, according to Theorem 2.2
(Chapter 2), we have guarantee (maxni=1{e iu})-DP at this layer. Similarly, we will have a
(maxcj=1{e
j
s })-DP guarantee at the aggregator layer, given that the function f in this chapter
is a linear function, it is easy to maintain the same property with the curator layer.
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Overall, because our framework works with two layers sequentially, based on Theorem 2.1
(Chapter 2), our framework is (maxni=1{e iu}+maxcj=1{e
j
s })-differentially private.
Clearly, Proposition 4.1 ensures that the noise injection probabilities at both the curator
and aggregator layer do not affect the privacy performance of our framework. Therefore, we
can safely tune the two probabilities to achieve enhanced data utility, whilst retaining the
same privacy guarantees as the existing privacy-preserving data aggregation schemes.
Proposition 4.2 ([38]). The proposed privacy preserving data aggregation framework is
secure.
Utility Analysis
In this section, we use the variance of Laplace distribution to measure the performance
of computation utility between our framework with PrivaDA that uses a Laplacian mech-
anism [38]. It is clear that the worst case for noise injection is dependent on the variance
of the Laplace distribution. We have Inequality 4.1 to represent a relationship to achieve
better data utility (than PrivaDA, because PrivaDA [38] proves it has better data utility than
PASTE [130]), while guaranteeing the same DP. Specifically, on the left side of Inequality 4.1,
we calculate the overall Laplace parameter involved in Algorithm 4.1, where the first item
represents the n data curators (users) and the second item represents the c data aggregators
(servers). On the right side of Inequality 4.1, we calculate the overall Laplace parameter for
PrivaDA. To keep the overall privacy budget the same as Algorithm 4.1, that is, the same
privacy guarantee, each data aggregator j in PrivaDA uses e js +maxni=1{e iu} as the privacy




















e js +maxni=1{e iu}
. (4.1)






















Given that we assume that the maximum values of the privacy budget for both data curators






















1  ratio  1. (4.2)
In Section 4.3, we use Inequality 4.2 to determine the value of the privacy budget ratio to
achieve enhanced data utility in the experiments.
Further, if we take the right-hand side of Inequality (4.2) as a normalised noise injection
of existing work (normalised to 1), then the left side of Inequality (4.2) measures the
normalised noise injection of proposed Algorithm 4.1. Let it be a function of ratio, that is,






1 ratio , and then it is easy to find (by solving f
0(ratio) = 0)
that 9raio 2 (0,1), f (ratio) has its global minimum value, i.e., minimum noise injection.
4.3 Experimental Evaluation
4.3.1 Evaluation Metric
In this chapter, we use the mean absolute error (MAE) [166] and the mean relative error
















where N is the overall number of experiments, Ri is the output of the ith experiment on a
privacy-preserving data aggregation scheme, and R is the ground truth, which is the output of
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the original data aggregation function. Specifically, in our experiments, we set N = 10,000.
Clearly, a lower MAE (MRE) indicates better performance for data utility.
4.3.2 Experimental Results
Experimental settings. According to the analyses in Section 3.1, for our experiments, we
compare the performance of data utility with schemes that share a similar topology for data
aggregation: PrivaDA [38], PASTE [130], a naive idea (Orig, which injects differentially
private noise at both the curator layer and aggregator layer without randomness, that is, with
probability equal to 1), and the proposed idea in this chapter (ThisWork, which injects noise
with randomness, as in Algorithm 4.1). In brief, PrivaDA has a three-layer network, where
the data curator layer splits and sends local data to data aggregators, and the data aggregator
layer aggregates the received data pieces, injects DP noise and sends the aggregated data to a
central server. PASTE implements an n to 1 network, where n data curators send differentially
private encrypted data to a data aggregator. Details about PrivDA and PASTE can be found
in Section 3.1. To simplify the experiments, we assign the same privacy budget (in all of
the above schemes) and inject noise with probability for all participants in the same layer
for ThisWork. To achieve the same DP guarantee, we set the privacy budget as eu + es = e ,
where e is the privacy budget for PrivaDA and PASTE. In particular, we have eu = ratio⇥ e .
The number of data curators n = 104 and the number of aggregators c = 5.
In the experiments, the values of ratio approximate the theoretical optimal one (Inequal-
ity (4.2)), yet do not exactly match it because of the randomised mechanism involved in
the experiments. Further, we do not use the real-world dataset because our objective is to
evaluate the performance of the above schemes based on the numeric properties of the input
data. Therefore, we generate synthetic data for each data curator with the same normal
distribution (mean = 500, variance = 1) where we have ten thousands data curators, each
data curator has five numeric data records. We implement the normal distribution with a
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Fig. 4.2 Data Utility Affected by Probability at Curator Layer (e = 10, Prs = 10 2).
Fig. 4.3 Data Utility Affected by Probability at Aggregator Layer (e = 10, Pru = 10 4).
default MATLAB function, normrnd(). For each single data record for data curators, we
truncate the generated data to a positive float array, where each single array element has four
decimal places. In addition, to comprehensively explore the data utility when applying DP
on summation function, we set the values of privacy budget to a large range [1,100]. (Source
code: https://github.com/suluz/sec_dp_aggregation)
Experimental results analysis. Figures 4.2 and 4.3 display how the noise injection
probability at both the curator layer and the aggregator layer affects the data utility. As
expected, the noise injection probabilities has a negative effect on data utility because both the
MAE and MRE values increase when we increase the noise injection probability. It is clear
that, by tuning these two probabilities, we can control the overall output quality to achieve
enhanced data utility over existing schemes. Figure 4.4 illustrates how the privacy budget e
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Fig. 4.4 Data Utility Affected by e (ratio = 0.75, Pru = 10 4, Prs = 10 2).
in DP affects the data utility. As an important property of DP, a larger e signifies that less
noise is added to the original request output; hence, it achieves better data utility. Figure 4.5
demonstrates how the privacy budget ratio between the curator and aggregator layer affects
the data utility. We see that, by tuning the privacy budget ratio, the schemes, which introduce
privacy budget into both the curator and aggregator layer, can achieve optimal performance
on data utility. In addition, we note that the MAE and MRE of ThisWork and Orig increase
in the tail in Figure 4.5. Such behaviours match our theoretical analysis for the utility of
Algorithm 4.1, that is, there exists a privacy budget ratio 2 (0,1) that provides the minimum
noise injection (i.e., the minimum value of MAE and MRE in Figure 4.5). Further, because
PrivaDA and PASTE do not inject DP noise for both data curators and data aggregators, their
MAE and MRE values are stable when tuning the ratio.
4.4 Summary
The applications of the IoT make it possible for large-scale data collection and analysis
through data aggregation. However, preserving personal privacy while ensuring acceptable
data utility is a significant challenge for data aggregation applications. In this chapter, we
have overcome the privacy disclosure problem of existing work caused by semi-honest
data aggregators, and provided a novel privacy-preserving data aggregation scheme that
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Fig. 4.5 Data Utility Affected by Privacy Budget Ratio (e = 10, Pru = 10 4, Prs = 10 2).
operates with colluding semi-honest data aggregators. Both the theoretical and experimental
evaluations demonstrated that, to achieve the same guarantee of security and privacy as in
previous works, our scheme provides enhanced output data utility.
Chapter 5
Privacy Budget Guarantees of
Distributed Systems
Following the previous chapter, when aggregating data from distributed data curators, to
preserve the privacy of data from each data curator, we could apply DP on data curators’
original data prior to sending them to a data aggregator. However, such a privacy-preserving
process could be vulnerable to worst-case collusion attacks, where n 1 out of n colluding
curators work together to infer a victim’s privacy from the aggregation output. That is,
the privacy performance of the whole aggregation system may not be differentially private
with regard to the victim data curator. Therefore, it is crucial to study the privacy budget
guarantees of distributed systems. Thus, the function to map the local DP budget of each
curator (that reflects the privacy level of each curator’s local data) to a global DP budget (that
reflects the privacy level of the whole aggregation system) is important.
In this chapter, we study the parallel composition of privacy budgets of differentially
private data aggregations through a special function, summation (counting), as this function
is useful to learn statistics of the aggregated data; hence it is commonly used in real-life
applications. Examples include analysing electricity consumption by aggregating data
from smart electricity meters, and counting the overall number of HIV-positive patients
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by collecting data from each hospital. Currently, there are two major results of parallel
composition of privacy budget: e = maxi{ei} [99] and e = Âi ei [140]. For a summation
function, the former [99] suffers from the problem of unknown privacy guarantees when
the aggregation sensitivity of the whole system is less than the sum of the data curator’s
aggregation sensitivity. The latter [140] suffers from the problem of low data utility by
using the global function sensitivity. To address these problems, we provide a new lower






(where |U | is the number of data curators
and D fL(xi) is the local sensitivity of data curator i), which works with an unconditional
sensitivity of the whole aggregation system. In particular, we take advantage of a property of
the summation function when computing local sensitivity. That is, the local sensitivity of
summation for a dataset equals the maximum summation of any sub-dataset. Additionally,
we demonstrate that data updating does not affect our lower bound of parallel composition
for summation. Both theoretical and experimental evaluations show that our privacy bound
offers better global privacy performance than existing work, without any special conditions
on the function sensitivity of the DP.
5.1 Introduction
As a result of the prevalence of smart devices, such as smart phones, fitness wristbands
and wireless sensors, personal information is generated and collected at every moment of
our lives [82, 124]. By analysing such information, we can improve the quality of our
life, our productivity and the correctness of our decision making [126]. For instance, it is
reported [105] that, based on the daily records of heart rate data from a smart wristband, a
group of doctors took a series of appropriate actions to save a middle-aged male’s life from a
serious heart attack.
Among all the functions in data analysis, the summation and counting functions are
two of the most classic and important ones. For example, energy providers can optimise
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electricity allocation in a state based on the periodic power usage (summation) of suburbs
in the state, or a hospital can learn seasonal flu trends by counting the daily number of flu
victims. In this chapter, we focus on the privacy issues associated with summation and
counting functions.
Currently, to steal private information, instead of brute force attacks, which require
powerful computing ability, inferring privacy through publicly available data is easier to
adversaries [16, 47, 108, 143]. In this chapter, we examine the worst-case assumption that
n 1 out of n data curators collude to infer a victim’s privacy using published aggregation
results. To preserve privacy for distributed summation and counting against worst-case
adversary scenarios, we use DP as our privacy notion. The traditional DP usually works in
centralised scenarios, based on a trusted and secure database that holds all the data. Given that
we aim to preserve the data curator’s privacy in a distributed setting against the worst-case
collusion attacks (where n 1 out of n participants share their local data to infer a victim’s
private information by comparing their data with the final computing results), we need to
extend the centralised DP to distributed DP (DDP).
In the research field of DDP, Dwork et al. [36] proposed the first scheme to extend
DP in distributed scenarios by combining SMC and centralised DP. Inspired by [36], a
body of work has applied the combination of SMC and DP in different applications, such
as data aggregation [122], machine learning [18], data publishing [63] and theoretical
computer science [115]. However, the techniques of SMC in these works incur a significant
computational cost, which is not realistic for many smart devices. Differing from the above,
McSherry [99] and Shi et al. [140] provided a more formal definition of DDP. Their DDP
scheme automatically guarantees global e-DP (the presence or absence of any data curator
barely affects the aggregation outputs) by ensuring local ei-DP at each data curator i. That
is, they study the DDP through studying the research problem of parallel composition of
the privacy budget, where we aim to find a function g, such that e = g(e1,e2, . . . ,en). Given
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that such a function g does not depend on a specific network topology, for simplicity, we
consider an n to 1 star network in this chapter Figure 5.1 displays the basic network topology
settings and assumptions, where each data curator sends local aggregation xi to a central
server to have the final aggregation y, and f is the aggregation function, which is specified as
summation in this chapter.
y
y = f ( f (x1), f (x2), . . . , f (xn))
x1 x2 xn. . .





: n data curators (at most n 1 are colluding)
: secure communication channels
ri, j : record j in database i
Fig. 5.1 Basic Network Topology Settings.
As noted, there are two major results: e = maxi{ei} [99] and e = Âi ei [140]1. However,
we observe a weakness for each of the two solutions. The former [99] suffers from the
problem of unknown privacy guarantees with conditional local function sensitivity, that is,
the aggregator’s local function sensitivity (D fL(X) = maxi{ f (xi)}= maxi{Â j xi, j}, where
X = {x1,x2, · · · ,xn} as defined in Equation (2.3), Chapter 2) should be greater than the sum
of the data curator’s local function sensitivity (Âi D fL(xi) = Âi{max j xi, j}). When we have
a case where some of the data curators always return large values, for example, a smart
meter at a factory always reports a greater electricity consumption than a smart meter at a
residential apartment at any given time, the condition for [99] is always true. However, in
some other cases (e.g., the MovieLens dataset used in our experiments), the above condition
will not be achieved. The latter solution [140] suffers from the problem of low data utility
1In this chapter, we use the naive scheme of [140] because it has the same task as [99] and our work. That
is, we all aim to guarantee the global DP only by injecting local DP noise at the data curators.
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by using the aggregator’s global function sensitivity (defined in Equation (2.2), Chapter 2)
for each data curator. Table 5.1 presents a counterexample for parallel composition in
[99] where t is the timestamp and xi is data curator i. That is, for a summation function
f , D fL(X) < Âi D fL(xi). In Table 5.1, each data curator xi calculates the sum of their
local data, for example, f (x3) = 1+ 1+ 1+ 27 = 30. We also have their local sensitivity
D fL(xi) = max4j=0{xi, j}, for example, D fL(x1) = max{1,2,3,4}= 4, then the sum of each
data curator’s local sensitivity is Â3i=1 D fL(xi) = 4+ 8+ 27 = 39. The local sensitivity of
the overall aggregation function is D fL(X) = max3i=1{ f (xi)} = 30. Thus we have 30 =
D fL(X)< Âi D fL(xi) = 39, such a case is not considered in [99].
Table 5.1 Counterexample for Parallel Composition in [99].
t x1 x2 x3
0 1 5 1
1 2 6 1
2 3 7 1
3 4 8 27
f (xi) 10 26 30
D fL(xi) 4 8 27
Therefore, in this chapter, we aim to provide a new lower bound of the parallel compo-
sition of the privacy budget for differentially private data aggregation for a summation (or
counting) function. This uses the local sensitivity of the summation function to inject less
noise than [140], while such sensitivity has no condition as in [99]. We summarise our main
contributions in this chapter as follows:
• We use the local sensitivity of the summation function to calculate the lower bound
of parallel composition on the privacy budget, so that we have less noise injected
compared to [140] to ensure better data utility with the same privacy requirements.
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• We do not set any condition on the local sensitivities between the data aggregator and
the data curator, such that, compared to [99], our result fits more general datasets to
differentially private data aggregation using a summation function.
• We mathematically prove that our lower bound of parallel composition of the privacy
budget also works with two common scenarios of time-serial data aggregation: passive
data updates (malicious data cleansing) and active data updates (dynamically adding
or removing data curators and/or serially refreshing data).
• We experimentally evaluate our result over two real-world datasets to illustrate the
performance of our privacy budget bound across various experimental settings.
We organise the remainder of the chapter as follows. We show our lower bound of
privacy budget and the proofs in Section 5.2. In Section 5.3, we study the performance of
our result using two real-life data update scenarios. Then, in Section 5.4, we experimentally
evaluate the performance of our privacy budget bounds with two real-world datasets. Finally,
Section 5.5 concludes this chapter.
5.2 Unconditional Lower Bound of Privacy Budget
In this chapter, the major privacy risk comes from collusion attacks, where partial computing
participants (data curators) share data (inputs) that they provide to data aggregators, and then
attempt to infer victims’ private information by comparing the published aggregation outputs
against colluding shares. Given that we do not know the exact number of curators who may
join in collusion attacks, we make the strongest assumption that n 1 out of n data curators
are colluders.
Naturally, the traditional concept of DP is suitable to handle the above worst case because
of its strongest assumption about an adversary’s background knowledge. Differing from
traditional DP, our objective is to guarantee e-DDP to preserve a data curator’s privacy
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against the strongest collusion attacks. According to the DDP achieved in [99] and [140],
we also guarantee the global DP (with local sensitivity) by ensuring local DP for each data
curator.
According to Definition 2.5 (in Chapter 2), for a mechanism T to be e-global differen-
tially private, we should have:
T (X) = f (X)+DPnoise(e,D f (X)),
namely,
Pr[T (X) 2 S]
Pr[T (X 0) 2 S]  exp(e⇥D f (X)), (5.1)
where X = (x1,x2, . . . ,xn) and X 0 is a neighbouring set of X and they have all the same
elements except one: | kXk kX 0k |= 1.
Given that the global DP should preserve privacy against the strongest collusion attacks,
we have the following Theorem 5.1 to find a lower bound of the privacy budget e to achieve
the global DP in Equation (5.1) by implementing the local DP for all data curators.








where f is a summation (or counting) function, U is the set of data curators.
Proof. For each data curator i, we have guaranteed the local DP,
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Then according to [99], the parallel composition of Tis is,




Pr[T (X) 2 S]

























































Recalling the global DP guranteed by Equation (5.1) and the DP definition (Defini-






, and then we prove






-differentially private, if Ti is
ei-differentially private.
In the proof of Theorem 5.1, because the query function f is a summation (or counting)
function, then maxi2U { f (xi)}= D fL(X). In contrast to [99], we do not have any condition
on the value of D fL(X). Actually, since we relax the condition D fL(X)   Âi2U D fL(xi) in
[99], we treat our result as an approximation of the lower bound of the privacy budget for
distributed DP. Note that once a dataset meets the condition of D fL(X)  Âi2U D fL(xi) in
[99], our lower bound of privacy budget would be greater than the result of [99]. Namely, in
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that case, our result would inject more differential noise than [99]. Further, we use the local
sensitivity D fL(X), which is much smaller than the global sensitivity D fG(X); therefore, we
could provide better data utility than [140].
Additionally, to learn the worst case of the performance of distributed DP, we also study
the upper bound of D fL(X) = maxi2U { fL(xi)} in Theorem 5.2, that is, the relationship
between D fL(X) and Âi2U D fL(xi), where f is the summation (or counting) function.
Theorem 5.2. Let database xi have mi records and a summation (or counting) function
f on xi has local sensitivity D fL(xi), then the upper bound of local sensitivity of f on








As we know, D fL(X) = maxi2U { fL(xi)}  S2; thus, if we can find a k so that D fL(X) 













Therefore, D fL(X)maxi2U {mi}⇥Âi2U D fL(xi).
Algorithm 5.1 shows an approach to guarantee the distributed DP for a summation and
counting function in a star network.
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Algorithm 5.1: Differentially Private Data Aggregation.
Input : Original data curator’s database: X = {x1,x2, . . . ,xn};
Data aggregation function: f ;
Local DP budget, ei, for each data curator i.
Output : Differentially private data aggregation output: R.
1 Data curator i generates DP noise DPi by ei and its local function sensitivity D fL(xi),
i.e., DPi = DP(ei,D fL(xi)), 8i 2U ;
2 Data curator i sends f 0(xi) = f (xi)+DP(ei,D fL(xi)) to the data aggregator, 8i 2U ;
3 Data aggregator computes
4 R = f ( f 0(x1), f 0(x2), . . . , f 0(xn));
5.3 Privacy Performance with Continuous Data Updates
In this section, we study the privacy performance (i.e., lower bound of privacy budget e for
global DP) of Algorithm 5.1 when we update data in real-world applications. Specifically,
our discussion will mainly focuses on two types of data update: passive data updates (e.g.,
malicious data cleansing) and active data updates (e.g., dynamically adding/removing data
curator and/or serially refreshing data).
Case 1: Passive Data Updates. In real-world applications, to mislead data aggregation,
a malicious data curator i may arbitrarily pollute his or her original data f (xi) as f 0(xi) =
f (xi)+d , where d is the arbitrary pollution. To ensure the correctness of the data aggregation,
it is necessary to cleanse the polluted data. Currently, there are several ways to recover the
original data from the polluted data, such as compressive sensing [70]. Instead of studying
techniques for data recovery (such as determining what data to recover), in this chapter, we
only focus on the lower bound of privacy budget for a distributed differentially private data
summation (or counting) function (Figure 5.1) after cleansing the polluted data. There are
two cases that should be considered: (1) when malicious data curators submit the polluted
data with local DP guarantees and (2) when malicious data curators only submit the polluted
data, but do not provide local DP with their submissions. We name the set of malicious
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data curators M , the set of honest data curators as H , and the set of all data curators as
U = M [H , where M \H =?.
Malicious data with DP guarantees. In this case, once polluted data are cleansed,
the information submitted by a malicious adversary i would also be Ti(xi) = f (xi) +
DPnoise(ei,D fL(xi)), 8i 2M , regardless of whether the adversary adds DP noise before
or after the polluted data injection. Therefore, the lower bound of e for global DP will be
guaranteed by Theorem 5.1.
Malicious data without DP guarantees. After cleansing the polluted data (arbitrary
value), the data submitted by a malicious data curator j, who did not provide any DP
guarantees on the submitted data, will be T j(x j) = f (x j). In this case, we use Proposition 5.1
to show the lower bound of the privacy budget e for such a case.
Proposition 5.1. Let Ti provide ei-DP, i 2H , T j does not provide DP, j 2M , then the
parallel composition of all Ti and T j will not have DP guarantees.
Proof. * 8 j 2M , T j does not provide DP,
) 8 j 2M , T j(x j) = f (x j) = f (x j)+0 = f (x j)+DPnoise(e j,D fL(x j)). According to Def-
inition 2.5, when a mechanism T j does not provide DP guarantee
(DPnoise(e j,D fL(x j)) = 0), e j =+• > ei, 8i 2H , then, based on the conclusion in Theo-
rem 5.1, the parallel composition of all Ti and T j will be {+•}-differentially private; hence
we do not have any DP guarantees.
Therefore, in Case 1, to guarantee distributed DP in data aggregation by applying a
summation and counting function for the network in Figure 5.1, we must assume that the
malicious adversaries only arbitrarily pollute the data, but faithfully follow the local DP
protocol.
Case 2: Active Data Updates. In real-world applications, we may have the following
cases: new data curators join, existing data curators leave, and the data curators regularly
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refresh their private data. In Proposition 5.2, we study the lower bound of the privacy budget
for such cases.







DP, then adding or removing a T j, and refreshing data by a mechanism Ti will not affect the
DP guarantee, unless there is a Tk that does not provide DP after an update.
Proof. Assume the existing differentially private mechanism T satisfies:
Pr[T (X) 2 S]













where U is the set of all existing data curators.
Then when we add a T j that provides e j-DP, the parallel composition of the current T
and T j will be,
Pr[T (X) 2 S]
Pr[T (X 0) 2 S] ⇥
Pr[T j(x j) 2 s j]
























































Given that the new data curator set U 0 contains all current data curators, including the
recently joined one, the conclusion from Theorem 5.1 holds. Similarly, we can prove the
case of removing a T j in the same way by simply replacing ⇥ with ÷ and replacing + with
  from the above equations. Moreover, we can treat data refresh as a sequential composition
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of addition and deletion, and then prove its lower bound of privacy budget by the above in
two steps (or applying the sequential composition property of Theorem 3 in [99]).
Based on Theorem 5.1, Proposition 5.1 and Proposition 5.2, we have Theorem 5.3.







-DP in the case of distributed summation and counting,
cleansing polluted data, dynamically adding or removing data curators, and refreshing data,
unless there is a malicious data curator T j that refuses to guarantee DP on its original
database.
5.4 Experimental Evaluation
In this section, we use two real-world datasets and evaluate the performance of the lower
bound of the privacy budget e for distributed DP. We start by introducing the two real-world
datasets and the evaluation metric we used, and then compare the results of the experiments
with [99] and [140].
5.4.1 Datasets, Evaluation Metric, and Experiment Settings
The datasets we use are the MovieLens 100K dataset2 and Electricity Load Diagrams 2011-
2014 dataset3. Specifically, in the MovieLens 100K dataset, 943 users posted 100,000
ratings on 1,682 films, where each user rated at least 20 films, and each film received 20
to 250 ratings. In the Electricity Load Diagrams 2011-2014 dataset, 370 electricity meters
reported energy consumption every 15 minutes for four years from 2011 to 2014.
Table 5.2a is an example of the MovieLens 100K dataset, where xi is user i and y j is film
j, and the values are the ratings from user i on film j. The example in Table 5.2a shows that
2https://grouplens.org/datasets/movielens/100k/
3https://archive.ics.uci.edu/ml/datasets/ElectricityLoadDiagrams20112014
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people’s taste in films may be entirely different (e.g., Film 4 and Film 5). There is also no user
who always provides a high rating on movies. This property means that this dataset does not
fit the conditions of the existing parallel composition result of [99] because it is possible that
the summation of the data curators’ sensitivities is greater than the aggregator’s sensitivity.
For example, in Table 5.2a, ÂD fL(xi) = 14(= 4+ 5+ 5) > D fL(X) = 13 (maximum of
individual summation: x1).
Table 5.2 Examples of Datasets.
(a) Example of ML-100 Dataset.
x1 x2 x3
y1 1 0 1
y2 2 1 1
y3 2 2 1
y4 4 1 1
y5 0 4 1
y6 4 (max in x1) 5 (max in x2) 5 (max in x3)
sum 13 (max of the three sums) 13 10
(b) Example of ELD-1114 Dataset.
x1 x2 x3
y1 51 14 100
y2 62 11 110
y3 61 22 (max in x2) 105
y4 49 14 107
y5 70 (max in x1) 0 120 (max in x3)
y6 54 15 115
sum 347 76 657 (max of the three sums)
Table 5.2b is an example of the Electricity Load Diagrams 2011–2014 dataset, where xi
is electricity meter i and y j is a timestamp j and the values are the electricity consumption
reading by meter i between time j  1 and j. The example in Table 5.2b shows that the
electricity consumptions read by each meter are always stable. The one that reads larger
numbers will always do so. This property fits the condition of [99] because, when some
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data curators always have greater data values and the summation of the data curators’
sensitivities is always less than the aggregator’s sensitivity. For example, in Table 5.2b,
ÂD fL(xi) = 212(= 70+ 22+ 120) < D fL(X) = 657 (maximum of individual summation:
x3).
The global lower bound of privacy budget in [99], [140] and this work provides an estima-
tion of the global privacy performance for distributed differentially private data aggregation.
In our experiments, we evaluate the privacy performance over different lower bounds of
privacy budget based on the difference between noise injected from local DP and noise
injected for global DP based on the estimated lower bound of the global privacy budget.
A smaller difference indicates that the global lower bound of the privacy budget reflects











where N is the total rounds of experiments, Li is the overall noise added by data curators at
experiment round i (local DP) and Gi is the overall noise added by the global lower bound
of the privacy budget (global DP). In our experiments, we set N = 100K. Clearly, a smaller
value of MAE means a smaller difference between the estimated global DP guarantee and
the local DP guarantee. Therefore, a smaller MAE shows better privacy performance results
from the corresponding global lower bound of privacy budget.
For convenience, in our experiments, we assign the same epsilon value (X axis in the
figures) for all data curators in one experiment for a given privacy level. Additionally, Shi
et al. [140] used the global function sensitivity for the data aggregator, D fG(X), for local
DP noise injection, and then estimated a global lower bound of the privacy budget Âi2U ei.
Meanwhile, McSherry [99] used the local function sensitivity for data curators, D fL(xi), for
local DP injection. Given that the noise injection parameter in [140] is completely different
from that in [99]’s and ours, in the experiments for evaluating the global lower bound of
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the privacy budget, we only compare the privacy performance between [99] and our work.







from Theorem 5.3. We use greater values for privacy budget for data
curators because we want to explore the utility performance of summation function in an
extreme case where data utility is the first priority. (Source code: https://github.com/suluz/
dist_DP)
5.4.2 Experimental Results Analysis
In the figures for our experimental results, we label the result of [99] as MaxEpsilon, the
result of [140] as SumEpsilon, and this contribution as ThisWork. We rename the MovieLens
100K dataset as ML-100 and the Electricity Load Diagrams 2011-2014 dataset as ELD-1114.
Table 5.3 Comparison of Different Global Lower Bounds of Privacy Budget on Two Datasets.
e (used by data curators)
ML-100 ELD-1114
Summation Counting Summation (⇥10 8)
MaxEpsilon ThisWork MaxEpsilon ThisWork MaxEpsilon ThisWork
10 191.8323 14.7879 70.6503 1.8854 5.265 35.914
20 95.6142 7.3888 35.0246 0.9524 2.638 17.874
30 63.7804 4.9304 23.2179 0.6325 1.756 11.972
40 47.7364 3.6995 17.5044 0.4753 1.32 8.9504
50 38.228 2.957 13.9977 0.3798 1.0592 7.154
60 31.806 2.4607 11.6983 0.3159 0.8772 5.9543
70 27.5308 2.1067 9.9931 0.2716 0.7494 5.1044
80 23.9762 1.8447 8.8742 0.238 0.6534 4.4538
90 21.2536 1.6375 7.7922 0.2113 0.5846 3.9683
100 19.1398 1.4748 7.0025 0.1887 0.5267 3.5926
Figure 5.2 and Table 5.3 show the privacy performance of different global lower bounds
of the privacy budget on the MovieLens 100K dataset (ML-100), where f is a counting
function in Figure 5.2a and a summation function in Figure 5.2b. In the ML-100 dataset,
D fL(X)  Âi2U fL(xi) (e.g., when f is counting, we calculate the local sensitivity of the
aggregation system, D fL(X) = 730, and the sum of the local sensitivities of the data curators,
Âi2U fL(xi) = 943, based on the definition of the local sensitivity (Equation (2.3), Chapter 2)).
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Based on the analyses in previous sections, the global lower bound of the privacy budget of
MaxEpsilon will not be achieved in ML-100. That is, the noise added by the global lower
bound of the privacy budget will be very different from the noise added by the local privacy
budget. In fact, from both Figure 5.2a and Figure 5.2b, we can see that the noise injected by
the global lower bound of privacy budget is closer to the real noise injected into the system
compared to MaxEpsilon. Thus, our privacy budget provides better privacy performance than
[99] in the case where D fL(X) Âi2U fL(xi).
(a) Counting (b) Summation
Fig. 5.2 Privacy Performance on ML-100.
Figure 5.3 and Table 5.3 show the privacy performance (on the summation function) using
the different global lower bounds of the privacy budget on the Electricity Load Diagrams
dataset (ELD-1114). In the ELD-1114 dataset, D fL(X)   Âi2U fL(xi); thus, according to
Theorem 2.2 (in Chapter 2) and Theorem 5.3, the privacy performance of MaxEpsilon
would be better than ours. In the case where D fL(X)  Âi2U fL(xi), the lower bound of the
privacy budget would be an approximation of the one in MaxEpsilon. In fact, Figure 5.3
clearly shows this. Further, if we compare the experimental results in Figure 5.2 and
Figure 5.3, we can find that, in the cases where MaxEpsilon [99] does not work (Figure 5.2),
the privacy performance of our global privacy budget is much better than [99]. In the
cases where MaxEpsilon [99] provides maxi2U ei-distributed DP correctly (Figure 5.3), the
privacy performance of our privacy budget is close to MaxEpsilon [99]. Therefore, as an
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approximation of MaxEpsilon [99], the overall privacy performance of our privacy budget is
satisfied. However, as our privacy budget does not rely on any condition, the lower bound of
privacy budget in this chapter is more generally applicable.
Fig. 5.3 Privacy Performance on ELD-1114 (summation).
In Figure 5.4 and Table 5.4, we compare the noise injected for local DP by SumEpsilon
and ThisWork on the MovieLens 100K dataset (ML-100) and the Electricity Load Diagrams
dataset (ELD-1114), where f is the summation function. As discussed in the analyses in
Section 5.2, both Figure 5.4a and Figure 5.4b show that the noise injected by the schemes
in [140] (using D fG(X) to generate differentially private noise) is much greater than Max-
Epsilon [99] where D fL(xi) is used to generate differentially private noise. The reason for
these experimental results is that, according to the property of Laplace noise, a smaller
function sensitivity would result in less noise injection. The summation of the individual
privacy budgets scheme of [140] uses global sensitivity, which is much greater than the local
sensitivity used by the maximum privacy budget scheme of [99] and ours; thus, MaxEpsilon
and our approach provide much better data utility (less noise injection) than SumEpsilon
in both Figure 5.4 and Table 5.4 with given privacy requirements (values of the privacy
budgets).
In addition, we observe that all the curves in the figures of our experimental results show
the same gradient, pattern or shape. This outcome occurs because, regardless of which final
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(a) ML-100 (b) ELD-1114
Fig. 5.4 Noise Injection with Different Function Sensitivities for Local DP Guarantee (sum-
mation).
Table 5.4 Noise Injection with Different Function Sensitivities for Local DP Guarantee
(summation).
e (used by data curators) ML-100 ELD-1114 (⇥10
 4)
SumEpsilon ThisWork SumEpsilon ThisWork
10 29058 17 5870300 2.257
20 14562 9 2928800 1.1306
30 9655.5 5.7 1961600 0.7498
40 7280 4.3 1475000 0.564
50 5814.4 3.5 1177700 0.4516
60 4866.1 2.9 976270 0.3756
70 4147.6 2.5 833930 0.322
80 3641.2 2.2 734320 0.2815
90 3233 1.9 650930 0.2485
100 2915.4 1.7 584560 0.2246
privacy budgets and function sensitivities are used in the two schemes (sum or max), the
privacy budget and function sensitivity are just two numeric parameters to noise injection
in Figures 5.2, 5.3 and 5.4. Given that the two schemes follow the same noise injection
distribution (Laplace distribution), they should have almost the same gradient or shape of
curve, as illustrated in our figures.
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5.5 Summary
To take advantage of sensor networks to collect and analyse data for better decision making,
privacy is essential. Among all the data analysis functions, the summation and counting
functions are two of the most important. To preserve individual privacy against the strongest
collusion attacks, existing schemes either provide low data utility by using a global sensitivity
of summation (or counting) function or use unknown privacy guarantees. To address such
problems, in this chapter, we explored the privacy budget guarantee of distributed systems to
offer a new lower bound of the parallel composition of privacy budgets with unconditional
function sensitivity for both data aggregators and data curators in a distributed environment.
Both the theoretical and experimental evaluations show that our result works in all conditions,
in comparison with [99], and provides better data utility than [140], while achieving the same
privacy requirements.
Chapter 6
Differentially Private Path Publishing
Paths in a given network (map) are a generalised form of time-serial chain that occur in
many real-world applications, such as trajectories and Internet data flows. Differentially
private trajectory publishing concerns publishing path information that is usable to the users,
yet secure against adversaries, to reconstruct paths with maximum background knowledge.
In existing studies, perturbed paths are published, where each vertex is sampled from a
predefined set applying DP to replace the corresponding vertices in the original path. Such
schemes are robust to protect the privacy of vertices of a given path/trajectory against
adversaries that have knowledge of the whole path, but one missing vertex (and its associated
edges) of the path. In this chapter, we relax such potential adversaries’ background knowledge
to be all except one edge of the path, and hence consider the scenario of more powerful
adversaries with maximum background knowledge of the entire network topology and paths
except for one (arbitrary) missing edge. Under such an assumption, the perturbed path
produced by the existing work is vulnerable because the adversary can reconstruct the
missing edge from the existence of edges in the perturbed path whose ends are close to the
two ends of the missing edge. To address this vulnerability and effectively protect edge
privacy, instead of publishing a perturbed path, we propose a novel scheme of graph-based
path publishing to protect the original path by embedding the path in a graph that contains
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fake edges and replicated vertices applying DP techniques, such that only genuine users who
have full knowledge of the network topology are able to recover the exact vertices and edges
of the original path with high probability. We theoretically analyse the performance of our
algorithm in terms of output quality: DP guarantees, utility and execution efficiency. We also
conduct extensive experimental evaluations on a high-performance cluster system to validate
our analytical results.
6.1 Introduction
Paths are pervasive in our daily life, e.g., geometric trajectories, internet traffic flows, supply
chains and intelligence exchange networks [43, 56]. Publishing a path helps the owners
of the path (or external researchers) discover more knowledge about the path and obtain
information in the path. However, attackers may infer the privacy of a path from its published
information by applying auxiliary information [22, 106]. Therefore, it is crucial to consider
privacy disclosure risks when publishing a path.
In this chapter, we consider path publishing against adversaries with the maximum
knowledge of the network topology (all vertices and edges except one arbitrary edge). That is,
given a network N = (V,E), which is not a complete graph, we publish a path P= (V,EP⇢E)
protecting an arbitrary edge e2 EP against adversaries who have N0 = (V,E \{e}) containing
P0 = (V,EP \{e}). This problem can be found in some potential worst-case scenarios.
Disease Transmission Chain. In this scenario, N contains the social connections be-
tween patients, V is a set of patients from the same community, E is a set of relationships
between patients and P is a disease transmission chain. Path publishing allows external
researchers to study the way that the disease transmits, and "adversaries" are people that
want to know the existence of relationship between the patients.
Intelligence Exchange. In this scenario, N is a spy network, V is a set of spies, E is a set
of spy communication channels and P is the message exchange path. Path publishing is the
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way to let all spies know who should be contacted, and "adversaries" are counter-intelligence
units that want to know how a targeted spy exchanges information with other spies.
Privacy-preserving path publishing against the maximum background knowledge is well
studied in trajectory publishing with DP [33] because of its privacy-preserving guarantees
against attackers potentially with arbitrary auxiliary information. There are two main tracks
of research in differentially private trajectory publishing: set-of-trajectories publishing [21,
65, 113, 79, 19, 3, 58, 93] and (single-) trajectory publishing [71, 171, 61, 158, 157, 20]. In
this chapter, we address the latter problem.
Existing studies in differentially private single-trajectory publishing share similar ideas.
First, their solutions (in DP) are robust under potentially the same worst-case assumption of
adversaries’ background knowledge. That is, the adversaries do not have some locations of a
given path. In the worst case, only one location (and its associated edge(s)) is missing at the
attacker’s side. Second, they use the exponential mechanism of DP (ExpDP) to implement
DP. Specifically, the published trajectory contains fake locations only, which are sampled
via ExpDP from a predefined area, to replace the real ones in the target trajectory. The
differences over these methods mainly stem from the quality measurement for sampling
fake locations based on different objectives, such as the spatiotemporal relationship between
locations [171, 20], the movement directions in a trajectory [71] and the similarity between
the real and fake locations [61, 158].
The state-of-the-art results in single-trajectory publishing achieve a satisfying trade-off
between utility and privacy by DP against adversaries with missing vertices. However, we
identify two weaknesses in existing work [71, 61, 171, 158, 20]. First, the assumption of
missing vertices does not cover the worst scenario of adversaries with maximum background
knowledge, that is, when an adversary has full knowledge of the map, including all vertices
and edges, except one edge on the trajectory. In this case, the published (perturbed, privacy-
preserved) path by existing solutions is vulnerable because an adversary could reconstruct
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the missing edge with knowledge of the existence of edges in the perturbed path whose two
ends are close to the two ends of the missing edge. Note that the vertices’ closeness could be
measured by different metrics, such as spatiotemporal relationships, movement directions in
a path and semantic similarities. Second, the existing work does not generally publish real
vertices on the path, so it is difficult for genuine users (who have full information about the
network) to reconstruct the original path from the published one to confirm the exact links
between the real vertices. Figure 6.1 depicts an example attack against existing work, where
fake/published vertices are spatially close to the actual vertices, considering the utility of the
published trajectory. As a result of the spatial closeness between the published/perturbed
vertices and the actual vertices (attackers’ background knowledge), the attackers aim to
infer the missing information by recognising the corresponding actual vertex/edge of each
published vertex/edge, e.g., edge (v̂1, v̂2) is the fake version of actual edge (v1,v2). Since we
assume that the attackers have maximum background knowledge, i.e., all except one missing
edge, and the fake edges/vertices maintain the connectivities of the actual edges/vertices,
such a missing edge cannot be an edge that is missing in both fake and real paths, e.g., edge
(v1,v3). Based on the published and axillary information, edge (v̂2, v̂3) in the published path









: path published by existing DP algorithms
(containing perturbed vertices)
: attackers’ auxiliary information
(in addition to the published knowledge)
: guessing sampling set of perturbed vertices
by spatial closeness
Missing Edge Discovered:
Edge (v2,v3) must be in the path
Fig. 6.1 Example Attack Inferring Privacy from Published Path of Existing DP Algorithms.
To fill the research gap, this chapter studies how to protect an arbitrary edge when
publishing a path. In summary, our main contributions are as follows:
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• We address the problem of differentially private path publishing in a generalised form
against inference attacks from adversaries with more background knowledge than
existing work. Differing from existing work, where the adversary knows the network
topology and n 1 out of n vertices of the path, we preserve privacy against adversaries
who have full knowledge of the network and all vertices on the path, except one missing
edge of the path.
• Our proposed method guarantees high data utility and privacy (DP). That is, genuine
users (who have full knowledge of the network) are able to reconstruct the path, but
adversaries are unable to infer the missing edge and hence reconstruct the path. In
particular, we publish a graph-based path where fake edges and duplicate real vertices
are created to embed the real path into a graph for publishing, such that only genuine
users are able to reconstruct the exact vertices and edges of the original path, and
determine the visit order of the vertices with high probability.
• We evaluate key properties of the proposed method both theoretically and experimen-
tally. Specifically, we mathematically analyse DP guarantees and the data utility of
our scheme. We conduct experiments on a cluster system and extensively evaluate our
scheme with synthetic datasets with various network sizes and densities.
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first work that considers edge privacy (i.e., the
existence of an edge between two vertices), demanding through differentially private path
publishing.
The remainder of this chapter is organised as follows. In Section 6.2, we provide
a brief introduction of the preliminaries of this chapter, including the path and network
models and the attackers’ background knowledge. We then present our differentially private
path publishing in Section 6.3. Mathematical analyses are also displayed in this section.
Afterwards, in Section 6.4, we provide experimental evaluation results on the performance of
our algorithms using synthetic datasets. Finally, we conclude the chapter in Section 6.5.
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6.2 Preliminaries
In this section, we briefly introduce map and path models, as well as assumptions about
adversaries’ auxiliary information.
6.2.1 Network and Path Models
Without loss of generality, a network, such as, roadmap, internet node map or spy network,
etc., is a bidirected/undirected yet incomplete graph, N = (V,E), where V is the set of vertices
and E is the set of edges. In this chapter, the network is a connected graph (every pair of
vertices is connected by a path, rather than an edge) that contains the path P.
The path P = (V,EP ⇢ E) is a subset of the network N. We define a path as a sequence
of vertices in a given order, that is, P = {v1,v2, . . . ,vn}, where vi 2V is the ith vertex in P
and ei = (vi,vi+1) 2 EP is the ith edge in P. Given that the path P may contain rings, we may
have 9i 6= j, vi(2V ) = v j(2V ).
6.2.2 Adversaries’ Auxiliary Information
In contrast to the assumption of adversaries’ auxiliary information in existing work
on differentially private trajectory publishing, we assume that adversaries have correct
information about the vertices, but incorrect information about the edges of the path. We
assume the worst case of the adversaries’ auxiliary information, where the adversaries do not
know the existence of one arbitrary edge in the original path P (and the network N), say ei =
(vi,vi+1). That is, the adversaries have N0 = (V,E 0), P0 = (V,EP0) that ei = E \E 0 = EP \EP0 .
6.2.3 An Example
Figure 6.2 illustrates an example of the models of network, path and adversaries’ back-
ground knowledge, where edge (v3,v4) is the missing edge to the adversaries. Consider
the example of publishing disease transmission chain here. The vertices (white dots) and
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edges (solid lines) in Figure 6.2 represent patients and their relationship, respectively. Path P
(acyclic snake lines) is the disease transmission chain. In this given network/graph, there is
only one unknown relationship (edge (v3,v4)) to adversaries. Clearly, relationships between
patients in the transmission chain could include private information, for example, this could







v1! v2! v3! v4! v5! v6
E 0 : E \{(v3,v4)}
P0 : v1  v2  v3,v4  v5  v6
The attacker guesses a possible path:
v6! v5! v4! v1! v2! v3
Fig. 6.2 Example of Network N = (V,E), Path (The Real One P), and Adversaries’ Partial
Path as Background Knowledge (P0).
Given that the adversaries only know that an unknown relationship (the missing edge)
is a non-existent edge in network N0 = (V,E 0), in Figure 6.2, this unknown relationship
could be edge (v1,v3), (v1,v4), (v1,v5) and (v3,v4). By considering these four possible
edges and adversaries’ partial path P0, if we do not publish the real chain directly, the
adversaries could have several possible transmission chains (acyclic paths). For example,
it could be a path v6 ! v5 ! v4 ! v1 ! v2 ! v3 (marked by dashed lines) or a path
v1! v2! v3! v4! v5! v6 (that is the real one). Note that, since P0 is a partial path, the
adversaries cannot confirm the transmission direction of the original chain (path P); hence
the adversaries may have other possible chains in a different transmission direction, such as,
v3! v2! v1! v4! v5! v6.
Therefore, our goal is to publish a privacy-preserved real path P. Such a published path
allows the genuine users to recover the original path; however, the missing edge remains
unknown for the adversaries that potentially have maximum background knowledge about
the network.
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6.3 Proposed Algorithms
In this section, we show a differentially private algorithm (and associated analysis) to preserve
privacy for path publishing against adversaries with background knowledge, as described in
Section 6.2.
6.3.1 Idea Overview
In short, we propose a graph-based path publishing that uses the topology of the original
network and the connections between vertices of the path to conceal the edge existence against
adversaries who do not have full knowledge about the edges in the given network. Our idea
is inspired by the permutation idea in [57]. That is, genuine users’ full knowledge about the
network acts as a private key to recover the true information from the perturbed/published
data.
In general, when building a graph-based path, we apply DP to introduce uncertainties to
hide the exact information of edges in the path with the following privacy-preserving rules:
1. For the edge e = (u,v) 2 EP, vertex u and v are not placed in the same branch of the
graph-based path.
2. For the edge e = (u,v) 2 E \EP, vertex u and v are placed in the same branch of the
graph-based path.
3. For the non-existent vertex connections e = (u,v) /2 E, vertex u and v are either in or
not in the same branch of the graph-based path randomly (by DP).
4. For vertices that appear multiple times in the graph-based path, this does not implicitly
indicate whether those vertices are in a circle or not (because of DP).
6.3 Proposed Algorithms 105
5. For a group of nodes without a parent and a group of nodes without a child in the
graph-based path, we place the group that contains the vertex with the closest index to
the first node of the path as the root of the graph-based path.
In the above rules, Rule 1 and Rule 2 guarantee that the genuine users with full knowledge
about the network can recover the exact vertices and edges of the original path. Rule 5 allows
the genuine users to determine the visit order of the original path with high probability. In
contrast, Rule 3 and Rule 4 introduce uncertainties to confuse adversaries who do not have
full knowledge about P (i.e., missing edge(s)).
Figure 6.3 shows an example of producing a graph-based path by Rules 1, 2, 3 and 5
from a given network N = (V,E), shown in Figure 6.2. We will show how Rule 4 works
in the next section. We first construct a graph G = (VG = V,EG) and G’s complement
H = (VH =V,EH =U \EG), where U consists of all two-element subsets of V . For G and
H, we have (E \EP)⇢ EG, EP ⇢ EH . Given that N is not a complete graph, it is clear that G
and H contain fake edges not belonging to N, that is, (EG[EH)\E 6= /0. For example, in
Figure 6.3, edge (v1,v3) in G, and edges (v1,v4) and (v1,v5) in H are non-existence edges of
N (in Figure 6.2). Note that H is a Hamilton graph, e.g., P is one Hamilton path in H. Next,
if e = (u,v) 2 EG, we place vertices u and v to the same branch of GP (e.g., vertices v3 and
v6); otherwise, we place vertices u and v to different branches of GP (e.g., vertices v2 and
v3). Finally, we choose v2 and v3, rather than v6, as the root of GP because v2 has the closest
index to the first node (v1) of the original path among all vertices in root and leaf: v2, v3 and
v6. Note that, in this chapter, the following concepts, root, leaf, branch and level, follow the
same meaning as that of the tree (or forest) data structure.
When the genuine users receive GP, they recover the original path by two steps. First,
they recover the path without knowing the correct direction by Rule 1 and 2 based on their
full information about the network N. Second, after recognising v1 and v6 as the two ends of
the path, they confirm v1 as the first node of the path by Rule 5 because v2, as one of the roots















Network N contains an acyclic path P (Figure 6.2)! (G,H)! graph-based path GP
Fig. 6.3 Example of Producing the Graph-based Path.
of GP, has the closest index to v1 rather than v6. In contrast, according to the rules applied
on GP, the missing edge could be (v1,v4), (v1,v5) and (v3,v4) because those vertices pairs
are in different branches of GP. That is, the published GP maintains the indistinguishability
between the real missing edge (v3,v4) and non-existent edges (v1,v4) and (v1,v5) to the
adversaries.
Further, G and GP are equivalent for graph-based path publishing. G hides the path
information, and potentially indicates the visit order with Rule 5. However, it can require a
high computational cost to recover the real path. We demonstrate that it is more efficient to
recover the original path from GP than that from G in Corollary 6.1 in Section 6.3.3.
Table 6.1 lists the notations used in this chapter.
Table 6.1 Summary of Notations.
Notation Description
·0 The corresponding notation of adversaries’ background knowledge
·̂ The processed ·
E; EG; EP The set of edges in N; in G; in P
e, ei Edges
G The input graph to produce GP
GP The published graph-based path
H The complement graph of G
N The network/graph containing the path P
P The original path for publishing
V ; VG The set of vertices in N (and P); in G
vi, v
( j)
i , v, u The vertices
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6.3.2 Map Pre-processing
In this section, we pre-process the given network to meet the privacy-preserving Rule 3
and Rule 4 by injecting duplicate vertices and fake edges with the exponential mechanism of
DP (ExpDP).
Differentially Private Vertices Pre-processing
Pre-processing vertices requires an acyclic path in H; otherwise, even genuine users
cannot recover the exact path. For example, consider using the original network containing
a cyclic path in Figure 6.4 (top) to produce a GP. It is easy to conclude that we cannot
recognise whether v5 or v3 is the successor of v2 when we visit v2 for the first time.
To convert a network to fit Rule 4 and the acyclic requirement, we apply the inheritance
concept in object-oriented programming (OOP) to create base vertices and sub-vertex(s) in a
network. This idea comes from a feature of cyclic paths, that is, when there is a cyclic path





Cyclic path: v1! v2! v3! v4! v5! v2! v3! v6


























Fig. 6.4 Example of DP Vertices Pre-processing.
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All the unique vertices in a given network N are base vertices, and all repeated visited ver-
tices in the path P and the duplicate vertices created by DP are sub-vertices. The relationship
between base vertex and sub-vertex(s) should be publicly available; otherwise, the genuine
users cannot recognise the sub-vertices to reconstruct the original path. Similar to inheritance
in OOP, each sub-vertex inherits the connections from its corresponding base vertex. When
inheriting a connection, the sub-vertices have to decide whether such a connection belongs
to G or H. Figure 6.4 illustrates the idea of base vertex and sub-vertices. For example, in







3 are connected in the processed network N̂. Moreover, according to the
cyclic path in the original network, (v(0)2 ,v
(0)




3 ) /2 EP. Note that, since, in
the proposed idea, the genuine users need the connections between real vertices to recover
the actual path, we design the published graph-based path containing all base vertices and
sub-vertices. Hence, it is natural that such information is publicly available.
Although such an operation converts a cyclic path to an acyclic one, there is a potential
privacy disclosure risk against the adversaries knowing m 1 out of m edges as the back-
ground knowledge. Given that the relationship between the base vertex and sub-vertices
is publicly available, it is easy for adversaries to learn whether or not there is a ring in
the path based on those sub-vertices to subsequently infer the missing edge. Therefore, to
preserve privacy (hide the real ring of the path) against such adversaries, we apply ExpDP
to create more sub-vertices (duplicate/fake ones), for example, vertex v(1)4 in Figure 6.4 is a
duplicate/fake sub-vertex created with ExpDP.
To create the duplicate/fake sub-vertices, the main task is related to the number of
sub-vertices for a given base vertex. To minimise the overall number of vertices after pre-
processing, we apply ExpDP to sample a number from a range [num,max{maxNum,2}] for
each base vertex, where num is the number of appearances of a given base vertex in the
original path, maxNum = max{num} for all base vertices, e.g., maxNum = 2 in the cyclic
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path in Figure 6.4 because the maximum appearance of a vertex is 2 (based on vertex v2 and
v3).
To confuse adversaries about whether or not there is a ring in the original path P, we want
the numbers of sub-vertices of base vertices to be indistinguishable. That is, a base vertex
with a smaller degree implies that there is less chance of being visited repeatedly; hence, it
would have a higher probability of having more duplicate sub-vertices. For simplicity, we
have the following quality function to measure the number (n) of duplicate sub-vertices for
base vertex i, where di is the degree of base vertex i:
qv(n, i) = max{n} n+max{di} di. (6.1)
Depending on the adversaries’ background knowledge, the sensitivity of qv(n, i) is determined
by the maximum degree difference when there is an edge in the path missing. That is,
Dqv = max{|qv(n, i) qv(n, i0)|}= 1,8 base vertex i.
Algorithm 6.1 shows how we convert a cyclic path to an acyclic one, while adding
duplicate sub-vertices to the processed network with ExpDP (a.k.a differentially private ring
removal). Lemma 6.1 proves the DP guarantees of Algorithm 6.1.
Lemma 6.1. Algorithm 6.1 is ev-differentially private.
Proof. For vertices pre-processing, we add duplicate vertices to the original network with
quality function qv (Equation (6.1)) and privacy budget ev. We use Equation (6.2) to calculate
the overall privacy budget for this step, where VP is the set of real vertices in the path P
(9u,v 2VP,u = v) and Vm is the set of real and duplicate vertices. Note that the difference
between VP and V 0P is that we have two pairs of (v,v
0) such that |v.degree  v0.degree|= 1,
where v 2VP, v0 2V 0P and v = v0. We assume that the path is acyclic, so we split the set VP
into two subsets: Vs and Vr, where Vs contains the vertices appearing only once in the path
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Algorithm 6.1: Pre-processing Differentially Private Vertices (a.k.a. Differentially
Private Ring Removal).
Input : A network N = (V,E);
A path P = {v1,v2, . . . ,vn}, n  |V |;
A quality function: qv;
A privacy budgets: ev.
Output : A Hamilton network N̂ = (V̂ , Ê);
An acyclic path P̂.
1 (V̂ , Ê) (V,E);
2 P̂ P;
3 maxDegree max{v.degree in P,8v 2V};
4 for each v 2V do
5 v.subNum Sample a number from [v.baseNum,maxDegree] with qv
(Eq. (6.1)) and ev;
6 for i 2 to v.subNum do
7 v.subi 1 v;
8 if i v.baseNum then
9 replace ith v 2 P̂ with v.subi 1;
10 else
11 P̂ P̂.push(v.subi 1);
12 for each v 2V do
13 for each u 2V where e = (v,u) 2 E do
14 for each u.subi /2 V̂ do
15 V̂  V̂ +{u.subi};
16 Ê  Ê +{(v,u.subi)};
17 return: N̂, P̂;
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The last step of Equation (6.2) comes from the parallel composition of DP [99]. Therefore,
this lemma holds.
Differentially Private Edge Pre-processing
When a network N contains an acyclic path P, irrespective of whether an edge belongs
to the path or not, we split the processed network N = (V,E) into two graphs: G = (VG =
V,EG =E \EP) and H =P. Then, to fit Rule 3, we turn all the non-existent vertex connections
in this network to edges either in G or H randomly using ExpDP.
To do so, we first create a vertices relationship matrix R|V |⇥|V | for the path according to




ru,v = 2, if e = (u,v) 2 E \EP;
ru,v = 1, if e = (u,v) 2 EP;
ru,v = 0, if e = (u,v) /2 E;
ru,v = 1, if u = v.
(6.3)
Now we replace the non-existent edges (r = 0) as fake edges either in the path (r = 1)
or not (r = 2) with ExpDP. To conceal any possible missing edges for adversaries with
background knowledge, we want to have more fake edges. Therefore, r = 2 should have a
higher quality when implementing ExpDP to add fake edges. Given that adversaries may
have a different number of edges than the original path, to measure the quality of r = 1 and






where Dqe = |qe(1) qe(2)|= (|E| 2)/|E|⇡ 1.
112 Differentially Private Path Publishing
Algorithm 6.2: Pre-process Differentially Private Edges.
Input : A network N = (V,E);
A path P = {v1,v2, . . . ,vn};
A quality function: qe;
A privacy budgets: ee.
Output : A vertices relational matrix R|V |⇥|V |.
1 R|V |⇥|V | Traverse N from v, values in R determined by Eq. (6.3);
2 for each ru,v = 0 do
3 ru,v 1 or 2 with qe (Eq. (6.4)) and ee;
4 return: R|V |⇥|V |;
Algorithm 6.2 shows the differentially private edge pre-processing. Lemma 6.2 proves
the DP guarantee of Algorithm 6.2.
Lemma 6.2. Algorithm 6.2 is (ee + ln2)-differentially private.
Proof. For edges pre-processing, because we turn all non-existent connections in the network
N to an edge in either graph G or graph H with a quality function qe (Equation (6.4)) and












Pr[edge(= E \E 0)ToH]
=




2exp(ee) = exp(ee + ln2).
(6.5)
Therefore, this lemma holds.
6.3.3 Graph-based Path Production
In this section, we use Algorithm 6.3 to generate the graph-based path from the differen-
tially private matrix R|V |⇥|V |. In Algorithm 6.3, we first call Algorithm 6.1 and Algorithm 6.2
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Algorithm 6.3: Publish Graph-based Differentially Private Path.
Input : A network N = (V,E);
A path P = {v1,v2, . . . ,vn};
Two quality functions: qv and qe;
Two privacy budgets: ev and ee.
Output : A graph-based path GP.
1 N̂ = (V̂ , Ê), P̂ Call Alg. 6.1 with (N,P,qv,ev);
2 R Call Alg. 6.2 with (N̂, P̂,qe,ee);
3 (V̂ , Ê) Call Alg. 6.4 with (P̂,R);
4 if u 2 V̂leaves has closer index to v1 then
5 V̂  reverse the order of levels in V̂ ;
6 return: GP (V̂ , Ê);
to pre-process a differentially private network, and then insert each vertex of the path into the
graph GP one by one by calling Algorithm 6.4 in Line 3 of Algorithm 6.3 to have an initial
GP for publishing. To recover the visit order of the original path with GP, we check two
groups of vertices: roots and leaves. The group, which contains the vertex with a closer index
to the real first vertex in the path P, will serve as the root in the final output. That is, to fit
Rule 5, we may turn GP upside down to have the final output. This operation is implemented
from Line 4 to Line 5 of Algorithm 6.3.
According to the sequential composition of DP [99], based on Lemma 6.1 and Lemma 6.2,
we have Theorem 6.1 to study the overall privacy budget of the DP of Algorithm 6.3.
Theorem 6.1. Algorithm 6.3 is (ev + ee + ln2)-differentially private.
Lemma 6.3 and Proposition 6.1 study the probability of recovering the correct path P
from the published graph-based path GP.
Lemma 6.3. There are at least two root nodes in the graph-based path GP.
Proof. Assume there is only one root v in a graph-based path, then according to Rule 1, u
(neighbour of v in the path) and v should be placed into different branches (because edge
(u,v) 2 EP). That is, u should also be a root of the graph-based path. Therefore, this lemma
holds.
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Proposition 6.1. Given a path P = {v1,v2, . . . ,vn}, the expected probablity of confirming
the visit order of P is at least 1/2 by our graph-based path GP (without DP injection).
Proof. According to Lemma 6.3, we assume there are k  4 vertices that are roots and leaves
in GP. There is only one case where GP cannot confirm the first node of P. That is, among
the k root and leaf vertices, vertex v, whose index is the closest one to the first node of
the path, and vertex u, whose index is the closest one to the last node of the path, are both
roots. In such a case, for a genuine user that knows the two ends of the published path
by Rule 1 and Rule 2, because both u and v are the closest nodes to one end of the path,
based on Rule 5, the genuine user cannot distinguish which end is the first node of the path.
The probability of such a case in all possible graphs G is 2/ k2
 
= 4/k(k 1) because the root
and leaves sets are exchangeable. Moreover, u should be closer to the last node than v to
the first node. We assume it has Pr 2 [0,1] probability to have such case. Then GP has a
1 Pr⇥ 4/k(k 1) probability to confirm the real visit order of P, which is at least 2/3. In
addition, consider a special network with n vertices and n  1 edges. Give a path P from
such network, because both the first node and last node will be the root in the graph-based
path, we have 1/2 probability to confirm the real first node. Therefore, we have probability
1/2 = min{1/2, 2/3} of confirming the visit order of P such that this proposition holds.
Algorithm 6.4 is used to produce the graph-based path GP. Generally, in Algorithm 6.4,
we maintain and track the status of each vertex during the insertion process to ensure the
vertices are correctly placed in the graph-based path. Clearly, because we hide the exact
information of the path in the topology of the graph-based path, the levels of GP, where
we place the vertices, play an important role. Thus, we prepare a possible levels set for
each vertex against the present graph when placing the vertex into GP (Line 5 to Line 8
in Algorithm 6.4). To ensure the first node of the path could be placed as the root in the
graph-based path, we always use the maximum level from the set for inserting the vertex
(Line 10 to Line 14 in Algorithm 6.4).
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Algorithm 6.4: Insert Vertex.
Input : A path P;
A vertices relationship matrix R.
Output : A vertex superset V̂ and an edge set Ê
1 Init: An empty stack S, Sbak S, level.top 0, level.bottom 0,
u P.dequeue(), u.level 0;
2 S.push(u);
3 v P.pop();
4 while P 6= /0 do
5 if v.visit = 0 then
6 for i level.top 1 to level.bottom+1 do
7 if Call Alg. 6.5 with (S,v,R, i) then
8 v.levelRange v.levelRange+{i};
9 if v.levelRange 6= /0 then
10 v.level  max{v.levelRange};
11 level.top min8x2S{x.level,v.level};
12 level.bottom max8x2S{x.level,v.level};
13 v.visit 1, S.push(v);
14 v P.pop(), v.visit  0;




19 v S.pop(), v.levelRange v.levelRange {v.level}, v.level  nil;
20 if v = u then
21 (S,R) Call Alg. 6.6 with (Sbak,Rbak,vbak);
22 P Pbak, v P.pop(), v.visit 0;
23 for each v 2 S do
24 if rv,x = 2,8x 2 S then
25 Ê e = (v,x);
26 Vv.level  Vv.level +{v};
27 Ê Remove duplicate edges;
28 V̂  {Vi},8i 2 [level.top, level.bottom];
29 return: (V̂ , Ê);
To compute the possible levels set, we exclude all bad levels that introduce contradictions
to the graph building rules of Algorithm 6.5. Claim 6.1 studies the way to navigate the bad
levels when inserting a vertex v into GP.
Claim 6.1. The connectivity is transitive in a branch of GP.
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Algorithm 6.5: Test Insertion Level.
Input : A stack S;
A vertex u;
A vertices relationship matrix R;
A given level n.
Output : A boolean status.
1 if ru0s parent,u0s child = 1 then
2 return: False;
3 for each v 2 S do
4 if v.level = n AND ru,v = 2 then
5 return: False;
6 if v.level > n AND ru,v = 2 AND ru,v0s child = 1 then
7 return: False;
8 if v.level < n AND ru,v = 2 AND ru,v0s parent = 1 then
9 return: False;
10 return: True;
Claim 6.1 shows an important feature of our graph-based path: all the vertices in one
branch should be connected to each other. That is, when inserting v into GP, a bad level for v
either breaks our Rule 2 for GP or such a transitive relation in Claim 6.1 exists. The upper
half of Figure 6.5 shows a counterexample to Claim 6.1. Given u,x 2 GP, ru,x = 2, when
inserting v 2 P to GP where rv,u = rv,x = 1, there is no good level for v, if 9y 2 GP where
ry,v = ry,u = ry,x = 2 and y’s level in GP is between u’s and x’s. This case indicates that there
may be bad placement(s) from the existing vertices that are already in the present graph. To
overcome the bad placement(s), we record each inserted vertex in a stack. When we have a
vertex with an empty possible levels set, the stack enables us to backtrack and re-insert the
recently inserted vertices until we can successfully insert all the vertices into the graph. This
backtracking operation is implemented from Line 18 to Line 19 of Algorithm 6.4. The lower
half of Figure 6.5 illustrates an example addressing this issue.
Based on Claim 6.1, we have Theorem 6.2, which underpins the graph-based path.
Theorem 6.2. A graph-based path exists unless 9u 2 P such that u breaks the transitive
relation of all possible topologies of GP.






















(bad: v connects to x)
(bad: v and y not in a branch)
(bad: v connects to u)
Adjusted GP:
+ ! (good)
Fig. 6.5 Example of Claim 6.1.
According to Theorem 6.2, it is possible to have a network that cannot deliver a graph-
based path GP. Namely, to insert a vertex u to a GP, after trying all the possible levels of each
vertex in the present GP and backtracking the stack in Algorithm 6.4, we cannot find a good
level to insert u. The upper half of Figure 6.6 shows an example of a bad GP by Theorem 6.2,
where the present GP is the only possible topology with the given vertices a, b, c and d. That
is, a is only connected with c, b is connected with c and d. As we can see, there is no way to
appropriately insert e, which is connected with a and d only, to the present GP. Particularly,
we cannot insert e to the level above a (or the level below d) because e will be connecting
with c (or b) then. We cannot insert e to the same level as a and d because vertices in the
same level are not connected, but we must keep e connected with a and d. We cannot insert e
to the level between a and d because e will immediately connect a and d, which breaks the
present connectivity in GP where a and d are not connected.
The reason for the conflict when inserting a vertex is straightforward. When a vertex
u has multiple connections in the network, according to Rule 1, Rule 2 and Claim 6.1, the
topology of the graph-based path may not satisfy all the transitive relations relevant to u
at the same time. To address this problem, we propose Algorithm 6.6 to eliminate such a
conflict. The main idea of Algorithm 6.6 is splitting the vertices, which breaks the transitive
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Fig. 6.6 Example of Resolving Conflicts in GP.
relation in branches in the present GP, depending on u and its degree of connectivity in the
network. As a result, each piece has fewer connections from the original vertex. This way, it
is easier to satisfy the connectivity of a conflicting vertex. In Algorithm 6.6, when splitting
a vertex v, we have v.connections =
T
i vi.connections, where i v.degree. The lower half
of Figure 6.6 shows that, after splitting the vertex e into e0 and e1, we resolve the conflict
introduced by vertex e. The new GP satisfies all the rules for a graph-based path.
Note that the splitting operation of Algorithm 6.6 is different to the differentially private
vertices pre-processing of Algorithm 6.1, since, in Algorithm 6.1, the sub-vertices are
duplicates of the base vertex, but have different connections according to the positions of the
duplicates, that is, some of the sub-vertices are fake ones. However in Algorithm 6.6, after
splitting the base vertex, each piece of the base vertex inherits partial connections from their
base vertex, that is, those vertices are not fake ones. Theorem 6.3 proves that this splitting
operation ensures we always have a graph-based path from any input network and path.
Theorem 6.3. Algorithm 6.6 guarantees production of a graph that satisfies the rules for the
graph-based path.
Proof. When inserting a new vertex vnew to the graph-based path GP by Algorithm 6.4, if we
cannot find a level in the present graph-based path GP to satisfy the connectivities of vnew,
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Algorithm 6.6: Resolve Inserting Conflicts.
Input : A stack S;
A vertices relationship matrix R;
A vertex v0.
Output : A stack S;
A vertices relationship matrix R.
1 Scon f lict  /0;
2 level.top min8u2S{u.level};
3 level.bottom max8u2S{u.level};
4 for each u 2 S do
5 Scon f lict .push(the conflicting u for v);
6 S.remove(u);
7 if Scon f lict = /0 then
8 Scon f lict .push(v0);
9 for each u 2 Scon f lict do
10 Stemp /0;
11 for l 2 [level.top 1, level.bottom+1] do
12 Sl  Insert the suitable v 2 S if u.level = l;
13 Stemp.push(Sl);
14 Stemp Solve a set cover for u and Stemp;
15 Split u according to Stemp;
16 (S,R) Insert the split us to S and R;
17 if v0 /2 S then
18 S Insert v to S as Alg. 6.4;
19 return: S and R;
then we say there is a conflict. In the worst case, every time when inserting a vertex, we
have a conflict. In such a case, we first apply Algorithm 6.6 to split each base vertex i in the
network/graph into at most ki pieces, where ki is the degree of vertex i, then insert each piece
of the base vertex i by Algorithm 6.4. Clearly, we will end up with a forest as the topology
of the graph-based path, where the forest contains |EG| trees. Each of the trees contains only
one edge of G. Therefore, this theorem holds.
Finally, we study the depth of GP in Proposition 6.2 that assists the proof of Corollary 6.1,
where we show that it is efficient for genuine users to recover the original path from the
graph-based path GP.
120 Differentially Private Path Publishing
Proposition 6.2. The depth of the graph-based path is the length of the longest branch, and
this is at most |VG|/2.
Proof. According to the way we build the graph-based path, the longest branch comes from
the maximum-sized complete sub-graph in G. We construct G by removing the edges of the
path from (and adding non-existent edges into) the original network; thus, in the worst case,
there are at most |VG|/2 vertices that could form a complete sub-graph in G. Therefore, this
proposition holds.
Corollary 6.1. It takes O(|VG|) time complexity for a genuine user to recover the original
path from the graph-based path (GP in Figure 6.3).
Proof. For the genuine user, it takes O(|VG|+ |EG|) time complexity to traverse all the edges
in G to recover the path edges by Rule 1 and 2. In the worst case, O(|EG|) is equivalent to
O(|VG|2). However, according to Proposition 6.2, each vertex in GP has at most O|VG| edges.
Thus, for the genuine user, it takes O(|VG|+ |VG|) to search all edges in GP. Therefore, it
takes O(|VG|) time complexity to confirm the path connections.
6.4 Experimental Evaluation
In this section, we present the experimental evaluation of the proposed algorithm, including
the dataset we used, experimental configurations and experimental results.
6.4.1 Dataset and Configurations
According to the inputs of our algorithm, we need a dataset that contains a network where
all vertices form a path. To evaluate the performance of our algorithm over different sizes
of graphs, similar to [42, 4], we generate and use a synthetic dataset. This is an bidi-
rected/undirected network with different sizes and densities, which contains the path (either
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acyclic or cyclic) used for publishing. We produce the bidirected/undirected network with
a given number of vertices |V | and a given number of edges |E| in three steps. First, we
sample all the vertices from a two-dimensional plane uniformly. Second, we draw a path for
publishing to connect all the vertices in the network. Third, all the edges not in the path yet
in the network are randomly generated with a uniform distribution.
In the experiments, because the graph-based path can definitely recognise the vertices
and edges of the published path, we measure the utility of the produced graph-based path
by whether the visit order of the original path can be restored or not. We name the output
confirming the correct visit order as "good output" in the figures for experimental results.
In addition, because we prove that some network topology may not produce a graph-based
path, in the experiments, we also show the percentage of "usable maps", which can produce
a graph-based path.
Given that our differentially private algorithm is randomised, according to the law of large
numbers [41], we report the expected algorithm performance of each aspect by calculating
the average results of running the algorithm 1,000 times. To simulate the real-world scenario,
the size of a given network/path in our experiments is no more than 10 vertices. Accordingly,
the number of edges of the synthetic network is in the range from |V | 1 (a network only
has a Hamilton path for publishing) to 12 |V |(|V | 1) (for the complete network). Thus, in
our experiments, we have overall 122 different sizes of networks as inputs.
The experiments are implemented in Python 3.7, plotted with MATLAB R2019b, on a
server, with 16 cores and 64 GB memory offered through the Phoenix HPC service at the
University of Adelaide. (Source code: https://github.com/suluz/dp_path)
6.4.2 Experimental Results
In this section, we evaluate the performance of our algorithm from the following aspects:
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• the run time of the algorithm with DP on either vertices (Algorithms 6.1) or edges
(Algorithms 6.2),
• the output quality of the random networks without DP (Algorithms 6.1, 6.2) and the
splitting strategy (Algorithm 6.6) for the graph-based path,
• the quality of the differentially private output (Algorithms 6.1, 6.2).
Given that our graph-based path can definitely confirm whether an edge belongs to the
original path, we evaluate the output (graph-based path) quality by testing whether the output
can confirm the visit order of the original path, as shown in Section 6.3. In the figures in this
section, each point on a curve represents a specific network with a given number of vertices
and edges.
Run Time
Figure 6.7 depicts the run time of our algorithm with acyclic paths over different sizes
of networks and different settings for DP on either vertices or edges. It is clear that, when
increasing the number of vertices, the run time of the algorithm increases significantly.
However, from Figure 6.7c and Figure 6.7d, the increasing number of edges results in a
decreasing run time. The reason for this is that, with a given number of vertices and a given
ee, when increasing the number of edges, fewer spaces are available to add fake edges; hence,
the number of possible topologies of the network decreases, so it will take less time for the
algorithm to find a suitable graph-based path.
According to Equation (6.1), more vertices are injected with a smaller privacy budget on
vertices ev, so that the run time in Figure 6.7a (ev = 0.5) is much higher than the run time
in Figure 6.7b (ev = 1). Further, based on Equation (6.4), more edges are injected to the
network (G in Figure 6.3) with a greater privacy budget on edges ee; hence, the run time in
Figure 6.7c (ee = 0.5) is much higher than the run time in Figure 6.7d (ee = 1).
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(a) DP on vertex (ev = 0.5)

























(b) DP on vertex (ev = 1)





















(c) DP on edge (ee = 0.5)





















(d) DP on edge (ee = 1)
Fig. 6.7 Run Time (Acyclic Path).
Outputs Quality over Random Networks without DP
































(a) Percentage of Usable Networks








































(b) Percentage of Good Output with
Usable Networks




































(c) Percentage of Overall Good Out-
puts
Fig. 6.8 Output Quality without DP and a Splitting Strategy.
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In Figure 6.8, we study the performance of our graph-based path without both DP
injection and a splitting strategy (as in Algorithm 6.6) for different sizes of graphs with an
acyclic path.
Figure 6.8a shows the percentage of usable networks for successfully producing the
graph-based path without a splitting strategy. In particular, about 43% (52/122) of the
networks cannot produce the graph-based path with over 50% possibility, especially for
networks (paths) with more than seven vertices. Moreover, only about 30% (30/122) of
networks produce a graph-based path with 100% guarantee. Such networks are the complete
graph and the sparse graphs G = (V,E) where |E| 2 [|V | 1, |V |+3].
Figure 6.8b depicts the percentage of good outputs, which can confirm the correct visit
order of the original path from the usable networks. According to how we recover the exact
path from the graph-based path (Section 6.3), in our experiments, we count the good outputs
as follows.
• If we confirm the first node of the original path directly, we count it as a good output.
• If the two ends of the original path have equal chance of being confirmed as the first
node, we add 0.5 to the total number of good outputs.
Consequently, we have consistent results for both Figure 6.8b and Proposition 6.1. That
is, with at least 50% probability, our graph-based path confirms the visit order of the original
path. This is the exact original path, if we have full information about the vertices and the
existence of the edges of a network. In addition, Figure 6.8b shows that, with a given number
of vertices, the number of edges and the percentage of good outputs are roughly positively
correlated. The reason is that, on average, more edges in the network mean more vertices
are linked to the first node of the path (Line 3 and Line 10 of Algorithm 6.4); hence, we
have a higher probability of keeping the first node as a root to have a good output. The result
illustrated in Figure 6.8b provides a base result for analysing the experimental results in the
next section.
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Finally, Figure 6.8c illustrates the Hadamard product [64] of Figure 6.8a and Figure 6.8b,
namely, the overall good output percentage without a splitting strategy and DP injection.
Quality of Differentially Private Outputs
In this section, we report the output quality of our algorithm (with consideration of DP
injection and the splitting strategy) on both acyclic paths (in Figure 6.9) and cyclic paths (in
Figure 6.10). With the splitting strategy of Algorithm 6.6, we always produce a graph-based
path from any network with 100% guarantee in the experiments, so we do not plot a figure to
present it.



































(a) DP on Vertices



































(b) DP on Edges
Fig. 6.9 Output Quality with DP on Acyclic Paths.
To evaluate the performance of our algorithm on acyclic paths in the worst case, we
select the number of vertices and number of edges to form a graph, from which we observe
a minimum number of usable networks in the experiments of Figure 6.8a. We use this
worst-case graph configuration for the experiments of Figure 6.9.
In Figure 6.9a, we only inject DP on the vertex to learn the effect of the differentially
private vertices pre-processing (Algorithm 6.1). Based on Equation (6.1) and Figure 6.8b,
with an increasing ev, fewer fake vertices are added; hence, we have an increasing percentage
of good outputs, which fits the results in Figure 6.9a.
126 Differentially Private Path Publishing
Figure 6.9b shows the performance of differentially private edge pre-processing (Algo-
rithm 6.2). Given a greater ee introduces more edges to the network (G in Figure 6.3), then,
according to the result of Figure 6.8b, we expect an increasing percentage of good output, as
in Figure 6.9b. In particular, when we have a very large ee, say 10 in Figure 6.9b, the network
will be almost a complete graph, based on the differentially private edge pre-processing.
According to the analysis of Figure 6.8b, the utility of the graph-based path will approach
its maximum value when being a complete graph. Therefore, in Figure 6.9b, all the curves
converge to the maximum utility.
Comparing the results of Figure 6.9a and Figure 6.9b, as injecting DP on vertices
introduces fake vertices, it decreases the probability of placing the first node of a path as
a root. This affects the performance of the graph-based path more significantly than DP
injection on edges. Therefore, for acyclic path publishing, to protect private edges, only
injecting DP on edges is required to meet both privacy and utility requirements.

































(a) ee = 0.5

































(b) ee = 1

































(c) ee = 5
Fig. 6.10 Output Quality with DP on Cyclic Paths.
When we have a cyclic path in a given network, to preserve the privacy of the path (the
existence of a ring and the existence of an arbitrary edge), DP on vertices and edges is always
needed. Given that we have already studied the performance of DP on vertices in Figure 6.9a,
we inject DP on both vertices and edges in Figure 6.10. Specifically, according to Figure 6.9b,
we tune ev with three fixed ees: ee = 0.5 in Figure 6.10a, ee = 1 in Figure 6.10b, and ee = 5
in Figure 6.10c.
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In Figure 6.10, we select the network with 6 vertices and 10 edges (because it achieves
a local minimum for the percentage of good outputs) as a base network for cyclic path
publishing. We compare the performance between a cyclic path and its corresponding acyclic
path with the same number of vertices. With a given ev and a given ee, our algorithm achieves
better performance on acyclic paths than cyclic paths, as the vertices in a cyclic path have
more than one copy, according to Equation (6.1); hence, the differentially private vertex
pre-processing would create more vertices for cyclic paths than acyclic paths. Then, based
on the result of Figure 6.8b, more vertices damage the performance of the graph-based path;
hence, the results in Figure 6.10 are as expected. Additionally, for the same reason behind
Figure 6.9, when increasing ev and ee, the percentage of good output is increased, as shown
in Figure 6.10.
6.5 Summary
In this chapter, we have proposed a differentially private graph-based path publishing algo-
rithm. In this algorithm, we hide the real path in the topology of the original network by
embedding it in a graph containing fake edges and vertices and applying DP techniques, so
that only trusted users who have full knowledge of the existence of the edges in a network
(which contains the target path) can reconstruct the exact vertices and edges of the original
path, and hence determine the visit order of the vertices on the path with high probability.
Our algorithm effectively protects edge existence, which is not supported with existing ap-
proaches for differentially private path publishing, while preserving the existence of vertices.
Both theoretical analyses and experimental evaluation show that our algorithm guarantees
both utility and privacy against adversaries who miss partial edge information, but have




Clustering with Convergence Guarantees
Iterative clustering around representative points is an effective technique for clustering that
helps us gain insights about data to support various important applications. Unfortunately, it
also provides security holes that may allow adversaries to infer the private information of
individuals with some background knowledge. To protect individual privacy against such
inference attacks, preserving DP for iterative clustering algorithms has been extensively
studied. Existing differentially private clustering algorithms adopt the same framework to
compute differentially private centroids iteratively by running Lloyd’s k-means algorithm to
obtain the real centroids, and then perturbing them with a DP mechanism. These algorithms
suffer from non-convergence problems, that is, they provide no guarantees that they will
terminate at a solution of Lloyd’s algorithm within a bounded number of iterations. This
problem severely affects their clustering quality and execution efficiency.
To address this problem, this chapter follows the same centroid updating pattern as exist-
ing work in interactive settings; however, we propose a novel framework for injecting DP into
the real centroids. Specifically, to ensure convergence, we maintain the perturbed centroids of
the previous clustering at the iteration t 1 to compute a convergence zone for each cluster in
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the current iteration t, where we inject DP noise. To have a satisfactory convergence rate, we
further control the orientation of centroid movement in each cluster using two strategies: one
takes the orientation of centroid movement from iteration t 1 to iteration t (past knowledge),
and the other uses the additional information of the orientation from iteration t to iteration
t +1 (future knowledge). We prove that, the expected number of iterations of our algorithm
(in both strategies) converging to a solution of Lloyd’s algorithm in at most twice as many
iterations as Lloyd’s algorithm. Further, when using both past and future knowledge, we
prove that our algorithm converges to the same solution as Lloyd’s algorithm (for the same
initial centroids) with high probability, at the cost of a slower convergence speed compared
with using only past knowledge, as a result of duplicated operations in each iteration re-
quired to compute the future knowledge. We perform experimental evaluations on six widely
used real-world datasets. The experimental results show that our algorithm outperforms
the state-of-the-art methods for interactive differentially private clustering with guaranteed
convergence and enhanced clustering quality, while meeting the same DP requirements.
7.1 Introduction
In the era of big data analytics and rapid development of deep learning and its impressive
achievements, such as the Google artificial intelligence Go player, AlphaGo, beating the best
human Go player by being self-taught using deep neural networks [142, 162], traditional
machine learning techniques, such as k-means clustering, are increasingly important for
learning insights from small data without a ground truth. They also offer high running
efficiency and prediction accuracy [125, 112]. In this chapter, we address the issue of effective
privacy preservation when realising the popular Lloyd’s k-means clustering algorithm [87].
Despite the benefits enjoyed from clustering, the privacy disclosure risk can thwart
people’s willingness to contribute data (especially data that may link to privacy) to clustering
algorithms. Consider the following inference attack based on the difference between the
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outputs from a private dataset and an adversary’s background knowledge. We consider a
trusted data curator that manages a dataset X and an adversary that owns a dataset X 0. In
the worst case, X and X 0 differ by a single data element. At any arbitrary iteration t during
clustering, assume a set of centroids in X is accidentally disclosed to the adversary. By
comparing the difference between the set of centroids generated by X and X 0, the adversary
can easily infer the value of the missing item x0, and thus technically gain full knowledge
of the dataset X . Figure 7.1 depicts how such an inference attack works, where n(t)i is the
overall number of items in cluster i at iteration t of X .
Cluster i at iteration t:
x0
S(t)i : Cluster centroid (including x0)

















Fig. 7.1 Illustrated Example of An Inference Attack.
From the above inference attack example, it is clear that preserving the privacy of
individual items in a dataset when running an iterative clustering algorithm must protect
the true value of the centroids of the clusters at each iteration. Unfortunately, some of the
well-known privacy-preserving paradigms, such as SMC or MPC [174] and anonymity [150,
95, 80], are vulnerable to such an inference attack because both the SMC paradigm and
the family of anonymity are vulnerable to adversaries that have the maximum background
knowledge (e.g., n 1 out of n items in the dataset).
To preserve privacy against inference attacks with maximum background knowledge
(e.g., Figure 7.1), DP [33] has been applied in Lloyd’s algorithm in interactive settings [148],
whereby random DP noise is injected into each iteration when running Lloyd’s algorithm.
Numerous studies [12, 34, 104, 176, 148, 118] guarantee DP while achieving acceptable
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clustering quality in interactive settings through three DP mechanisms: the sample and
aggregation framework of DP [114], the exponential mechanism of DP (ExpDP) [100] and
the Laplace mechanism of DP (LapDP) [37]. We identify two weaknesses with existing
work [12, 34, 104, 176, 148, 118]. The work in [104] is based on a sample and aggregation
framework; however, it shows unsatisfactory clustering quality because its uniform sampling
may result in skewness over the sampled buckets; hence, the aggregated centroids would
have a significant distance to the Lloyd’s result. Studies such as [12, 34, 176, 148, 118] apply
ExpDP and LapDP; however, they suffer from a non-convergence problem, as unbounded
noises are injected to an arbitrary direction. This problem severely affects the clustering
quality (as the clustering result would have an unknown distance to the true centroids) and the
efficiency of the algorithm (as it requires a large computational cost to determine predefined
parameters). The importance of convergence guarantees (to a local optimum of Lloyd’s
k-means) for differentially private k-means clustering is two-fold. First, without convergence
guarantees, a predefined iteration number is required to terminate a differentially private
k-means algorithm. To find such an iteration number to satisfy the clustering quality with
a given input dataset, we must run the algorithm over the dataset multiple times. Further,
running the algorithm on different datasets requires recalculation of the iteration number
through the above process repeatedly, which results in a large computational cost. Second,
because a non-convergent result may have an unbounded large distance to the local optima of
the k-means problem, existing work such as [12, 34, 176, 148, 118] on differentially private
k-means clustering provides no clustering quality guarantees.
To overcome the above weaknesses, we propose a new differentially private k-means
clustering algorithm in interactive settings that improves existing work by offering guaranteed
convergence and enhanced clustering quality with the same DP requirements. In summary,
our main contributions are as follows.
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• We propose a novel approach for differentially private clustering that injects bounded
DP noise into each iteration of the clustering process by applying ExpDP in a controlled
orientation to preserve data privacy against inference attacks. In comparison with
existing work that injects unbounded noise in arbitrary directions, our approach ensures
convergence in at most double the number of iterations as with Lloyd’s k-means
clustering.
• We analyse key properties, including convergence, convergence rate and bound of DP,
for the differentially private k-means clustering algorithm using two centroid updating
strategies based on past knowledge of previous iteration centroid movement (using the
same assumptions as existing work), and past and future knowledge, that is, centroid
movements based on the previous and next iterations. The former requires fewer
iterations for convergence, while the latter results in enhanced convergence quality.
• We experimentally evaluate the performance of the clustering quality with various
experimental settings on six widely used real-world datasets. With the same DP
guarantees, our algorithm for the centroid updating strategies achieves better clustering
quality (utility) than other state-of-the-art differentially private k-means clustering
algorithms.
To the best of our knowledge, our algorithm is the first that ensures convergence for
differentially private k-means clustering in interactive settings.
The remainder of this chapter is organised as follows. In Section 7.2, we provide a brief
introduction to the preliminaries of this chapter, including Lloyd’s algorithm and definitions
related to convergence. In Section 7.3, we introduce our approach to ensure convergence
through noise injection in controlled centroid movement orientation, and introduce prelim-
inary analysis on the convergence property. In Section 7.4, we propose two designs for
noise sampling zones during each iteration of clustering. In Section 7.5, we describe our
differentially private k-means clustering algorithm and its convergence and DP proof. In
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Section 7.6, we provide the experimental evaluation and compare the clustering quality (data
utility) of existing work and our algorithm. Finally, we conclude this chapter in Section 7.7.
7.2 Preliminaries - Lloyd’s k-Means Algorithm
In this section, we briefly introduce Lloyd’s k-means clustering algorithm [87]. Following
the same pattern as existing differentially private k-means algorithms, we consider DP noise
injected into real centroids computed by Lloyd’s algorithm over several iterations. We also
provide our definitions related to convergence.
The k-means clustering aims to split a dataset with N items into k clusters, where each
item is allocated into a cluster with the nearest cluster centroid to itself. The formal cost










where C= {C1,C2, . . . ,Ck} is the set of k clusters, x is an item in the dataset X = {x1,x2, . . . ,xN}
and Si is the centroid of Ci. Equation 7.1 calculates the total cost of a set of centroids.
The most well-known k-means clustering algorithm is an iterative refinement algorithm
called Lloyd’s k-means clustering [87]. Lloyd’s algorithm improves the quality of centroids
by iteratively running a re-assignment step and a re-centroid step. In the re-assignment
step, each item is assigned to its nearest centroid to build the k clusters. In the re-centroid
step, the algorithm re-calculates the centroid (mean) for each cluster. For simplicity, in this
chapter, the centroid of a cluster and the mean of a cluster are interchangeable concepts.
The new/updated k centroids are used for the next re-assignment step. Lloyd’s algorithm
terminates when the k centroids remain the same after two neighbouring iterations. Lloyd’s
algorithm is guaranteed to converge to a local optimal solution of the k-means problem within
a finite number of iterations.
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To measure the quality of convergence, in this chapter, we define convergence and
convergent degree for a differentially private k-means clustering algorithm.
Definition 7.1 (Convergence). Given a dataset D , an integer k, Lloyd’s algorithm L , and
the set of local optimal solutions of the k-means problem C , we have L (D)! C . We say a
differentially private k-means algorithm, F , is convergent, if and only if, F (D)! C .
Definition 7.2 (Convergence Degree). Given a set of initial centroids d 2D , L (d)! c2C ,
the convergence degree of F is the probability Pr[F (d)! c].
In addition, Table 7.1 lists the notations used in this chapter.
Table 7.1 Summary of Notations.
Notation Description
·̂ Corresponding notation (· from Lloyd’s algorithm) in privacy-preserving algorithms










C(t)i Cluster i at iteration t
D Value difference of the cost function between two iterations
e(t)i DP budget for C
(t)
i
I Overall iterations of Lloyd’s algorithm
q Quality function from DP
J(S
(t)
i ) Value of the cost function for C(t)i with centroid S
(t)
i
S(t)i Cluster centroid in C
(t)
i
X (t)i Centroid updating orientation controller in C
(t)
i
7.3 Controlled Centroid Updating Orientation for Noise
Injection
In this section, we first provide an overview of our approach, and then preliminarily analyse
the convergence property for randomised centroid updating for k-means clustering.
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7.3.1 Approach Overview













Fig. 7.2 Overview of Orientation Control.
Intuitively, if we can decrease the value of the cost function (Equation 7.1) iteratively,
a k-means clustering algorithm would finally converge. In this chapter, we leverage this
convergent property of Lloyd’s algorithm to bound DP noise injection. The main idea of our
approach is that we bound/control DP noise in a selected area for each iteration during the
clustering process to guarantee the convergence. Given that there are many possible centroid
movement directions in the selected area, to ensure the clustering quality, we apply ExpDP
in a controlled orientation for centroid updating to approximately approach the direction
of convergence of Lloyd’s algorithm. Our idea differs from the existing work, where the
updated cluster centroids are arbitrarily produced by a DP mechanism. Figure 7.2 illustrates
the overview of our approach. In general, we have four steps to update a set of differentially
private centroids at each iteration t.
1. Run Lloyd’s algorithm using the past iteration t 1 centroid S(t 1)i for a real centroid
S(t)i for each cluster i. Note that this S
(t 1)
i is the differentially private centroids Ŝ
(t 1)
i .
2. Compute a convergence zone by S(t)i and S
(t 1)
i for each cluster i.
3. Generate a sampling zone in the convergence zone by S(t)i and orientation controller
X (t)i for each cluster i.
4. Sample a differentially private centroid Ŝ(t)i in this sampling zone with ExpDP.
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We define a convergent zone (for convergence guarantee) and the corresponding sampling
zone for centroid updating formally in Definition 7.3. The specific requirement for the
convergent zone comes from Lemma 7.1 in the next section.
Definition 7.3 (Convergent & Sampling Zones). In C(t)i , a convergent zone is a set of




i ||}, where S
(t)
i is the
mean/centroid of C(t)i . A sampling zone is a subset of the convergent zone.
Definition 7.4 (Orientation Controller). In C(t)i , an orientation controller is node X
(t)
i such
that the differentially private centroids Ŝ(t)i is randomly sampled by ExpDP according to the
orientation S(t)i  X
(t)
i .
The challenge in our scheme is to fill the gap and design a suitable sampling zone
and orientation controller in interactive settings that guarantees convergence and achieves
enhanced clustering quality while meeting the same DP requirements as existing work. In the
following sections, we propose two types of sampling zone (depending on whether we have
knowledge of future centroid movement [90] or not) for our differentially privacy clustering
algorithm.
7.3.2 Preliminary Analysis of Convergence Properties
In this section, we present a preliminary analysis that provides the foundations for our
algorithms in the next section. In general, the following properties of the proposed algorithms
are considered:
• the convergence of the proposed algorithms;
• the rate of convergence of the proposed algorithms compared with Lloyd’s algorithm;
• the trade-off between utility and privacy of the proposed algorithms.
We first study the convergence of a randomised iterative clustering algorithm in Lemma 7.1.
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i || in Euclidean distance, 8 t, i.
Proof. In Lloyd’s algorithm, after the re-assignment step, prior to the re-centroid step, we
build C(t)i and have J
(S(t 1)i ) = Âx2C(t)i
||x  S(t 1)i ||2, where S
(t 1)
i is the mean/centroid of
C(t 1)i that is used in the re-assignment step to generate C
(t)
i . Similarly, after the re-centroid
step, when the members of C(t)i do not change, we have J
(S(t)i ) = Âx2C(t)i
||x S(t)i ||2.
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where ||C(t)i || is the number of items in C
(t)
i . Note that, in Lloyd’s algorithm, J
(S(t)i ) is the




i as the centroid for C
(t)
i
that satisfies ||Ŝ(t)i   S
(t)








i || = a
(t)
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i ) = ||C(t)i ||⇥ (1  (d
(t)
i )
2)⇥ (a(t)i )2 > 0.
Thus, by updating the centroids to this set Ŝ(t) = {Ŝ(t)1 , Ŝ
(t)
2 , . . . , Ŝ
(t)
k } (rather than the
mean/centroid of clusters, S(t)), the value of every item Âx2Ci ||x  Si||
2 can be further
decreased, which results in a decrease of the cost function (Equation 7.1).
In addition, as we have a finite set of clustering solutions (at most kN), and since we
decrease the cost in each iteration with a randomised iterative algorithm, the algorithm
satisfies the properties from the above proof and hence must converge (not approach) to a
fixed value of the cost function.
Next, we consider the convergence and the convergence rate for a special case of Ŝ(t)i in
Lemma 7.2 and Lemma 7.3. This special Ŝ(t)i (shown in Figure 7.3) is in the line segment of










i < 1. Lemma 7.2 and Lemma 7.3
assist us to prove the properties of our proposed algorithms in the following sections.
Lemma 7.2. Given an algorithm ALG, if we randomly select an Ŝ(t)i in the line segment of
S(t 1)S(t) in C(t)i , the degree of convergence of ALG is one.
Proof. We know that the k-means clustering problem has a set of local optimal solutions,
S = {S1,S2, · · · ,Sn}, where Si is one local optimum (the one to which Lloyd’s algorithm
converges to) that contains k centroids of the clusters, Si = {Si,1,Si,2, · · · ,Si,k}. According to
Lemma 7.1, assume ALG is convergent to Ŝ = {Ŝ1, Ŝ2, · · · , Ŝk} /2 S, then we must have room
to further reduce the cost by either a re-assignment or a re-centroid. Therefore, Ŝ is not the
set of centroids that makes ALG convergent, unless Ŝ 2 S. Thus, ALG is convergent to, at
least, one local optimum of the k-means clustering problem.
We say that a set of k nodes (each cluster contributes one node) belongs to a local
optimum, Si, if Lloyd’s algorithm converges to Si by taking such a set of nodes as the initial
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set of centroids. Given that the two ends of the line segment S(t 1)S(t) belong to the same
local optimum, then it is guaranteed that S(t 1), S(t), and Ŝ(t) always belong to the same local
optimum for all iterations. Therefore, this lemma holds.








Fig. 7.3 Help Figure for Lemma 7.2 and 7.3.
Lemma 7.3. The expected number of iterations of algorithm ALG (described in Lemma 7.2)
has at most 11 d 2 the number of iterations of Lloyd’s algorithm, where d is the expected value
of d (t)i , d 2 (0,1).
Proof. Based on Lemma 7.2, the overall value difference of Equation 7.1 from the first




i ) is the same in both ALG and Lloyd’s
algorithm, where I is the total number of iterations. In each iteration, the cost is decreased









t ) for ALG. Given the
properties of Lloyd’s algorithm, we know that Dt = Âki=1 D
(t)
i for all clusters at iteration t.
According to Lemma 7.1, during re-assignment we have D̂(t)i = (1 d 2)⇥D
(t)
i , where d =
E(d (t)i ). Thus, D̂
(ra)
t = Âki=1[(1 d 2)⇥D
(t)









D(ra)t . Considering the expected value of those Ds, we have D̂
(ra)
t = (1  d 2)⇥D
(ra)
t , d =
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E(d (t)i ). In the worst case, Î < 1mini,t{1 (d (t)i )2}
⇥ I. Given that D̂(rc)t > D
(rc)
i , we have
J =(D(ra) +D(rc))⇥ I
=(D̂(ra) + D̂(rc))⇥ Î
>[(1 d 2)D(ra) +D(rc)]⇥ Î
>(1 d 2)⇥ (D(ra) +D(rc))⇥ Î.
Therefore, Î < 11 d 2 ⇥ I for the expected values of Î, I and d .
7.4 Sampling Zone Design
In this section, we first discuss the rules for building a sampling zone, and then propose the
two designs for the sampling zone.
7.4.1 Design Rules
Ideally, in a convergent zone, when applying LapDP, the probability of a node S as the Ŝ(t)i
needs to follow a monotonous decreasing function for the distance between S and S(t)i . A
truncated LapDP [7] would be a straightforward way to achieve this. That is, once the random
noise of LapDP is outside the convergent zone, we truncate it to the border of the convergent
zone. However, this truncated LapDP will introduce issues, as the nodes in the border of the
convergent zone may have a higher probability (sum of the probabilities of the nodes outside
the convergent zone) than the ones closer to the S(t)i . Therefore, in this chapter, we apply the
ExpDP in the convergent zone (in fact, in the sampling zone) to sample the Ŝ(t)i .
When designing a sampling zone, we use the following rules. First, there should be
a single sampling zone in C(t)i for all parties, i.e., the trusted data curator and adversaries.
Otherwise the differences among the sampling zones in different parties will result in signif-
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icant differences among their clustered results, which could be used for privacy inference.
Second, the single sampling zone should not have an explicit relationship to S(t)i (the real
mean/centroid of C(t)i ), as otherwise the adversary may easily learn the expected value of
S(t)i with high probability, and the expected value can be used as the real value. Third, to
control the convergence orientation, the orientation controller should be used when building
the sampling zone.
Based on the above discussions of the sampling zone and the research challenges pre-
sented in Section 7.3, we apply two strategies for the orientation controller to build two types
of sampling zone in the following sections. The major difference between the two strategies
is based on whether we use past knowledge only or both past and future knowledge [90] of
the cluster centroids as the orientation controller for the sampling zone. Such a difference
results in different clustering qualities and convergence rate.
7.4.2 Orientation Control with Past Knowledge





trend of cluster centroid movement. Therefore, the orientation controller could be the point
of intersection of the convergent zone’s borderline and the line S(t 1)i S
(t)
i . However, because
such a point of intersection has an explicit relationship with S(t 1)i and S
(t)
i , so we cannot
use it as the orientation controller directly. To solve this problem, we simply shift this point
of intersection with a random angle to have an orientation controller, X (t)i . Given that we
still want the X (t)i to be as close as the point of intersection, we use the following probability
function for sampling an angle g: Pr[g(t)i = r] µ exp(1 2|r|/p), r 2 [0,p/2].
7.4.3 Orientation Control with Past and Future Knowledge
Clearly, the sampling zone with past knowledge of the cluster centroids cannot guarantee
the convergence orientation towards the convergence of Lloyd’s algorithm over the iterations.
This results in a poor convergence degree. To improve the convergence quality, we use the
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centroid movement in future iterations as the orientation for centroid updating. As discussed,
Lloyd’s algorithm approaches a local optimum of the k-means clustering problem through
iterations. If we use the final/convergent centroid, S(t+rt)i , as the orientation controller in
C(t)i , we can provide clustering quality using a random mechanism (i.e., the ExpDP) as
much as possible. Note that, in C(t)i , S
(t+rt)
i is the future knowledge of the cluster centroids.
However, taking such an S(t+rt)i means we have to further run Lloyd’s algorithm for rt
iterations in C(t)i , which will result in a large rate of convergence when the differentially
private algorithm converges. Therefore, considering the computational cost, we select the
orientation controller, X (t)i , with S
(t+1)
i .
7.5 Proposed Algorithm and Associated Analysis
In this section, we present the differentially private k-means clustering algorithm with
guaranteed convergence. We analyse its convergence, convergence rate and DP guarantees.
7.5.1 The Clustering Algorithm
The first step of our algorithm involves sampling zone generation. We generate our sampling
zone by computing its centre and radius, respectively. The centre of the sampling zone, P(t)i ,




i . A larger
sampling zone provides more choices for the Ŝ(t)i ; thus, we use the following probability
function for sampling l (t)i , Pr[P
(t)
i ] = Pr[l
(t)
i = r] µ exp(2 2r) = p,r 2 (1/2,1). The radius




i ||. In this chapter, depending on whether we use
past knowledge only or both past and future knowledge, we name the sampling zone as prior
sampling zone (past knowledge) and posterior sampling zone (past and future knowledge).
Algorithm 7.2 shows how we build the sampling zone with either past knowledge or past plus
future knowledge regarding the cluster centroids. Figure 7.4 shows the key idea in building
the sampling zone.




























(b) Posterior Sampling Zone (Past and Future
Knowledge).














Fig. 7.5 Key Idea of Algorithm 7.1: Centroid Updating.
Once the sampling zone is established, each party samples their own Ŝ(t)i from this
sampling zone with the ExpDP. In the implementation, we sample the Ŝ(t)i by sampling a













i ), where d
(t)
i 2 (0,1), a
(t)
i 2 ( p/2,p/2). An
Ŝ(t)i , that is close to the S
(t)
i , has better clustering quality for iterations in the interactive
setting, as the scoring function should be monotonously decreasing for both d (t)i and a
(t)
i .
In this chapter, we use the following scoring function for the pair (d (t)i ,a
(t)
i ) because of
its simplicity: q(d (t)i ,a
(t)
i ) = (1  d
(t)
i )+ (1  2|a
(t)
i |/p). It is easy to see that the local
sensitivity of the scoring function is 2, i.e. Dq = 2.
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Finally, when the clusters converge (to a real local optimum from Lloyd’s algorithm),
we apply the LapDP to inject noise to the final clustering result. Specifically, to have
good clustering quality, we inject the Laplace noise to the counts when calculating the
mean/centroid of each cluster (Line 12 in Algorithm 7.1). The local sensitivity of this
counting function is 1. Algorithm 7.1 shows how the approach works.
Algorithm 7.1: Differentially Private k-Means Clustering.
Input : X = {x1,x2, . . . ,xN}: dataset in size N.
k: number of clusters (< N).
e(t)i : privacy budget for Cluster i at Iteration t, C
(t)
i .
e0: privacy budget for the final output.





q: scoring function for the ExpDP when sampling the Ŝ(t)i .
Output :S: set of the final k centroids.
1 Initialisation: Uniformly sample k initial centroids S(0) = (S(0)1 ,S
(0)




2 while clusters do not converge do
3 for each Cluster i at Iteration t do
4 C(t)i  assign each x j to its closest centroid S
(t 1)
i ;
5 S(t)i  mean of C
(t)
i ;
6 SamplingZone(t)i  run Algorithm 7.2;
7 Ŝ(t)i  sample from SamplingZone
(t)
i using ExpDP with q and e
(t)
i ;
8 S(t)i  Ŝ
(t)
i ;





10 S add noise to S(t) by the LapDP with e0, publish e0;
7.5.2 Proof of Convergence and Differential Privacy
According to Lemma 7.1, 7.2 and 7.3, we have Theorem 7.1, 7.2, 7.3 and 7.4 to study the
convergence and convergence rate of Algorithm 7.1, respectively. Theorem 7.5 studies the
privacy bound of Algorithm 7.1.
Theorem 7.1. Algorithm 7.1 (sampling zone with past knowledge) has convergence degree
at least 1/m, where m is the number of local optima of Lloyd’s algorithm for a given dataset.
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Algorithm 7.2: The Sampling Zone Generator.
Input : S(t)i : mean of C
(t)
i .
S(t 1)i : mean of C
(t 1)
i .





Pr[g(t)i ]: probability to generate angle g
(t)
i .
useFuture: future knowledge of cluster centroids.
Output :SamplingZone(t)i .
1 if useFuture is yes then
2 C(t+1)i  re-assign data points in C
(t)
i by S
(t) = {S(t)i };








6 g(t)i  sample by Pr[g
(t)
i ];
7 X (t)i  shift Y
(t)
i on convergent zone’s borderline with angle g
(t)
i ;












10 SamplingZone(t)i  centre: P
(t)







Proof. The convergent orientation is not determined when the sampling zone relies on past
knowledge. With a uniform distribution for the orientation, if there are m local optimum of
the k-means problem for a given dataset, the convergent degree will be at least 1/m.
Theorem 7.2. The expected number of iterations of Algorithm 7.1 (sampling zone with past
knowledge) to converge is at most double the iterations of Lloyd’s algorithm.
Proof. According to Lemma 7.1 and Theorem 7.4, the key points for analysing the conver-
gence rate are the length of ||S(t)i  S
(t+1)













Given that, in this sampling zone (with past knowledge), we cannot determine the angle
a in Figure 7.6 to determine the explicit expression for ||S(t)i  S
(t+1)
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we simply use the triangle inequality to find the upper bound of Î. According to the triangle







< (1+ d (t)i )2. Note that, in this case, d
(t)
i may be





Given that our sampling zone is a subset of the convergent zone, we must have Î  2I.
Then we have Î min{2, 1
(1 d (t)i )2
}.
Theorem 7.3. Given a set of initial centroids, Algorithm 7.1 (sampling zone with past and
future knowledge) has a convergence degree of 1, that is, it converges to the same (final)




d , where n is the
number of items in a dataset D, d is the dimension of an item and m is the number of local
optima of Lloyd’s algorithm on dataset D.
Proof. In Algorithm 7.1, because each sampling zone is a subset of a convergent zone,
according to Lemma 7.1, Algorithm 7.1 is convergent. According to Lemma 7.2, any arbitrary
set of k nodes given as the initial set of centroids must converge to a local optimum in Lloyd’s
algorithm. However, for some sets of k nodes given as the initial centroids, they may belong
to different local optimum. Such nodes appear at the border area between two local optima.
Assume that a dataset D contains n items, where each item has d dimensions and the average
distance between two items is l, then the overall size of the space of D is nld . The overall size




d ⇥ [2(b lb)](d 1), where m is the number of local













d probability to not







when t > 1, all the sets of k nodes from SamplingZone(1)i belong to same local optimum.
Therefore, based on Lemma 7.2, this theorem holds.
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Theorem 7.4. The expected number of iterations of Algorithm 7.1 (sampling zone with past
and future knowledge) to converge is at most 2 d 2+2d cosa+1 2 (1,2) times the number of
iterations of Lloyd’s algorithm, where d and a are the expected values of d (t)i and a
(t)
i .
Proof. According to Lemma 7.3, the total number of iterations of Algorithm 7.1 depends on
the distance ||Ŝ(t)i  S
(t+1)



























Fig. 7.6 Help Figure for Proof of Theorem 7.4.














In Algorithm 7.1, we calculate the centroid S(t+1)i at iteration t, where it is expected
to have a Dt +Dt+1 change for the cost value. However, by applying a similar idea from
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d 2 2d cosa +1)2)⇥Dt+1
=Dt +( d 2 +2d cosa)⇥Dt+1,
where D̂t = Dt .
Recall how Algorithm 7.1 converges, whereby half the iterations decrease the cost
function by D̂t and half the iterations do so as Dt+1. Thus, assuming Î = T ⇥ I, then the

















T ⇥ IDt +
1
2
( d 2 +2d cosa)T ⇥ IDt+1.
Then we have 12T +
1
2( d
2 + 2d cosa)T < 1, so T < 2 d 2+2d cosa+1 . Note that, since
||Ŝ(t)i   S
(t+1)

















is in (1,2). Thus, based on Lemma 7.1 and Lemma 7.3, this theorem
holds.
Theorem 7.5. Algorithm 7.1 is e-differentially private, where e = e0 +ÂÎt=1 maxki=1{e
(t)
i }, Î
is the total number of iterations to converge.
Proof. When applying the ExpDP to sample Ŝ(t)i (Line 11, Algorithm 7.1) in C
(t)
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Thus, Algorithm 7.1 guarantees e(t)i -DP in C
(t)
i . In each iteration, all items xi 2 X are split
into k mutually exclusive clusters, based on parallel and sequential composition [99] after Î
iterations. Algorithm 7.1 is e-differentially private, where e = e0 +ÂÎt=1 maxki=1{e
(t)
i }. Note
that, as the Lloyd’s k-means algorithm usually converges after a small number of iterations,
according to Theorem 7.4 and Theorem 7.2, the value of the overall e would not be very
large in average.
7.6 Experimental Evaluation
7.6.1 Datasets and Configuration
Table 7.2 illustrates the key features of the real-world datasets used to evaluate the clustering
quality and convergence rate of Algorithm 7.1. As a matrix, each dataset contains #Records
⇥ #Dims cells. We use these datasets for two reasons. First, they are used for the clustering
experiments in several research chapters for k-means clustering tasks, such as in [73, 133]
for normal k-means clustering and [176, 148] for differentially private k-means. Second,
their sizes are in different orders of magnitude, which help us to show the performance
stability and scalability of our algorithm over different datasets. Iris [26] is one of the most
famous datasets for clustering containing the sepal length/width and the petal length/width
of three types of iris plants. House [45] and Image [45] are image datasets, consisting
of the RGB-values of house pictures, where each colour is quantised by 5 bits and 8 bits,
respectively. S1 [44] is a synthetic 2-D dataset with 15 non-overlapping Gaussian clusters.
Birch2 [177] is also a synthetic 2-D dataset, where each cluster’s centroid is placed in a sine
curve. Lifesci [75] is a life sciences dataset, where 10 principal components are used for
chemistry/biology experiments that fall into three categories.
We compare the clustering quality of Algorithm 7.1 (in both prior and posterior sampling
zones) with state-of-the-art e-differentially private k-means clustering algorithms and Lloyd’s
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Table 7.2 Descriptions of Datasets.
Dataset #Records #Dims #Clusters
Iris [26] 150 4 3
House [45] 1,837 3 3
S1 [44] 5,000 2 15
Birch2 [177] 12,000 2 5
Image [45] 34,112 3 3
Lifesci [75] 26,733 10 3
algorithm. The clustering quality is measured by the difference/gap of the final cost (Equa-
tion 7.1) between a differentially private k-means clustering algorithm and Lloyd’s algorithm.
A smaller gap indicates better clustering quality. In the experiments, we implement and
name them as Prior (Algorithm 7.1 with past knowledge [91]), Posterior (Algorithm 7.1 with
past and future knowledge [90]), SU [148], PrivGene [176], GUPT [104], DWORK [34],
BLUM [12] and LLOYD [87]. In brief, SU [148] proposes an optimal privacy budget alloca-
tion scheme to allocate the overall privacy budget to each iteration. PrivGene [176] applies
genetic algorithm that randomly samples the candidates with ExpDP for each iteration, and
then applies the crossover and mutate operations of traditional GAs to iteratively update the
centroids. GUPT [104] uniformly samples items from an input dataset to different buckets,
where the local clustering results of each bucket are produced by Lloyd’s algorithm. The
final clustering result is the mean of local results with Laplace noise injected. DWORK [34]
allocates the overall privacy budget to each iteration with decreasing exponential distribu-
tions. BLUM [12] predefines a number of iteration, and then allocates the overall privacy
budget to each iteration uniformly. Details about SU [148], PrivGene [176], GUPT [104],
DWORK [34] and BLUM [12] can be found in Section 3.4. Details about LLOYD [87] can
be found in Section 7.2.
Given that the six algorithms that achieve e-DP are randomised, we report their expected
clustering quality. According to the law of large numbers, we run all seven algorithms 300
times and take the average results. The initial set of centroids is randomly selected for
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all methods in each run. For those relying on a predefined iteration number, we take the
corresponding value (or function) from the original chapters. In addition, we normalise the
data in all datasets to [0,1]. Further, we normalise the final cost of all involved algorithms,
where the final cost of Lloyd’s algorithm is always one.
In each run, LLOYD, BLUM, DWORK, SU, and Algorithm 7.1 use the same initial
centroids. Given that GUPT starts by splitting the original datasets into several buckets, it
cannot use the same initial centroids as LLOYD. Note that calculating the overall privacy
budget depends on whether a method converges. Algorithm 7.1 and GUPT calculate the
overall privacy budget bottom-up. That is, once it terminates, we sum all the privacy budgets
used in each iteration to attain the overall privacy budget. SU, PrivGene, DWORK, and
BLUM calculate it top-down. Namely, the given overall privacy budget is split into each
iteration at the initialisation step. Therefore, in the experiments, we first allocate the same
privacy budget to each step for Algorithm 7.1 and GUPT, and then calculate their overall
privacy budgets. Next we take the overall privacy budget of Algorithm 7.1 as the overall
privacy budget for the methods that cannot converge. In the experiments, local sensitivity is
applied for all DP algorithms. (Source code: https://github.com/suluz/diffpriv_clustering)
7.6.2 Experimental Results
Figure 7.7 shows the expected clustering quality of each algorithm, where the cost gap
is given in log scale and the privacy budget varies from [0.1,1.0]. Generally, Algorithm 7.1
outperforms the state-of-the-art results with the same DP requirement in the six datasets in
both prior and posterior cases. Additionally, the performance gap between Algorithm 7.1 and
existing algorithms increases when increasing e , which indicates a better trade-off between
privacy and utility with our algorithm. Further, Algorithm 7.1 performs much better than
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(a) Iris (k = 3)





















(b) House (k = 3)


















(c) S1 (k = 15)





















(d) Birch2 (k = 5)




















(e) Image (k = 3)




















(f) Lifesci (k = 3)
Fig. 7.7 Clustering Quality Comparisons.
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other algorithms using larger datasets (e.g., Image and Lifesci), which reflects the scalability
of our algorithm.
Figure 7.8 depicts the convergence degree of Algorithm 7.1 using two strategies. We
study the convergence degree by comparing whether the output set of centroids of our
approach (without the final DP noise of Line 10 in Algorithm 7.1) is the same as that
of Lloyd’s algorithm. Given that we round the values in the clustering process, once the
output of our approach is in [0.99,1.01] of Lloyd’s algorithm, we call it a match. We report
the percentage of the matching results of the two strategies over all six datasets as the
convergence degree. From Figure 7.8, the posterior strategy, which uses both past and
future knowledge, outperforms the prior strategy, which only uses the past knowledge, in
convergence performance because of the convergence guarantees of Theorem 7.3. The
posterior strategy matches at least 84% (90% in most cases) output centroids of Lloyd’s
algorithm, while the prior matches no more than 80% (50 % in most cases).
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(a) Convergence Degree of the Prior Strategy (Past
Knowledge)
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1































(b) Convergence Degree of the Posterior Strategy
(Past and Future Knowledge)
Fig. 7.8 Convergence Degree of Our Approach.
Figure 7.9 and Figure 7.10 show the iteration ratio between Algorithm 7.1 and Lloyd’s
algorithm and how they converge, which confirms the theoretical analyses of Theorem 7.2
and Theorem 7.4. That is, using the past knowledge (prior strategy) for centroid updating
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provides faster convergence rate than using past and future knowledge (posterior strategy).
In particular, we compare the numbers of iterations that Algorithm 7.1 and Lloyd’s algorithm
execute until they terminate. Note that, in the experiments, the privacy budget does not affect
the number of iterations significantly because the experimental performance of ExpDP is not
as good as its theoretical guarantee with a relatively small sampling zone.






















(a) Iteration Ratio over e .
Iris House S1 Birch2 Image Lifesci
Prior 5.89 16.40 17.05 14.73 13.60 28.92
LLOYD 6.07 17.22 17.64 15.52 14.26 29.72
Ratio 0.97 0.95 0.97 0.95 0.95 0.97
(b) Average Iterations to Convergence.
Fig. 7.9 Iterations of the Prior Strategy (Past Knowledge) to Convergence.





















(a) Iteration Ratio over e .
Iris House S1 Birch2 Image Lifesci
Posterior 8.2 21.4 23.9 20.7 19.8 36.6
LLOYD 6.1 17.3 18.0 15.6 14.1 29.9
Ratio 1.34 1.24 1.33 1.33 1.40 1.22
(b) Average Iterations to Convergence.
Fig. 7.10 Iterations of the Posterior Strategy (Past and Future Knowledge) to Convergence.
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7.7 Summary
To address the non-convergence problem of the existing algorithms for differentially private
k-means clustering in interactive settings, in this chapter, we have proposed a novel centroid
updating approach by applying the exponential mechanism of DP in a selected area. The
novelty of our approach is the orientation control of centroid movement for noise injection
in the iterations of the clustering process to achieve convergence. We have demonstrated
the key properties of our approach and showed that it converges in at most twice as many
iterations as Lloyd’s k-means algorithm. The experimental evaluations validated that, with
the same DP guarantees, our algorithm ensures convergence and achieves better clustering
quality than the state-of-the-art differentially private algorithms in the interactive setting.
Chapter 8
Conclusions
In this thesis, we have studied differentially private data analytics from four aspects: dif-
ferentially private data aggregation with security guarantees, privacy budget guarantees of
distributed systems, differentially private single-path publishing and differentially private
k-means clustering. From Chapter 4 to Chapter 7, for each research aspect, we proposed our
novel approach and techniques that outperformed existing similar works in both mathematical
and experimental evaluations. In this chapter, we summarise the main contributions of this
thesis, and then provide some possible research directions for future work on differentially
private data analytics.
8.1 Thesis Summary
With the rapid growth of data-driven applications, the data analytics behind such applications
often use personal data to offer personalised services. Such processes occur at every single
minute around the world; however, as discussed throughout this thesis, these processes
compromise users’ privacy. Specifically, the data analytics not only gain insights from
these data to provide services, but also potentially violate users’ privacy. For instance, to
provide an accurate recommendation, a normal recommender system should learn our exact
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preferences by using historical records, and then make some recommendations about our
potential interest based on such information. In this example, our preferences are part of
our privacy. Therefore, to protect our privacy while having the benefits of these digital
applications, it is essential to develop new methods and techniques for privacy preservation
during data analytics to achieve acceptable trade-offs between individual privacy and data
utility.
As discussed in Chapter 1, the main contributions of this thesis are as follows. First, we
present a two-layer differentially private data aggregation with security guarantees against
semi-honest yet colluding data aggregators, which ensures both high data utility and low
communication cost. Second, we offer a new lower bound of privacy budget for distributed
differentially private aggregation/summation. Third, we propose a graph-based single-
path publishing approach that preserves the DP of each edge against adversaries with full
information about other vertices and maximum background knowledge about the edges.
Fourth, we provide a differentially private k-means clustering framework with convergence
guarantees.
As discussed in Chapter 2, DP has emerged as an important approach for privacy preser-
vation because of its mathematical bounds for privacy and utility trade-offs. In this thesis, we
use it as the main notion of privacy. Specifically, we apply DP for some computing tasks
of a data analytics process, as specificed in Section 1.1: data aggregation, data publishing
and data mining/machine learning. We review the state-of-the-art works in Chapter 3. These
underpin the research challenges of this thesis and motivate the work as a whole. From
Chapter 4 to Chapter 7, we demonstrate the technical details of our solutions.
When aggregating data from distributed data curators, existing work achieves both output
privacy and computing security; however, it faces at least one of the following problems:
(1) collusion between data curators, (2) collusion between data aggregators (in the case
of multiple aggregators), (3) the vulnerability of a single data aggregator and (4) high
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communication cost (in the case of no aggregator). To address those research challenges,
in Chapter 4, we propose a two-layer data aggregation system based on semi-honest yet
colluding aggregators. Our solution achieves DP for data output with high data utility by
random DP noise injection to achieve security by secure information sharing, while achieving
low communication costs by its non-complete topology. The experiments on real-world
datasets show that it achieves the same privacy requirement and provides enhanced data
utility.
To tackle the research challenges of unknown privacy guarantees for conditional local
function sensitivities and poor data utility achievable using unconditional global function
sensitivities for distributed differentially private summation, Chapter 5 provides a novel
lower bound of privacy budget to measure the parallel composition of privacy budget during
distributed differentially private summation. By taking advantage of a special property of
the summation function when calculating function sensitivity, our solution guarantees an
acceptable overall privacy performance without any conditions on the function sensitivity.
We also confirm the theoretical bound by running experiments on the real-world datasets.
The existing differentially private single-path publishing algorithms preserve privacy
against adversaries with maximum background knowledge of the vertices (n  1 out of n
vertices in a graph/network), but no information about the edges. However, those algorithms
are vulnerable once adversaries have different auxiliary information, such as full knowledge
about the vertices plus m 1 out of m edges. In Chapter 6, we present a graph-based single-
path publishing solution. In particular, we insert fake vertices and fake edges with DP to the
original path, and then hide the perturbed paths in the topology of the publishing graph with
a given rule. Through this, our approach ensures that only someone who has full knowledge
about the original path could recover the exact path from the published graph. We use random
synthetic datasets to experimentally evaluate the performance of the algorithm, including run
time and rate of path recovery using different sizes of random maps.
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The property of convergence is essential to randomised (differentially private) k-means
clustering algorithms. Without convergence guarantees, the differentially private clustering
output would be far from any local optimum of the k-means problem with given inputs.
That is, the clustering quality is severely affected by convergence. To deal with the non-
convergence problem with the existing differentially private k-means clustering algorithms,
Chapter 7 researches the convergence and convergence rates of randomised k-means clus-
tering. We show that, at any iteration, there is an area in each cluster where sampling any
node as the updated centroid with DP can guarantee the convergence. To further ensure the
convergence rate, we update the centroids with a given orientation based on the information
of either past centroid movement or future centroid movement. The real-world experiments
demonstrate that, because of the convergence guarantees, our clustering quality outperforms
existing work.
To conclude, this thesis has developed new methods and techniques for differentially
private data analytics to address the research challenges with differentially private data
aggregation with security guarantees, with privacy budget guarantees of distributed systems,
with differentially private single-path publishing, and with differentially private k-means
clustering. We believe that the outcomes of this work will allow individuals to enjoy
the benefits of data-driven products without concern about the disclosure of their private
information.
8.2 Research Directions for Future Work
Although we provide novel solutions to address the research challenges with existing work
on differentially private data analytics, there remain some possible extensions or research
directions that could form the basis for future work:
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• Differentially private data cleansing. In general, as a part of data aggregation, data
cleansing is often used to remove noise from the original data, which is important
for other data analytics tasks because the insights gained from the raw data heavily
rely on the quality of data cleansing. In contrast, for privacy-preservation purposes, as
discussed in Chapters 2 and 3, it is essential to have DP prior to using the data, that is,
injecting DP noise into the source data. Based on the above, as we must have noise in
the raw data anyway, it would be more efficient to achieve DP when cleansing data,
that is, retain some original noise with the data for DP purposes. Thus far, to the best
of our knowledge, only two works [76, 59] have focused on this topic; however, both
of them simply combine DP with normal data cleansing (i.e., cleansing the raw data
first, then injecting DP noise), which are not efficient enough.
• A unified and unconditional lower bound of the parallel composition of privacy
budget for data aggregation. In Chapter 5, our lower bound for the parallel com-
position of the privacy budget only reflects the overall privacy performance of the
distributed summation/counting function, without any conditions on local sensitivities
of data curators and data aggregators. However, as our result benefits from a special
property of the summation/counting function, it cannot be used on other distributed
aggregation functions directly. Therefore, in the future, we could study the parallel
composition of privacy budget for other distributed aggregation functions, such as
minimum/maximum, mean and variance, so that we would have a unified lower bound
of the parallel composition of the privacy budget that works with unconditional local
sensitivities. In addition, a similar future work extension is also needed for the secure
data aggregation studied in Chapter 4. We will consider extending the existing solution
to more complex aggregation functions, such as classification and clustering.
• Differentially private single path publishing against truly arbitrary auxiliary in-
formation. Existing work in differentially private single-path publishing preserves the
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privacy of vertices against adversaries that are missing information about the vertices
of the path, potentially n 1 out of n vertices of the path. In comparison, our work in
Chapter 6 preserves the privacy about edges against adversaries with information about
m 1 out of m edges of the path. Clearly, both our approach and the state-of-the-art
approaches preserve privacy with DP by making specific assumptions about adver-
saries. Without such assumptions, the performance of privacy preservation would not
be guaranteed. Therefore, it is crucial to discover a differentially private single-path
publishing approach that works against truly arbitrary auxiliary information, including
adversaries with maximum knowledge of vertices, edges, or both vertices and edges.
• Optimal privacy budget allocation for a convergent differentially private k-means
clustering. The privacy budget allocation presented in Chapter 7 follows a bottom-up
strategy. Namely, we allocate the same privacy budget to each iteration, and then
calculate the overall privacy budget according to the total number of iterations until the
algorithm converges. However, if it converges only after a large number of iterations,
the overall privacy budget would be very high. Therefore, it would be preferable
to have a top-down strategy as the allocation scheme, that is, we set a predefined
privacy budget for the whole algorithm to bound the overall privacy performance, and
then split the allocation privacy budget to each iteration. It is essential to study an
optimum privacy budget allocation scheme that ensures every iteration has sufficient
DP noise. The difficulty of such a scheme is that the total number of iterations is
typically unknown when determining the amount of privacy budget to allocate to a
given iteration.
• Extension of using global sensitivity. In this thesis, we use local sensitivity as the
implementation of function sensitivity in both theoretical and experimental analyses,
which helps achieve enhanced data utility. However, local sensitivity limits the signifi-
cance of the results, as it does not consider all possibilities of the private dataset over a
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given distribution. To attain a comprehensive analysis, global sensitivity should be con-
sidered because it covers all possible neighbouring datasets in the context of DP [144].
Therefore, it would be meaningful to extend both the theoretical and experimental
evaluations by using global sensitivity in future studies.
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